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REGIONAL AFFAIRS

Egypt's AL-JUMHURIYAH Attacks Jordanian Stance

Liberal Leader Letter

91AA0016A Cairo AL-JUMHURIYAH in Arabic
23 Sep 90 p 3

[From Ibrahim al-Wardani's "Missiles" Column: "Good Morning, Your Majesty"]

[Text] From the beginning of his rule of the State of Jordan to this day, His Majesty King Husayn has demonstrated that he is the number one supporter of pan-Arabism, the primary advocate of the need to revive it, and the man who has always worked for the unity of the Arab ranks with his ceaseless efforts and his obvious eagerness to rush to settle any disputes arising among the Arab brothers.

He was the first to restore diplomatic relations with Egypt and was the Arab leader most eager for Egypt's resumption of its normal relations with the Arab brothers. He also made efforts to settle the disagreement between Egypt and Syria. King Husayn is the leader who paved the way for creation of the Arab Cooperation Council—Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, and Yemen. He is also the leader who did his utmost to encourage Egypt to help Iraq militarily until Iraq triumphed in the al-Faw battle which changed the course of the Iraq-Iran war. This was accomplished with sound Egyptian military planning, with sophisticated and well-trained Egyptian weapons, and with Egyptian fighters who restored Iraq's esteem and preserved Iraq's dignity.

Until the eruption of the Gulf crisis, King Husayn continued to deal with President Mubarak in an attempt to contain and settle the crisis peacefully in the interest of both Iraq and Kuwait. But he then suddenly changed his position and amazed us with his actions, movements, and reactions which were recorded by the television cameras that reflected his despondent and anxious face which seemed to be totally aligned with Iraq and supportive of Iraqi President Saddam Husayn's invasion of Kuwait. All this was prearranged. King Husayn arrived in the conference hall late and avoided his usual consultations with President Mubarak. Prior to the debate, he even stated that the Palestinians living in Jordan aligned themselves with Iraq and volunteered to serve it. Who are these Palestinians? Are they the survivors of the black September massacre? Are they the widows, the orphans, and the disabled brought to existence by Wasfi al-Tall? It is true that Jordan has (long) common borders with Iraq. Perhaps this puts his majesty in a tight position. He has confined his consultations to Yemen, the PLO, Tunisia, and Iraq only. He has not implemented the Security Council resolutions or the Arab League resolutions. I, along with the ordinary Arab, wonder why King Husayn has put himself in this tight position, why he has swerved from his policy, and why

he has disavowed all international charters, as well as his enthusiasm for Arab unity? Frankly, I don't know. Even he does not know. Perhaps it is a trance in whose snare he has fallen! What a pity for King Husayn's policy which used to be cited as a model policy in the past. Oh, how shameful was that which he suffered from all those characterizations and descriptions which Yasir 'Arafat attributed to him and which were no less ugly than the characterizations attributed to those who sell their patriotism for a cheap price! Has his majesty forgotten what [Abd-al-Karim] Qasim, Iraq's murderer, did to his cousin, King Faysal? The time is not far away. Imagine that the people will turn against these leaders and will do to them what the Romanian people have done to Ceausescu! If his crisis does not kill him, then Saddam Husayn's fate will be death on his people's hands. I advise King Husayn to awaken from a trance which has knocked away his senses. I advise him to return to his patriotism and his Arabism, to support the right, and to withdraw his support for what is false. There is no shame in this because returning to what is right is a virtue. I tell his majesty: Fear not the tyrant because the tyrant is a coward. Who other than a frightened man would resort to intimidation? There is nothing more cowardly than the force of terrorism when faced with the force of the truth.

Rashad Jaballah

Liberal Party Secretary in Misr al-Qadimah

Saudi Oil Cut-Off

91AA0016B Cairo AL-JUMHURIYAH in Arabic
23 Sep 90 p 16

[From Samir Rajab's "Dividing Lines" Column]

[Text] I personally support the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia's decision to stop pumping oil to Jordan unless the latter pays the sums it owes.

Truly, an end must be put to the "age of courtesies" toward those who acknowledge no favor and who keep no "association, no acquaintance," and no sincere fraternal relationship.

In my opinion, what the Saudi Government has done is to complete the series of measures it has adopted against all those who have supported falsehood against right and those who have followed Saddam's path without conventional, legal, or traditional support.

The Saudi Government has already abolished all the exceptions and privileges granted the Palestinians and the Yemenis, and it has decided to treat them like it treats other people. There remain the "Sudanese!"

I don't know why Amman has been surprised by the Saudi decision which demands that Jordan pay \$48 million as the cost of oil already supplied to it and why it says the decision has come without any prior warning?

Did the Jordanians expect the "subsidy" to continue while their government takes a direction opposed to that taken by the entire world, unless we exclude the members of the "well-known" clique that has been carried away by Saddam Husayn's ambitions and that has submitted to his false inducements?

Logic, of course, says no. The Saudi Government is not required to extend an assisting and helping hand to those who are directly or indirectly hostile to it.

There is an opinion which says: But what is the crime of the Jordanian people whose hardship will escalate and whose problems will intensify in light of the Saudi decision to cut off the oil supplies at a time when the Jordanian people are experiencing their darkest and harshest days?

The answer is plain and simple:

Under all circumstances, peoples, regrettably, pay the price of their governments' mistakes. I am confident that the Saudi Government does not at all mean to complicate the Jordanian people's means of living. But it does want to tell these people: "This is what your leadership has done to you, not what you have done to yourselves."

Now, Amman says that it has no recourse but to get its oil needs from Baghdad. This step is, of course, engulfed in perils and is difficult to carry out by virtue of the comprehensive economic embargo imposed on Iraq!

Finally, I tell those who continue to cling to Saddam Husayn's "fraying" ropes: It is a disgrace to you—you who are heads of state and leaders—that your will should be usurped from you in this manner and that the current should sweep you without any awareness on your part of the imminent danger. I want you to examine carefully the words of Major General Hasan al-Naqib, an ex-chief of staff of the Iraqi army, which were published in the latest edition of *AL-MUSLIMUN*. The man who knows Saddam Husayn's true character has said:

"You say that he has destroyed Kuwait. We say: Has he not destroyed Iraq itself?

"You say that he has robbed, raped, and plundered and we say: Has he not robbed, plundered, and raped Iraq?

"Saddam Husayn has divided the Iraqi family to control Iraq. He has divided the Arab family to control the Arabs, and he has divided the single Muslim family to control the Muslims. Here he is now trying to divide the international family to control the world. He is thus approaching the end. For 22 years, we have endured homelessness, destruction, and perdition without ever enjoying our wealth that was immense. There is nothing in Iraq but murder, assassination, and displacement.

"Do you know how many Iraqis have been displaced in the world?

"Two million Iraqis who include the best engineers, doctors, teachers, journalists, politicians, and university

professors and students! Do you know how Saddam rids himself of his regime's leaders when he gets mad at them?

"He brings such leaders' dearest friends to kill them so that they may die twice.

"The image of Iraqi society has, regrettably, been concealed from the Arabs. It is the image of widowed women, of orphaned children, of social problems, of psychological complexes, of repression, of pressure, and of homelessness! All this has been concealed from them"

Remember, O ye who have hearts.

Former Leaders Issue Declaration on Gulf Crisis

90AA0011A Tunis LE MAGHREB in French
24 Aug 90 pp 8-9

[Declaration by important Maghreb personalities: "A Joint Declaration by Ben Bella, Ben Salah, Boumaaza, and Four Other Maghreb Figures"]

[Text] The following declaration is the result of a meeting that took place in Lausanne, Switzerland, last week. It brought together Messrs. Ahmed Ben Bella; Mohamed Basri, the former chief of the People's Army of Morocco; Dr. Mahmud Maghrabi, the former Libyan prime minister and a friend of Colonel al-Qadhafi; Bechir Boumaaza, one of the historic figures of the Algerian FLN [National Liberation Front]; and Ahmed Ben Salah, the leader of the MUP [Movement of Popular unity]; among others. Based on information from another source, we think that these personalities will launch initiatives aimed at a mobilization of Arab people's institutions within the framework of a people's rally that could be held in Tunis. As for this group's philosophy, the declaration of which text we publish here as an exclusive, makes it perfectly clear.

In nearly all Arab countries the popular masses are vehemently demonstrating against the occupation of Islamic Arab territories and positions by an alliance led by the United States.

Some Arab regimes rushed to their allies to ask for this occupation even before an international or Arab decision was made. It hurts every Arab and every Muslim that the state that serves as the protector of the holy places is at the head of the defeatist forces who asked that Arab and Islamic territories be occupied.

As do our popular masses, we feel that this new challenge is historically of the same nature as the tripartite occupation of the Suez Canal with the aim of subjecting the people of Egypt and their liberating revolution to the dictatorship of the big powers. At that time too, the shadow of these reactionary Arab regimes loomed behind that aggression. And today, for good measure, the argument of international law is being advanced in a vain attempt to justify it.

Because of the Gulf crisis and in the face of the danger that threatens the peace and unity of the Arab Nation, we, the signers of this declaration:

1) Denounce, as do our peoples, the duplicity of those who have hysterically hastened to the defense of an international legality that they have incessantly abused and held in contempt for decades, particularly with respect to the international motions and resolutions concerning Palestine and Lebanon. Their contempt for these documents persists to this day and is the chief source of the different tensions existing throughout the eastern part of the Arab world.

2) We are of the opinion that the moral credibility of the United States, which today presents itself as the armed defender of international law, is nil. To convince ourselves of this, it suffices to recall the numerous military interventions and the destruction it has caused in different countries, like Vietnam, Nicaragua, our sister nations of Tunisia and Libya, or even in Grenada, Panama, and Colombia.

3) We are of the opinion that the Arab regimes that are collaborating with the foreign occupation forces against peace and Islamic brotherhood in the very heart of Muslim lands have never ceased to be a source of tension on the Arab scene.

Their leaders' political, economic, and financial behavior has long constituted a factor in the weakening and impoverishment of those Arab peoples and countries that want to develop their economies, while these privileged individuals and their foreign allies have continued to amass colossal fortunes.

These regimes are the allies of all those forces that are opposed to Arab unity: the Western powers that refuse to acknowledge the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and the rights of the Lebanese people to peace, freedom, and security, defying international law when it is in keeping with their interests.

4) In view of the above-cited points and in the face of the constant deterioration of the situation in the region, it seems to us that the latest Iraqi proposals for a global solution to all the problems that are tearing the region apart are likely to initiate a real peace process.

So, despite the dangers that lie in wait for it, Iraq has taken it upon itself to raise these problems in their full magnitude and with all their implications. In doing so, Iraq is offering the Arab masses a historic opportunity to set in motion a redeployment of the Arab national movement and to provide the peoples of the region's struggle for emancipation with the united foundation that has up to now been seriously damaged by the discords maintained by foreign powers.

It is in fact through this powerful people's movement that action may also be undertaken aimed at promoting democracy, justice, and prosperity, all conditions likely

to strengthen the inviolability and security of those Arab and Islamic territories for which Iraq has been willing to make so many sacrifices.

5) We call on Arab leaders to meet again and to do so as quickly as possible in order to respond to the will of the people and to study the serious problem represented by the necessity of a speedy withdrawal of all foreign forces from Arab and Islamic territories.

We also call on them to reconsider the notion of Arab national security based on a constitutional, people's organization for Arab unity. Relations among all Arab countries must be reformulated by integrating into them the notions of real democracy and respect for human rights in the Arab world, freedom within the framework of this unity and this democracy. And last, we call on them to assign top priority to deciding on those ways and means likely to compel respect for international law through the application of international motions and resolutions on Palestine and Lebanon.

At the same time, we call on all political and popular forces to keep up the pressure to achieve this purpose. In this way we will succeed in convincing the aggressor nations that they will never have peace unless this peace benefits everyone and is a just peace. We call on these forces to jointly organize themselves, far from artificial dissensions, so that Arab nationalism and Islam unfailingly combine forces in the struggle in the hope of supporting the Palestinian people's intifadah until independence is achieved.

For this merger to work, current differences will have to be transcended in the noblest possible way. Iraq and Iran, which have just resumed their dialogue for the purpose of putting an end to their differences, are blazing the trail to be followed.

Our appeal is to the popular forces to organize themselves specifically for these objectives and to release the ways and means for vast popular rallies that will transcend the institutions that are traditionally reserved to the people. They will in this way favor cooperation and coordination of efforts throughout the Arab and Islamic world, the emergence of common attitudes, and sustained military action. In this way our Arab fatherland and our Muslim countries will see the conditions for their development restored in terms of independence, real democracy, and unity that will guarantee them security and prosperity.

In short, we proclaim our determination to bring together all the conditions necessary for holding a people's congress that will constitute the point of departure for new zeal to realize these objectives.

Ahmed Ben Bella, former president of the Algerian Republic

Mahmud Maghrabi, former prime minister of Libya

Mohamed Basri, former resistance leader of the Army of Liberation in Morocco

Bechir Boumaaza, former Algerian minister of economy
Ahmed Ben Salah, former Tunisian minister of economy

Abderrahmane Youssefi, secretary general of the Arab
Lawyers Union

Moncef Chabbi, Tunisian historian

Reaction to Egyptian Anti-PLO Campaign

90AE0364A Paris AL-YAWM AL-SABI' in Arabic
17 Sep 90 pp 16-18

[Article by Bilal al-Hasan: "Egyptian Media Launch Racist Attack Against Palestinian People"]

[Text] What is happening in the world of the Egyptian press? For weeks the information media in Cairo have been launching a concentrated campaign to defend the American presence in the Gulf and condemn anyone who opposes it. While the right to present an opinion is guaranteed, the strange thing is that this campaign is assuming racist dimensions that incite against the Palestinians—leadership, people, and cause.

Throughout an entire month the Egyptian media launched an organized, deliberate attack aimed at defending the Egyptian Government's position in the Gulf crisis.

The Egyptian media campaign assumed many dimensions. Some of these fall under the category of a purely political position, which is completely the right of Egypt and the Egyptian media, however much others may differ with the position. But a fundamental part of the attack goes beyond political positions and the right to disagree on political positions, to flow in suspicious, unpatriotic directions.

If Egypt and the Egyptian media take a stand against the Iraqi army's entry into Kuwait and against Iraq's decision to annex Kuwait, that is what we mean by the right to a political position and the right to political disagreement.

If Egypt disagrees with other Arab countries about the political tactics required to confront the Kuwait issue, that is also what we mean by the right to a political position and the right to political disagreement.

However, when this political and informational campaign turns toward conscious action to sabotage any Arab solution of the crisis, that is what we consider a departure from the right to independent political action.

When the goal of the Egyptian media becomes justifying calling on American armies to besiege and destroy Iraq as an ideal means to solve the Kuwait problem, that is what we consider a departure from the patriotic framework in treating Arab problems.

When the goal of the Egyptian media becomes the vilification of the Palestinian people and inciting the entire Egyptian people against the entire Palestinian

people, that is what we consider a racist attack, with all the low meanings that the word "racist" carries.

Lest we be charged with exaggeration or making false accusations, we will present some samples of the Egyptian media campaign with the facts about them in chronological order.

Promoting the Necessity for American Intervention

On 2 August 1990, the Iraqi Army entered the territory of Kuwait. Only four days later, while talk of an Arab move for mediation was at a peak, Anis Mansur wrote in the semiofficial Cairo newspaper AL-AHRAM, saying:

[Question] What do the Arabs do whenever Arab land is occupied?

[Answer] Condemnations and demonstrations; then we ask America and the United Nations to do something.

[Question] What can the Arab heads of state do?

[Answer] As you see: hem and haw and point fingers, and then look to America to do something.

[Question] And the solution, if any?

[Answer] Let us all turn to the White House, which can help on a dark day.

Was Anis Mansur speaking for himself, or was he the voice of his master?

Positions at Arab Summit Conference Misrepresented

On 9 August 1990, a week after the situation exploded between Iraq and Kuwait, an Arab summit convened in Cairo. It postponed its meeting for one day for consultation. On 10 August 1990, it issued a resolution sending Arab forces to the Gulf. Twelve countries voted for the resolution; eight opposed it, either rejecting it, abstaining, or having reservations. This resolution wrecked all possible opportunities and all proposed suggestions for finding a formula for Arab mediation between Iraq and Kuwait. The resolution was passed after American forces had begun arriving in the Gulf. It represented an official Arab cover at the summit level for the presence of American forces on Arab soil.

However, Ibrahim Nafi', editor in chief of AL-AHRAM, wrote a long article entitled, "Hidden Facts About the Arab Summit." In it he defended the position of President Husni Mubarak, saying: "President Mubarak thought that if he did not take the initiative and respond with Arab intervention, the other alternative would be immediate foreign intervention." But did President Husni Mubarak's position prevent foreign intervention? That is a question that Ibrahim Nafi' does not answer.

When Ibrahim Nafi' tries to enlist objectivity as justification for President Husni Mubarak's policies, he turns to listing the facts. He states them himself as follows:

"The first tendency was led by Iraq, the PLO, and Yemen. It called for forming a delegation headed by President Husni Mubarak to go to Baghdad before the summit's resolutions were issued to consult with Iraqi President Saddam Husayn. Their argument in this was that Iraq's President Saddam Husayn had informed them that he was ready to discuss all issues."

Is there any error in this position? Does it lean toward the Iraqi side and against Kuwait? Does it defend the Iraqi Army's entry into Kuwait? Nevertheless, the proposal was rejected. President Husni Mubarak in particular rejected it. He refused even to bring it to a vote by the Arab summit.

Ibrahim Nafi' continues his recounting of the "objective" facts, saying:

"The second tendency was led by the Libyan Jamahiriyah and Algeria. Although they condemned the Iraqi attack, they thought that we should not give legitimacy to foreign forces to enter Arab land and launch a war against Iraq."

Is there any error in this position? It is a position that agrees with the Egyptian position in condemning the Iraqi attack on Kuwait, but it rejects giving legitimacy to the presence of foreign forces. President Husni Mubarak rejected this position, too, and called on the Arab summit to vote on the resolution that he had already prepared in advance.

These facts that Ibrahim Nafi' himself relates clearly reveal that the possibility of finding an Arab solution existed at the Cairo summit conference. However, President Husni Mubarak's method of managing the conference pushed it toward what was being asked of him—finding a cover for the American military presence—notwithstanding the strange inference by AL-AHRAM's editor in chief, Ibrahim Nafi', that "President Mubarak thought that if he did not take the initiative and respond with Arab intervention, the other alternative would be immediate foreign intervention."

Justifying Calling on American Forces

The Egyptian media stressed that calling on American forces was a matter of necessity. Strangely, pens friendly to the regime and pens of the opposition united around this idea.

The leftist writer Ibrahim Sa'd-al-Din wrote on 19 August 1990 in the opposition newspaper AL-AHALI, the mouthpiece of the National Progressive Unionist Grouping Party [NPUG], as follows:

"One must acknowledge that the Arab nation does not by itself have the ability to force Iraq to abandon the policy of aggression and annexation and that international solidarity will be necessary to dislodge the aggressor from the territory of Kuwait. Iraq's aggressive behavior is what has led to the influx of imperialistic forces into the region."

The Wafdist right agreed with this proposition. Jamal Badawi wrote in the newspaper AL-WAFD on 26 August 1990 as follows:

"What are those who raised a clamor about the foreign presence in the Gulf going to do? Do they have the ability to move positively to stop the disaster and prevent an explosion, or is their ability limited to shouting and screaming to defame the Gulf states and accuse them of being lackeys of the West? Those who raise the slogans of patriotism and nationalism know the real state of affairs in the Arab world; so how are Kuwait and its neighbors to be blamed if they seek security outside the Arab family? They need merely explain to us how the Kuwaiti problem can be ended within the framework of an Arab solution. How would the solution take place? What would its terms and principles be? How would it be implemented?"

Good! Let us take Jamal Badawi's advice. Let us haul down the slogans of patriotism and nationalism. That's the solution for the problems of the Arab homeland!

Racist Attack Against the Palestinian People

Starting on 23 August 1990, the Egyptian media campaign took another turn and focused on the Palestinians and the Palestinian political position. The campaign was handled in a manner that went beyond the demands of a political disagreement. Claims were made and adjectives applied that came very close to being racist attacks. The style of the campaign reveals that it has ends that transcend the explosive situation in the Gulf, ends related to Egypt's future position on the Palestinian issue and the PLO. It is not unlikely that this campaign is the prologue to the emergence of a new call for a change in PLO leadership, similar to what happened in 1983, when Syria engineered a Palestinian split, called for 'Arafat's dismissal, and tried to gain control of Palestinian political decisionmaking. Given America's new hegemony over the Gulf region and growing Egyptian-American cooperation, eyes are probably turning toward an attempt to create a Palestinian situation that conforms to America's demands in dealing with the Palestinian issue. It is not unlikely that several Arab players will cooperate in taking a stand against the PLO for not blessing the American presence in the Arab region.

Sa'id 'Abd-al-Khaliq of the newspaper AL-WAFD began this campaign by coming out in principle against the Palestinian cause, saying:

"The crises, problems, and difficulties from which we suffer can be traced from beginning to end to the so-called Palestinian issue." (Notice the expression "so-called.") "We entered four wars because of the Palestinian issue. Egyptian blood flowed for the Palestinian issue. Egyptians lived in graveyards because of the Palestinian issue. Sewers overflowed in the streets against the Palestinian issue. We were more concerned about keeping the Palestinian issue at the center of attention than were those responsible for the issue, who sold out everything from land to principles. The time has

come for us to reassess our accounts, set things right, and turn our backs to the sellers of slogans and principles, the professional promoters of the so-called Palestinian issue."

No one can doubt the sacrifices of the Egyptian people and the Egyptian Army for the Palestinian cause. However, instead of being proud of these sacrifices, he has imagined that they are the source of all Egypt's suffering—as if Egypt's troubles ceased after the Camp David agreements! Instead of making Egyptian sacrifices a way to cohesion between the Egyptian and Palestinian people, these pens use them to create a kind of irreconcilable hostility between the two peoples. The logical end of the position is to call for us "to turn our backs" to the cause and those concerned with it. That is the main point.

On the same day, 23 August 1990, Samir Rajab wrote in the semiofficial newspaper AL-JUMHURIYAH, concentrating the attack on Chairman Yasir 'Arafat, as follows:

"Yasir 'Arafat has chosen to stand beside the aggressor." (No position had been issued by Yasir 'Arafat announcing that he was standing beside Iraq against Kuwait.) "People are saying that Yasir 'Arafat has collected the price of this position of his from Saddam Husayn on the personal and public level. Yasir 'Arafat—may God forgive him—has by his support for aggression against territory and people caused the words 'Palestinian cause' to be blotted out from the records of the present and the future."

On 1 September 1990, Samir Rajab wrote again, this time in the newspaper AL-MASA'. He went beyond attacking Yasir 'Arafat and attacked the Palestinian people, inciting the Egyptian people against them, and using the same positions, phrases, and words that racists use in their attacks. He said:

"As for the Jordanians and the Palestinians with them, throughout their lives they have been resentful of Egyptians. Their hearts overflow with resentment against them. Palestinians, who form a large proportion of the Jordanian citizenry, know in their hearts that Egyptians are superior to them in talent, ability, and experience in many fields of life. Therefore, they wait for any opportunity to get even with them and attack them."

Continuing his racist attack against Palestinians in general, Samir Rajab went on to say:

"We must have it out with those Palestinians living in Egypt who have drunk from the springs of Egypt's prosperity until they have leaped into the world of millionaires because of Egyptian generosity and easygoingness."

Samir Rajab went so far as to imagine war breaking out between the Egyptians and Palestinians everywhere:

"Throughout the past years, the Palestinians have been the epitome of stiffness and ingratitude. They have

declared war on our countrymen in Iraq, Jordan, or Kuwait. They have plotted conspiracies against them, so that the field might become clear for themselves. When the real hour of testing came, they attacked them and stole their money and property. They must therefore have no place among the ranks of this people, who possess purity, integrity, and sincerity of spirit."

What is racism if not this position, these words, and these terms? But Egyptian journalists defend all this meanness and call it "freedom of opinion." Once there existed in Egypt a law on insults. Al-Sadat martialed it against the opponents of his policy. The infamous law of insults is the only thing suitable for dealing with such positions.

The meanness does not stop with Samir Rajab's racist positions; it goes on to defend the 1982 Israeli attack on Lebanon and justify the Sabra and Shatila massacres. Anis Mansur undertook this dirty job in AL-AHRAM on 26 August 1990. He said:

"Three men have harmed the Palestinian people: Yasir 'Arafat, Yasir 'Arafat, and Abu-'Ammar [Yasir 'Arafat]. Abu-'Ammar's position on Lebanon was what enticed a murderer like Sharon to bring down Sabra and Shatila on their heads and force the Palestinian forces to withdraw. Abu-'Ammar recently decided to stand on the side of Iraq, sacrificing the money of Saudi Arabia and all the Gulf emirates." (The charge against 'Arafat used to be that he stood on the side of whoever paid!) "The Palestinian people therefore have only one thing they can do: sacrifice Abu-'Ammar soon."

We might call Anis Mansur an Israeli, a Zionist, and an American; but we cannot do so, because Anis Mansur is proud of all these adjectives!

The venerable writer Musa Sabri also participated in the campaign. On 29 August 1990, he wrote in the magazine AKHIR SA'AH denying Yasir 'Arafat's efforts toward Arab mediation and an Arab solution and inciting Egyptians against the Palestinians. He said:

"What was this gigantic effort that Yasir 'Arafat made to spoil the summit conference? Why, Mr. PLO Chairman? You took the role of dove of peace." (Was this a mistake?) "You kept traveling from Tunisia to Libya to Egypt to Iraq and back again. You said you were carrying a peace initiative, but it became clear that everything you asserted was merely pottering about. You had no planned initiative or anything of the sort. When the time came for seriousness and the summit conference convened, you were one of those enthusiastic for the attack on Kuwait." (Officially, that did not happen.)

Then with Musa Sabri we get to the real goal of this attack—the goal of breaking Egypt's relations with the PLO, which is America's desired goal. He said:

"I have read that 'Arafat wants to visit Egypt. How I wish we would send him someone to tell him that he has become an unwelcome guest and that patience has limits!"

Then the racist stands against the Palestinian people begin to show themselves, as Musa Sabri says:

"How miserable is the lot of Egyptians working in the Arab countries! We all know that they get the lowest wages and that the Palestinians in all the Gulf countries mistreat them, cut off their wages, and try to take the bread out of their mouths."

Anyone who reads such verbiage would think that the Palestinians rule Jordan, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, the UAE [United Arab Emirates], Kuwait, Bahrain, and Qatar, so that they can control and persecute Egyptians everywhere. Is there an Arab who can believe this?

We can keep quoting a stream of such positions, all of which started at a single time, 23 August 1990. But they all repeat and resemble each other—vilifying the Palestinians, inciting the Egyptian people against the Palestinian people, and calling for getting rid of the PLO leadership.

The question that must be asked is, Why this campaign? Why is it taking this provocative form? Why does it go beyond political disagreement to accuse and condemn the Palestinian people? Why does it go beyond political disagreement to call for a break with the PLO leadership in particular, at a time when there is political disagreement on the Gulf situation between Egypt and eight Arab states? The Egyptian press has not called for a break with them!

The goal seems to be the same as the American one—that of keeping the PLO out of the arena of political decisionmaking, so as to clear the air for implementing the American-Israeli solution to the Palestinian problem.

In the face of this goal that the Egyptian media campaign clearly reveals, we need only set down two facts:

Fact number one: Countries other than Egypt have in the past tried to dominate independent Palestinian national decisionmaking and have failed. Under Yasir 'Arafat's leadership, the PLO has succeeded in preserving its independence under extraordinarily difficult circumstances, those of the exodus from Lebanon. It thereby drew everyone's admiration, including that of the Egyptians themselves.

Fact number two: The relation between the Palestinian people and their leaders is too strong and firm to be influenced by media attacks based on racist positions that are more of an insult to the Egyptian people than to the Palestinians.

What is sad about all this is that the Egyptian press, a press with deeply rooted traditions, should allow such meanness to be published in its pages.

What is distressing about all this is that an influential editor in -chief should allow these articles to be published in his newspaper.

This is a question related to respect for the profession and nothing else.

It is a question related to concern for the unstained professional history of the editor in chief and nothing else.

If the profession becomes contemptible to its practitioners, then everything becomes contemptible.

[Box, p 17]

Objective Egyptian Writings

In the face of the flood of racist and irresponsible writings in the Egyptian newspapers, a very small space was left for articles that tried to think objectively. We review a few of them here, despite the fact that their voice was lost in the din of the demagogic media campaign.

Dr. 'Arif al-Dasuqi—AL-WAFD newspaper

"Have the Western fleets come to the Arabian Gulf in order to depart, or have they come to stay in its warm waters and by its beloved oil? They will certainly not depart so easily. They have come to stay to the last drop of oil, as long as the Gulf countries defray the costs, especially given the American budget deficit, which this operation will mitigate by about \$6 billion a year. So it is of no importance whether Iraqi forces leave Kuwait or stay; what is important is that the situation remain hot, so as to justify having the forces and fleets stay in the Gulf."

Dr. Husam 'Isa—AL-MUSAWWAR

"There is a feeling of humiliation in the Arab nation vis-a-vis a West that bruises continually. It is present in the form of Israel, which strikes and occupies Arab land every day. This feeling has caused the Arab scene to become divided about an issue on which I never imagined it would become divided. Why is the Arab scene becoming divided on a subsidiary issue if not for the basic problem, the constant Western bruising and the constant feeling of humiliation embodied in Israel?"

"When President Mubarak said, 'The Egyptian grass roots are putting pressure on me, and I have my own interests,' he was saying something true. The same thing has happened with Yasir 'Arafat: the intifadah has taken a stand on the side of Saddam Husayn."

Dr. Muhammad al-Sayyid Sa'id—AL-AHRAM AL-DUWALI

"The main fault with this course is that it is being taken in the absence of the Arabs, and thus in the absence of their interests. The main international force leading this course—the United States—may not hesitate to escalate

the situation into a military clash. If such a clash happens, there is no doubt that the United States will not be satisfied with forcing Iraq to withdraw. It will probably go on to cause fundamental political changes in the Gulf region. These will weaken not only the security of Iraq and the Gulf, but Arab security in all its aspects."

PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS

Open Letter Criticizes PLO Policies

91AE0005A London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic
1 Oct 90 p 17

[Article by Faysal Abu-Khadrah: "Open Letter to the PLO"]

[Text] The PLO may perhaps become the biggest loser in the Gulf crisis, and the Palestinian people will also be hurt greatly. As for Saudi Arabia, it will be able to surmount this test to its moderate political principles and love of peace and to its insistence on rejecting the politics of force and fait accompli. As for Kuwait, its ordeal will not go on for ever; it will inevitably be restored to its owners, and the Kuwaiti people will be gratified by the extraordinary support that the Arabs and the entire world have bestowed on them. Iraq will soon discover that force solves no problem. Neither Iraq nor any other state can instantly become Kuwait and erase the existence of a state from the face of the earth. Sooner or later Iraq will realize that it has made enormous mistakes that the Arabs never expected it to make concerning itself, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Palestine. Iraq's mistake concerning itself was that it unjustifiably opened the way to placing the Iraqi people and their future—and even their past—under severe threat of an explosion of the situation and the destruction of Iraq's military and economic structure. If war breaks out, Iraq will not be able to win against the United States and 20 Western and Arab countries amassing hundreds of thousands of troops in the Gulf. Iraq's mistake concerning Kuwait was that it rushed to get even with a small brother country that had never been remiss toward Iraq. Iraq repaid Kuwait's friendship with hatred and displaced Kuwait's people—people who had always supported Iraq, its causes, and Arab causes, and who had been the most prominent defenders of these causes in international and Arab gatherings.

Iraq made the mistake of forcing Saudi Arabia to turn for help to what Saudi Arabia itself had warned against and feared. While Saudi Arabia was taking Iraq's promise as an oath and covenant, it became evident that Iraq's trustworthiness regarding its oaths was not genuine. So Saudi Arabia hurried to arrange its own defense in order not to become Iraq's second, or even its first victim.

Regarding Palestine, Iraq made the mistake of leaving the Palestinian problem in limbo. Instead of rallying its armies behind the bulwark of the PLO, it rallied them in a confrontation with Kuwait. It thereby jeopardized the PLO's safety if war breaks out between Iraq and the

West, inasmuch as Palestine will find no Iraqi force able to wrest back the right that Israel has usurped by brute force. I say this to show what an enormous mistake the PLO made when without the full support of the Palestinian people it took sides against Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, the Arabs, and all peace- and justice-loving countries of the world. The PLO was content to increase the Arab split, rather than being the most effective mechanism for pressing rights, reconciling points of view, and eliminating everything that tends to disturb Arab solidarity, which ought to be the most effective weapon in the hands of the PLO.

Why, we ask, does the PLO become involved in every matter great or small? Why does it side now with this group and now with that, and then quarrel again with those who were on its side? This has been going on for at least 25 years. Why does the PLO consider itself a state like other states, with its own land, borders, army, and regime? Is it so that it can allow itself to oppose one side and favor another, at a time when the PLO ought to be a symbol of the loyalty and sincerity of the Palestinian people, who live on the soil of the Arab states, not on the soil of the Palestinian state? The PLO must be responsible for respecting the Palestinians and the countries in which they live, so that they do not violate the laws of these countries or interfere in their affairs. In the end, the Palestinians are strangers; and strangers must be polite, so that others will be polite to them.

Who is the responsible Palestinian who is issuing orders to incite the Palestinian people against each other and to kindle a conflagration between the Palestinians and the Arabs? As a result, not a year has passed without the Palestinian revolution's embarking on exhausting battles outside Palestinian territory. It has thereby lost its credibility among the Arabs and put itself outside the circle of liberation and the requisite means of liberation. We have not seen five months go by in succession from 1965 to the present without a Palestinian-Palestinian or Palestinian-Arab battle. Before the 1967 war, the PLO was not espousing the slogan of liberating Palestinian land from the usurping enemy, and that alone, but was at the same time raising slogans about liberating the Arab people from their various regimes. We would hear, read, and see how one leader or another from the ranks of the Palestinian revolution would butt in and raise the slogan of liberating Amman before liberating Jerusalem or that the way to Jerusalem passed through Beirut, Damascus, Juniyah, or Cairo, etc.—merely so that the Palestinian leader could confuse his responsibility as a revolutionary with his zeal as a daredevil.

We have seen with our own eyes how great a disaster befell the Palestinians when the [Palestinian] revolution decided to antagonize Jordan in 1970—how some were about to proclaim a republic, and how they sustained a terrible defeat and irreparable losses.

Then we witnessed the PLO's war against Lebanon. We heard and read how some organizations proclaimed explicitly that they would bring Beirut down in ruins on

the heads of its owners and of the Palestinians together. When the Lebanese-Palestinian war ended, the Palestinians had lost a great deal, the Lebanese had lost a great deal, and the Arabs had lost their trust in the revolution and the revolutionaries. We saw the Arabs of the PLO against Syria, Iraq, and Libya; then we saw reconciliations: Palestinian-Syrian, Palestinian-Iraqi, and Palestinian-Libyan. We witnessed a period of misunderstanding and of exhausting propaganda war between the PLO and Cairo and between the PLO and Damascus. Then we witnessed periods of deteriorating relations between the PLO and others. Palestinians kept asking:

For whose benefit does the PLO embark on these fights with the Arabs?

Who will devote himself to liberating Palestine? When and from where? From which Arab country should the liberation of Jerusalem be launched? Does the PLO still have a single Arab capital to which it can affirm its continued trustworthiness and loyalty?

For whose benefit did the PLO side with Iraq in its attack on Kuwait and the resulting situation?

What did Kuwait do to the PLO and Palestinians for the PLO to take this position toward Kuwait?

What wrong did Saudi Arabia do for the PLO to take this position toward it?

What will the tens of thousands of Palestinians say who live, work, and shelter themselves in Saudi Arabia and enjoy its hospitality and generosity, if someone asks them the following simple question:

Why are you repaying Saudi Arabia in this way?

Does the PLO think that Iraq would have dropped a chemical bomb on it, if it had announced its neutrality in the Gulf crisis and had tried to reconcile the sides, instead of standing with one against the other?

How can the PLO allow itself to take such a position on a question involving the annexation of land by force?

Isn't the PLO based originally on the principle of rejecting the annexation of land by force?

Isn't Palestine Palestinian land that Israel annexed, annexing along with it other Arab lands by arms?

How can the PLO explain to us its siding with one party, Iraq, and rejecting Security Council resolutions and United Nations decisions?

Isn't the Palestinian revolution the world's loudest voice deploring the injustice that has befallen the Palestinian people from Israel's rejection of United Nations resolutions?

Isn't the Palestinian problem basically a problem of international resolutions not adhered to by Israel, so that the Palestinian people were displaced and suffered all sorts of pain and deprivation?

What are the justifications—surely the Palestinian revolution must have them—for standing against all the Arabs in a crisis that was utterly remote from it and in which it should not have interfered?

Did Iraq ask the PLO to support its position?

Did the PLO have to destroy all the sympathy and convictions it had built up in the West about itself and its cause?

What will the PLO say to Washington? It had assured Washington that it would respect the norms of the international community, so that this community might stand on its side. Suddenly now, the PLO is standing with the side that rejects United Nations resolutions. It would seem to be telling Washington that it no longer accepts international resolutions.

What will the PLO say to the French, English, Italians, Japanese, Germans, and Soviets to justify its siding with Iraq, which has rejected all international constitutions, laws, and resolutions?

What is pushing us toward a dark tunnel is the fact that we no longer see new blood in the veins of the PLO. Our greatest fear is that the PLO will collapse into a political and nationalistic bureaucracy and will become like a professor who recites his lecture to the students, while the students divert themselves with other things.

Because we love the PLO, we are worried about its falling into political and military adventurism and being forced to embark on an unrewarding fight with other parties. A day or so ago we heard third-or fourth-rank PLO people trying with unintelligent and careless statements to set matters right again with Saudi Arabia. The fact of the matter, if these people can absorb the reality from what has happened, is that Saudi Arabia does not need the PLO's help. It hoped that the PLO would take a neutral stand in the Gulf crisis. However, if the PLO had to become involved, it should have stood beside Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, not against them.

As we say this, it hurts us not to be able to remain silent any longer, just as we can no longer shout. What we need now is new blood in the PLO and new supports that bring the Palestinians closer to the Arabs, not move them farther away. When one strips one's body bare of clothes, one comes down with a cold, and sometimes even more!

ALGERIA

PRA President on Party, Electoral Politics

90AA0008A *Algiers ALGERIE ACTUALITE in French*
23 Aug 90 pp 10-11

[Interview with Nouredine Boukrouh, president of the Algerian Renewal Party (PRA) by Mohamed Balhi; date and place not given; first paragraph is ALGERIE ACTUALITE introduction]

[Text] Born in 1950, Nouredine Boukrouh is the president of the PRA [Algerian Renewal Party] and the

author of a series of articles that have touched off a number of controversies. Here he speaks about Chadli, Hamrouche, the Iranian experience, and trick lasers. Khechinism and maternalistic socialism.... He rejects the charge that he is an invention of the power structure. Other interviews with the political figures making the news will appear in our upcoming editions, in preparation for the legislative elections.

[Balhi] What do the next elections hold in store?

[Boukrouh] What happened on 12 June has been useful in many ways. First, it has served to eliminate the FLN [National Liberation Front]; second, it has tested the FIS [Islamic Salvation Front] in victory; third, it has outlined the new political configuration that could result from the gesture of a massive vote for the FIS. Use of the ballot as a protest vote will not enter into the picture next time, and for the first time, we will see voting by preference. Thus we are confident that Algerians will realize the lesson to be learned, provided of course that the system, the State, abides by the rules and gives us the means to reach out to the Algerian people, to communicate with them.

[Balhi] Speaking of the State, political parties have accused the interior minister of facilitating the FIS victory and yet, the interior minister retained his seat in the new government. What do you think of this?

[Boukrouh] We expressed our view in a communique published by EL MASSA, EL MOUDJAHID and HORIZONS censured the passage concerning the ministry of the interior. In the communique, we said that we do not understand why no change was made at the ministry of the interior in the recent government reshuffle. The ministry of the interior did not do its job. On election day, we had many problems with many of the walis. We believed that a change was needed at the ministry of the interior, that someone more resolute should be appointed, someone better able to oversee an electoral period that will decide the fate of the country. We do not understand why the ministry of the interior came out of the recent reshuffle unchanged—and we have made our surprise known to Mr. Hamrouche.

The themes of 5 October were clear: economic and political freedoms, the regime, misused funds, the hogra, etc. Rather than to oppose the FIS, the trick was to surpass the FIS. That is what we wanted to do: to place ourselves above the FIS, not in opposition to it; to say to the FIS, "you are a memory, whereas we are a plan; you look to the past, whereas we look to the future." The FIS had to be challenged on the basis of Islam. Let us put ourselves in the shoes of someone looking to get out of the FIS. Where would he go? He can not join the RCD [Rally for Culture and Democracy]. The advantage of what distinguishes us from the other parties is that we can see things coming. The others fall into confusion and lose sight of things. In the middle of August, they brought

out the Forum for Democracy.... All ideas of alliances and common platforms failed—Adjerid, PSL [Social Liberal Party], the Democrats, the Democratic Conference.... It is not Mr. Bentobal who is going to save Algeria today! Our people have good sense. You cannot hoodwink the Algerians.

[Balhi] In any case, the FIS is enjoying a state of grace.

[Boukrouh] We must be done with FLN populism and now, with FIS populism. There is a danger. With its policy, the FIS may want to abolish society sooner than recognize its error, just as Khomeyni did. Khomeyni did not want to stop the shooting even after thousands had died.... That is Khechinism. That was Khomeyni's crime! At the start of the Iranian revolution, there was freedom. At the university, you could see portraits of Marx and Lenin as well as portraits of the martyrs of the revolution. It was surprising. It was seeing some demonstrators carry portraits of Marx while others held up their martyrs that surprised me when I visited there. An enormous gap.

There was nothing left of the State, no police, no security forces—all of that was gone! There was only the people, that was it. But there was not the anarchy we would have had here. They are a disciplined people. It must be remembered that they are Aryans. The Iranians are the true Aryans. Life is run from the mosques. When you get married, you go to the mosque. But in this totally Islamic climate, you could still see small groups brandishing portraits of Marx.... It was mind-boggling! If it had been Algeria, there would have been bloodshed. The Marxist-Leninist cells would have been assassinated....

[Balhi] Only at the start! Later, the revolution was taken over by the mullahs and assassinations followed....

[Boukrouh] All these elements told you that the revolution was about to explode...the Mojahedin-e Khalq who occupied an entire building, the armored vehicles surrounding it. The clash was coming. The mujahidin khalq were like the PAGS [Socialist Vanguard Party] who wear the hijab [Islamic dress code for women].

[Balhi] The PRA was not present at King Hassan II's meeting with the Algerian opposition parties at the summit of the UMA [Arab Maghreb Union]. Why not? Didn't the PRA exist? Was there a quota?

[Boukrouh] You will have to put that question to the Algerian president's office. We do not know the answer and can only speculate as to why. We, ourselves, learned about it through the media, on evening television. It was another surprise for us. That is not the first time a thing like this has happened. We were in no way contacted or informed. We can only speculate, like the public. People are saying the initiative was the King's, that he asked to meet primarily with one political party and that the president's staff foisted other parties on him into the bargain. Whether the PRA was not invited because of its small size, I do not know. We do not think of ourselves as less important than the other parties although we are

smaller in numerical terms than one or two parties, but no more than that. We have thought of sending a letter or making a demand for an explanation to the president's office, to the chief of staff's office, to ask the president's chief of staff first to inform us as to how the operation was organized and second, to make it a habit to inform the public fully on operations that involve the responsibility of the presidency.

[Balhi] On the subject of the recent reshuffle—prior to that, you mentioned “evasiveness” on the part of Chadli.

[Boukrouh] Things seem much more clear. More elements have emerged. One can clearly see president's and the government's new strategy taking shape. The head of government himself is an extension of the president's line, an extension of the exercise and practice of the presidential policy line. We view this latest ministerial reshuffle not as a minor shift made in the middle of the quiet season to guide the transition up to the election of a new national assembly, but as the emergence of a strategy aimed at preparing the field for a political force led by the president and by reformers in the hope of obtaining representation in the next national assembly. It was not done to realign positions, but to stake out a position in the new political future. That is now clear. We are convinced by this strategy now in place that the head of state wants to distance himself from everything reminiscent of the FLN's failure, of the men of the old regime and of 5 October 1988. The head of state is setting himself apart. He went as far as to fire people very close to him, including family members. If he has removed them from power, it is to rebuild a certain political credibility, to prove his will to raise the moral standards of public life. Thus, we expect to see this factor, this strategy develop into an active factor on the political scene.

[Balhi] You are said to be close to the president and opposed to Hamrouche. Where is the opposition?

[Boukrouh] We have never supported the president or Hamrouche. To us, Hamrouche is the president. We were created on a principle of opposition as simple as this: The president of the republic is at the center of this system, the pivot of this system. From the time he assumed the presidency until the past few days in any case, this is the first time that the president had embarked on radical changes. Until now, he had only tacked back and forth, stalling for time, moving one pawn on the game board only to replace it by another. It is the first time he has committed himself to an in-depth undertaking. To us in the PRA, so that you know where we stand, Hamrouche is synonymous with Chadli and he plans to continue Chadli's work in the future. That is the meaning of the recent decisions by the president and the prime minister. We sense that there is a true shift, a true turning point. And that is not the work of a man who is prepared to leave. Those are the initiatives of someone who has made up his mind to stay, either as Chadli himself or with Hamrouche as his avatar.

[Balhi] You once said that Hamrouche was a phenomenon of the past! A vestige of Chadli and Boumediene.

[Boukrouh] No! I did not say that exactly. I said several times that in his speeches, in expression of political views, Hamrouche calls to mind both Chadli and Boumediene. Reminiscent of Boumediene in expression, he pledged to make an announcement of economic intentions and he announced an entire program that is an outright free-market program, an economic program based on a return to the economic mechanisms in effect around the rest of the world, particularly in the “free-market” countries. Only, what he has undertaken at the economic level is not compatible with his expressed views. It does not reflect them; on the contrary, it contradicts them. He tries to soften things; he continues at times to talk like a populist as he did in Oran, Arzew, and in Hassi Messaoud at the time. But Hamrouche himself is changing—first, with the emergence of this factor. Behind the scenes, some rethinking has taken place. The power structure that now centers around the president and Hamrouche has decided to leap into the future and not remain on the defensive. They have distanced themselves from the FLN, from all those who embody the old system. They are placing their bets on the future.

[Balhi] What do you think of Dr. Saadi's statement that the removal of Cheloufi is nothing more than a concession to the FIS?

[Boukrouh] It is certain that the presence of the FIS factor on the political scene was taken into account in Chadli's political redeployment. It cannot be denied. Some of the changes are tailored to the political situation that emerged after the 12 June elections. It is possible. The same is possible with regard to the other political groups, because the president's and Mr. Hamrouche's new strategy cannot work without the other parties. The strategy must first be situated within the political environment, which is made up of the FIS and the other parties. This has to be viewed against the overall picture. In any case, the FIS and the other parties seem to approve of the transformation. The old regime is being brought to an end. The president was hesitant to go about it in such a radical way. From October 1988 to July 1990, he hesitated to do it. Now it is visible in the changes made in the government, the Army, the diplomatic corps, and the ministries....

[Balhi] But what caused hesitation on Chadli's part?

[Boukrouh] He knows best of all. We can only attempt to guess at the reasons. In any case, he hesitated because he hoped to gain something from the strategy he pursued up to the eve of the 12 June elections. He was convinced that the FLN would win them. Because the FLN was totally routed on 12 June, which eliminated its chances of successfully seeking office again, the president retreated and redeployed. He fielded a new approach.

[Balhi] Abassi Madani is beginning to talk in moderate terms as the legislative elections approach. What do you make of it? It is a tactic?

[Boukrouh] Mr. Abassi Madani is using a tactical language first of all to address those in the FIS, the components that make up the FIS. The FIS is a mass whose internal structure is unknown to the public, as are the political strains running through it, the balance of power inside it, etc. Abassi Madani is therefore forced to speak a certain language to his supporters. Second, he is adapting to a new situation in which he is no longer in the opposition, but in a position of governing. The FIS is in a governing position because it won a majority in the APCs [communal popular assemblies] and the APWs [wilaya popular assemblies]. This makes it impossible to continue to use the same language, to play the part of the opposition member, to bring complaints. You are now the one who has to oversee the present state of affairs. I also think that the FIS has backtracked from its original stands, which were more strident. The FIS went too far on the offensive in the position it took in its march on 20 April, in the ultimatum it issued to the president on 20 July to dissolve the national assembly, in the press conference given by Mr. Abassi Madani on 22 July in which he again pressed his demand that the national assembly be dissolved at the earliest date. Then abruptly after the president's decision was announced, we watched as Mr. Abassi Madani adopted a more considered posture and admitted that the deadlines should be reasonable. To us in the PRA, it is a good thing. It is good that the parties are rallying around good, common sense. But in terms of the FIS' tactics, some backpedaling has occurred. Mr. Abassi Madani should offer an explanation to his supporters. He who was so much on the offensive, so assertive as to talk about timeframes and deadlines, is now accepting deadlines that were not his to determine.

[Balhi] Are you involved in the interparty alliances?

[Boukrouh] It will never happen just like that. We have had political contacts at their request, at their initiative, with the exception of the FIS. We discussed new perspectives. The PRA had occasion to express and re-express its openness to dialogue. We have responded to these overtures from the stand that these alliances must be approached in terms of objective positions in the field and secondly, in terms of platform content. It is not a matter of stringing one set of party initials after another, or totalling up the individual parties' scores, which are meager in all cases, or of reacting to the FIS. Each of us, perhaps all of us together, must take action, create a new politics suited to the situation. We have even had contacts with the prime minister and with the president's office. In terms of principles, we are in favor of electoral alliances and even, of forming single tickets with groups whose ideas are compatible with our own.

[Balhi] Meaning? Abassi is promising paradise and California; Bencherif is promising an inland sea; and you, what are you promising?

[Boukrouh] Nothing. We are promising duties. We have said that our cause can be summed up in a phrase: to transform the Algerian people into an Algerian society that functions in accordance with the working principles of the present universe. We are a society that is wanting in all respects.

[Balhi] You spoke of "ghachi" with reference to the Algerian people. People took this as an expression of scorn.

[Boukrouh] No. A few people may have thought that. The word "ghachi" was used as a way of making ourselves realize who we are. Now is not the time to cover ourselves with positive qualifiers, just make ourselves happy. That is insane! This is a time to describe ourselves in objective terms. We are a community that is not functioning the way a developed, organized, well-ordered society functions. Rather, our society functions as a multitude of individuals. This can be seen in the way the economy works, in the streets, and in social relations. The fabric of our social, economic, and political relations must be rewoven. It was destroyed by colonization and 27 years of resignation under the FLN.

[Balhi] The PRA won only two communes. What does that mean?

[Boukrouh] It was extraordinary that we won even two communes, not the reverse! Let us look at those who got votes or more votes. It has been said that these were the parties that already had supporters and voters, parties that pre-existed. Some people had been waiting 40 years to cast their ballots for an Islamic candidate and the first one to come along would naturally snatch up those votes. Others had their ballots marked for the tamazight RCD for 40 years and were simply waiting for candidate to give their votes to. Others still waited for 70 years for a communist candidate to vote for. We arrived on the scene with no previously established voter group and yet we were able to win 66,000 votes. We have 17,000 members. In the elections, we ran in 10 percent of the communes. At that rate, had we fielded candidates in all communes, we would have had 660,000 votes—nearly 10 percent of the national electorate—despite the fact the PRA has been in existence for one year.

[Balhi] Your support base, as your party congress demonstrated, is another FIS.

[Boukrouh] No! There is a little bit of the FIS, it is true. But what is the FIS, which processes the raw material of Islam? The Algerian people are an Islamic raw material. There are people who came to us because they were quickly drawn by the rational element in our vision of an Islamic society.

[Balhi] What is your view of applying the shari'ah?

[Boukrouh] It is not possible to run things or to talk of an Islamic solution the way the FIS would have it. What is the shari'ah? God is not a legislator. God has given guidelines; he has shown the way, given guidance, but

everything else falls to human intelligence. You cannot repudiate what has been accomplished by human intelligence. All that the West has done must also be done in the name of Islam, without complexed feelings.

[Balhi] The policing of morals...?

[Boukrouh] ...total arbitrariness. The judge also becomes the executioner of the sentence. He alone is the one to reconstruct everything and that is totalitarianism. That is what the communists did; that is what we saw in Iran. When you went to the mosque, you could see that it was the nerve center of all communal life. You would find weapons, military instruction manuals, typewriters, a telephone, a fleet of cars—everything. They left out the women. They had to pay for that with 10 years of failure. In 1979, Iran had no external debt. It had an income of 24 billion dollars. Today, it has a debt of 100 billion dollars and is searching for ways to stimulate investment.

[Balhi] Hamrouche said in the Tunisian newspaper REALITES that there was nothing in common between Algeria and Iran....

[Boukrouh] He is totally mistaken! Because the process that occurred there is not driven by doctrine but by psychological factors. The psychology that carried the FIS is the same psychology that carried the Islamic Revolutionary Party in Iran. The imam who has been shoved aside, who has been excluded, who never grew wealthy, will—when he finds himself behind an altar or with a sabre in hand—take revenge! It is a serious error to believe that it is a matter of Sunnism or Shi'ism. That has nothing to do with it. Psychology is the dynamic behind this phenomenon, propelling it in Iran just as it does in Algeria, just as it could in Sudan or in Afghanistan. During the first three months, alcohol is banned, then one thing is shut down and then another, until—nothing. The shari'ah is not complete and exhaustive: It deals with the private side of law. It does not deal with business law, maritime law, administrative law, and all of that has to be addressed. The shari'ah that we at the PRA are speaking about consists in adopting the fundamental postulates of Islam, but everything else would have to be created.

[Balhi] Which is what the Moroccan historian, Al Jabiri, said in YOUM ASSABAA in an article entitled "The Constitutional Gaps in Islam." There is no such thing as a "turnkey" shari'ah....

[Boukrouh] Exactly. That is difficult to explain to people from the FIS, for example. The FIS had no role in the events of October [1988]; it made political hay of it all with tremendous ease because it sounded the theme of Islam, it touched on people's frustrations, economic frustrations, injustice. We would like to see debates organized in the fall in which the FIS, ourselves, the RCD, etc., would participate. That would enable the people, Algerians, to see for themselves, to compare. The FIS' rhetoric appeals to irrationality whereas we speak to rationality. They evade rationality. The FIS did not use

the laser to further Islam, rather to trick people for the benefit of a political party. We saw this in the elections. They overstepped the bounds. The FIS used licit and illicit means. It all comes down to a conquest of power in the name of Islam, one that will cost Islam very dearly. Rather than dissociate the idea of an idol, on the contrary they tried to create an idol from an idea, a political idol—the idea of a sheik, a scholar, using identification. Is there anyone among the FIS people who have ever written a single line?

The FIS must be challenged without touching Islam. That will take a very delicate surgical operation, but that is where the solution lies. The FIS must be dissociated from Islam, which is feasible. Islam can be expressed in other ways. In our vision of society, we have said that we will fight against totalitarian Messalism. Islam, to use Montesquieu's expression, is the spirit of the laws, an inspiration to draw from. Islam is an inspiration. Islam is authenticity that eventually bears fruit, becomes productive, in social deeds. The people who talk about Islam do not share that vision. To them, Islam is a break with the world. If you break with the world, where can you go? You will flounder. The positive accomplishments of the West are valid, [as published] worthy of Islam; if it has managed to create social justice in Switzerland or in Austria, that is good. We are completely at ease. The FIS would have preferred people like the PAGS or the RCD, which have the effect of sending people in the direction of the FIS, later to say "there are infidels, there are believers." We do not want to see our future decided by the toss of a coin—tails, it's the FLN; heads, it's the FIS. We want to break out of that stranglehold.

It is not just a matter of reforming the State. The State and the people both need reform. In the past, there was wealth from oil; now there is heaven and divine wealth. "Go to the FIS and become independently wealthy. They will tell you that you are on your way to heaven." "The FIS will come to power and the drought will end" or "nature will thrive by herself." That is the typical Algerian who wants something for nothing, who lies to himself believing that his destiny will fall into his lap. But the future is made only through work. For every deed, there is a profit or a loss. If you work, you profit; if you do not work, you starve. What is incredible is the person who fainted at the sight of Allah in a laser beam—he deserves to be thrashed. Again, that is the same Algerian in a rut; the "tamaa" in the gandoura, who used to be an FLN member and who has acquired a gandoura and tells himself now that he will vote FIS and see what he how far he can ride for free on history. We could stray even farther; we could have a 30-year experience of the FIS the way we had a 30-year experience of the FLN, but we would still come back to—must come back to—the laws of nature: "You work, you have, you must work and work well, quality counts now." The Algerian wants a refrigerator, but that is an industrial process in itself and it has to be performed. The FIS continues to say the people are good, the state is bad.... God does not run things anymore; God never ran human affairs and that is something that Muslims must learn!

[Balhi] Are you pessimistic?

[Boukrouh] If the FIS comes to power, Algeria is certain to fall 10 or 15 years behind. A generation would be sacrificed, although it would not be the first. What is behind the FIS? Nothing! We know who Abassi is; after him, who knows [as published] what there is, what rhetoric? Already, we have the dubious figure of Abassi Madani, who engages in doubletalk. We know he wants to reconcile everyone and consequently alienates everyone. Look around you at the APCs. They talk to you about the comingling of the sexes and I do not know what else, but where is there an FIS' program? Where is the Islamic solution?

Neither the machinery, nor finances have ever produced a policy. A policy is created from ideas. In Europe, the philosophy of the Enlightenment produced the West as we know it today. The FIS is holding on to the memory of a society. "Ideas and not battles mark the progress of humanity."

EGYPT

Politicians React to Gulf Crisis

91AA0013A Cairo AL-AHRAM AL-DUWALI in Arabic
29 Sep 90 p 8

[Article by Muhammad Yusuf al-Masri and Ahmad al-Batriq]

[Text] The partisan situation is turbulent, buffeted by high waves, as if the Gulf crisis is the strong wind that is whipping up those waves with such a tremendous force.

The confusion and the intermingling of events in this complex crisis is probably the reason for party stands in our country becoming just as complicated as the crisis itself, and intertwined and interlocked just like the events and the winds that have been blowing on them.

However, AL-AHRAM AL-DUWALI, in this article, is trying to throw light on the nature of Egyptian party activities in relation to the crisis on the one hand, and to explain how our political parties are affected by the current events in the Gulf on the other.

Dr. Rif'at al-Sa'id, Secretary of the National Progressive Unionist Grouping [NPUG] Central Committee, draws attention to an important pivotal point. The Gulf war, he says, has set off several problems. Regardless of the points of agreement and disagreement, these problems have raised the question of the nature of relations between the Arab countries and of how useful the formal Arab councils [established between certain Arab countries] are and many other problems, most importance of which is the question of democracy and the distribution of wealth in the Arab homeland.

Focussing on the question of democracy in the Arab homeland, secretary of the NPUG Central Committee said that had the Arab countries been of a democratic

nature the Iraqi president would not have been able to occupy the State of Kuwait, and the other parties would not have been able to do what we object to doing, namely to invite foreign forces to the area.

Indeed, this crisis has forced to the front the real problem in the method of Arab thinking, which we can describe as the method of the "incomplete sentence."

What we as political parties are asked to do, he continued, is not to utter the complete sentences. Our sentence, for example, is to say that we are against the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and against inviting the Americans to the area and against providing an Egyptian or Islamic or Arab cover for the existence of these forces.

Some of us accept the first part of the sentence but do not wish to complete it. Some others accept the latter part of the sentence but do not wish to say it from the beginning, while logically half a sentence is a very serious mistake.

But the prevalent logic in the Arab arena, according to Dr. al-Sa'id, even among the Arab and nationalist progressive parties, has to do with half a sentence.

Thus, some people are satisfied with condemning Saddam Husayn while some others are satisfied with condemning those who invited the U.S. forces. We insist on saying the whole sentence. We reject the Iraqi invasion, and we reject foreign presence and call for simultaneous withdrawal. This withdrawal has become a condition. It is neither logical nor acceptable that we should always ask Iraq alone to withdraw. The U.S. forces must withdraw from all the Arab area. It would be a calamity for us as Arabs and Muslims if the U.S. forces stayed in the area.

This, Dr. al-Sa'id added, is as far as the impact on the Egyptian party movement is concerned. As for the NPUG, I believe that our problem is the same as everybody else's, I mean the problem of the incomplete sentence. In fact, a problem has arisen within the party not concerning completing the sentence but concerning the emphasis to be put on each of its parts. For this reason the NPUG general secretariat drafted three successive statements with the succession of events. Initially we issued a statement condemning the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. When the U.S. forces arrived we issued a statement condemning foreign presence. When the situation settled we issued a statement condemning the invasion and the foreign presence and demanding simultaneous withdrawal.

Dr. al-Sa'id then raised another point, saying that the stands of certain Egyptian parties were not balanced, especially al-Wafd Party which adopted an astonishing stand. Dr. al-Sa'id said: Despite the fact that I personally respect the attitudes of al-Wafd Party, I quite frankly did not understand al-Wafd's attitude toward the crisis. AL-WAFD newspaper headlines seemed to insist on calling upon the Americans to strike at Iraq. This is an alarming situation. If those who live in Iraq are Iraqis, then they are our brothers. Also we must not forget that

1 million Egyptians live in Iraq and that U.S. bombs do not differentiate between them and the Iraqis.

Since when, he wondered, have the Egyptians beat the drums of war while the peace opportunities have not yet been exhausted?

The attitude of the Socialist Labor Party [SLP] toward the Gulf crisis was the subject of great controversy. Majdi Ahmad Husayn, the party's parliamentary deputy, said that his party was anxious to define a nationalist attitude toward the Gulf crisis. It was affected by the events in the Gulf, and it devoted many meetings to evaluating this serious crisis.

His party, he added, has been able to define a view which it believes is the right one because it juxtaposes the rejection of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait with the problem it has caused, namely the presence of foreign forces in the Arab area.

He said the crisis has generated a vigorous internal debate in the party, developing into a public activity that found expression in a series of successful seminars and press reporting by the party's paper AL-SHA'B, which led to the paper gaining wide circulation among the masses because, according to him, the Egyptian people were in need of hearing the other viewpoint.

Majdi Hasan added: Differences over the Gulf crisis are a reality in all the democratic countries. It is therefore hoped that the government would interact with the opposition's views rather than distort the opposition's image and hurl accusations at it.

He said that his party condemns Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and that the statements issued by the party during the early days of invasion have condemned the invasion and called for Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait.

Discussing the al-Wafd's attitude toward the crisis, he said that this attitude is not new since this party's line has never clashed with the U.S. line on the international level. On the domestic level, there is close identity of views between the al-Wafd Party and the government, which became evident before the Gulf events. This attitude is probably due to the imminent election date.

Wahid Ghazi, chief editor of AL-AHRAR newspaper, said that the Gulf crisis has generated new political activity in the party scene. It has created two principal trends. The first, which is supported by the vast majority, is unreservedly against the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, while the other has several reservations most significant of which is the call for the need to solve the problem among the Arabs without interference by foreign forces.

The advocates of the latter line, he added, have forgotten that it was Iraqi President Saddam Husayn who brought these forces.

The foreign forces, he continued, have come as an inevitable result of the Iraqi invasion. Several political

activities have taken place within the sphere of these two trends. This was reflected in the resolutions and statements issued by the parties as well as in their newspapers, something what was abundantly clear to the masses.

Wahid Ghazi says: But these differences in views occurred within the framework of a single party; they did not develop into chaos and vituperations. It has become evident that the political parties are not opposing for opposition's sake since the opposing majority stands with the popular and national trend which is also the trend of the Egyptian political leadership.

On the internal level, the Socialist Liberal Party [SLP], on the basis of freedom of expression within the party, allowed some elements, very few in number, to express their views that differ with the party views on certain details. Their contention is that there are certain reservations regarding condemning the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Although these views represent only a tiny fraction, they were allowed to be published in the paper alongside the newspaper's views and those of the party in condemning the invasion without reservation.

Every political party has its program, he added. Personally he was not surprised by the attitude of certain opposition parties and their newspapers because the stand of these parties on the question of invasion is part of their programs that were expected to change in the light of recent international changes.

Counselor al-Damirdash al-'Iqali, a DNP deputy, said that the impact of the Gulf crisis was obviously going to affect all the political bodies, including the parties.

Every party has voiced its fundamental principles which escaped the attention of many people because of preoccupation with internal activities.

Citing the al-Wafd Party as an example, he said the party hastened to proclaim its own fundamental principles that psychologically, historically and futuristically link it to the West which in turn is linked to the United States.

He said that AL-WAFD newspaper today reflects the views not only of the United States but also the wishes of the U.S. citizen. The paper instigates the United States and its allied forces to strike at Iraq, a fact that reflects al-Wafd Party's psychological affiliation.

Al-'Iqali cites the NPUG as another example. Its principles call for the independence of Egyptian decision-making backed by a broad base of workers and peasants with links to the Arab masses.

In light of these principles, the NPUG sensed that the U.S. intervention is a danger greater than the danger of Iraqi occupation of Kuwait. It therefore was anxious to denounce the U.S. intervention and at the same time to call for Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait.

Citing the Islamic inclined Labor Party as a third example, counselor al-'Iqali said that this party felt that

the Islamic factor should be above all other factors. Therefore it believes that the problem began as an inter-Arab problem but developed into something similar to a crusader-Zionist campaign using the Saudi call for help as a cover. Therefore the paper hastened to denounce U.S. intervention and to call for the need to find an Arab solution that would exclude foreign intervention.

As for the SLP, he added, it is oscillating between all these views; one time it denounces foreign intervention and another time it sympathizes with the Saudi desires. This is perhaps due to the lack of ideological basis in the SLP's program.

Now, what do the al-Wafd Party leaders say?

Ibrahim Faraj, the party general secretary, says that the Egyptian parties have been affected by the Gulf crisis each according to its own stand toward this crisis. Certain parties have considered the Gulf crisis as an Arab crisis represented in a big Arab country attacking a small Arab country and in a threat to other small countries that were compelled to seek the assistance of foreigners in order to repel aggression.

The attitude of these parties is different from that of other parties that have hastened to support aggression and condemn seeking help from foreign countries. Such argument is unacceptable because assistance cannot be asked from a foreigner unless he has an interest. The United States has common interests which it is only natural for it to defend.

The al-Wafd party, he added, saw such action as only natural and acceptable. For this reason its plan is quite different from that of Jordan, Yemen, Algeria, or Tunisia. Certain other Egyptian parties like the Labor Party and the Islamic Alliance also pursued the same course.

The al-Wafd general secretary then said that he does not see any signs of a party campaign to counter the al-Wafd stand. He called for an Arab plan on the basis of Arab charters, particularly the Arab League Charter and the Joint Defense Pact in order to end the crisis.

He added: The claim that al-Wafd Party expresses the wishes of the U.S. citizen is ludicrous and cannot be serious. His party, he said, is not prodding the United States to wage war. Rather it wishes the crisis to end peacefully and within the framework of justice. If there is anybody inciting war it is not the al-Wafd Party.

Scholars Discuss Strategic Aspects of Gulf Crisis

Steps for Future Security

90AA0348A Cairo AL-AHRAM AL-DUWALI in Arabic
26 Sep 90 p 9

[Article by Dr. Isamah al-Ghazali Harb: "Future of Security in the Gulf;" first three paragraphs AL-AHRAM AL-DUWALI introduction]

[Text] The Gulf crisis has stirred up a number of important Arab problems, including Gulf security, espe-

cially after the Arab system proved incapable of providing guarantees of regional security for this vital part of the Arab nation. Any objective look at events since the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait must recognize the group of negative challenges that set them apart.

Despite this painful fact, one should not rush to abandon the only escape, by which we mean, we should work toward providing guarantees of security within a regional framework, in which each Arab party that is capable of and anxious to fill this void would participate, which arouses well-known foreign ambitions.

What is the way to resolve this difficulty? Dr. Isamah al-Ghazali answers this question from his private point of view. We will publish the comments and other views that we receive regarding this same issue from a regional perspective. We shall begin today to publish views and comments that we have received vis-a-vis the Gulf crisis.

For the fourth time in two decades, a security issue in the Gulf has arisen by force. The first time was in the early seventies, particularly 1971, in the wake of the British withdrawal from "east of Suez," and the emergence of claims to fill the vacuum, stemming from the withdrawal. The second occasion was in the mid-seventies, as a result of the October War and the oil embargo that accompanied it, when American warnings to the Gulf states increased in 1974 and 1975 with regard to a decisive response if they again embarked on imposing such an embargo. The third time occurred at the end of the seventies and early eighties, resulting from a group of dramatic changes in the Gulf region and surrounding area. These included the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, the Iranian revolution, and the outbreak of the Iraq-Iran War. Now—at the start of the nineties—in the wake of the Iraqi aggression against Kuwait and its brutal annexation, the issue of Gulf security arises for the fourth time, along with a search for measures to achieve it.

Despite the fact that the issue of Gulf security concerns many regional and international parties, and that all of them see this security from the perspective of their special interests, the party most conscious of this security, and most concerned with it, has always been the United States and its allies in Western Europe and Japan. This is obvious, because of the increasing dependence of those countries on gulf oil. With the presence of more than half of the world's reserves of oil in that small area of the world, the gulf region is of decisive, strategic importance to the culture of those countries, and to the prosperity of their economies. Therefore, when those countries speak of "gulf security," they mean protection of the gulf against dangers and threats that could block the continuation of the organized flow of oil to themselves, in sufficient quantities and at reasonable prices. By this is understood that the raising of the issue of gulf

security on all previous occasions, and the accompanying security projects, were to safeguard American and Western vital interests in gulf oil.

However, the concept of "security" is relative and changeable. Accordingly, this concept does not necessarily conform to the Arab concept of security, which includes more than a guarantee of oil supplies. The Arab means—in essence—the security of the peoples living in the gulf region, that is, to protect them from invasion or armed threats, guarantee their territorial integrity and regional unity, safeguard their natural wealth and protect it from plunder and waste, and guarantee a reasonable amount of economic luxury, cultural achievement, social justice and political independence. In this concept, whatever opposes those goals is in fact a threat to gulf security. Moreover, the Arab sense of gulf security might differ from, or rather, be incompatible with gulf security as seen by this or that power from outside the gulf region, or from inside it, if the nature of that power's policies was to damage any of the above elements of security.

In light of that, an important question is raised: what were the considerations of the Iraqi regime vis-a-vis the issue of gulf security, and the vital Western interests therein, on the eve of its invasion of Kuwait? It is not difficult for the observer to deduce that the essence of the Iraqi considerations was that the United States and its allies would not take a great deal of notice, so long as their interests continued to be guaranteed, i.e., so long as the flow of oil to them continued (especially since that was the biggest lesson of the Iraqi-Iranian War). Certainly, the Iraqi regime was prepared to offer various guarantees in that regard, in exchange for condoning the swallowing of Kuwait, i.e., a pledge for silence of the Western powers over Iraq's rape of gulf security (Arab concept) in exchange for its preserving the international concept of gulf security, as those nations see it.

However, the Iraqi considerations failed to take into account that such a deed as that would constitute a significant upset in the balance of power in the region, not only with regard to the other Arab gulf countries, led by Saudi Arabia, but also with regard to Iran. From the American and Western viewpoint, this means sowing the seeds of tension and instability in the region. It also means that these powers were aware of the aspirations of the Iraqi president to curb Iran's defiance forever, on the one hand, and to dominate the gulf region—oil, people, tribes and ruling regimes—on the other. Accordingly, this kind of sick delusion and dreams was more than an expression of Iraq's true capabilities, especially since the Iraqi regime's methods were foolhardy and not subject to accountability and rational assessment.

Therefore, upon assessing the impact of the Iraqi invasion on gulf security, one can say:

- The invasion severely violated gulf security from the Arab viewpoint, in terms of putting an end to one of the countries of the region, dispersing its people and wasting its resources, no matter what slogans, such as "justice in distribution," or abolishing artificial borders, were raised to justify this.

- At the same time, the Iraqi regime failed to convince the Western nations that its invasion and annexation of Kuwait would not threaten "gulf security" as they see it, i.e., security of their oil interests.

This congruence between the Iraqi threat to gulf security (as the Western powers view it), and to gulf security from the Arab viewpoint, explains the agreement between the United States and its allies on the one hand, and the group of gulf states and its supporting Arab nations on the other, in opposition to the Iraqi invasion.

However, this agreement to condemn the Iraqi aggression, and to insist on restoring the legitimate government to Kuwait, does not necessarily mean an agreement on measures that could be taken to protect gulf security, after the effects of the Iraqi aggression are eliminated. To be more precise, the Arab concept of gulf security could be based—fundamentally—on a number of principles, whose importance has been demonstrated by this crisis. They include:

1. In achieving gulf security, reliance ought to be—in the first analysis—on the gulf and Arab states themselves, and not on foreign powers. It is inconceivable that such an international massing of troops could be repeated every time security in the gulf is threatened.
2. It is impossible to separate gulf security and Arab security generally. If the basic challenge to Arab regional security is linked to the Israeli threat, and to a lack of resolving the Palestinian issue, then certainly the crisis has demonstrated beyond any doubt that a lack of resolving that issue, and international lassitude toward Israel's aggressive policies, is what forms the best political and psychological grounds for supporting Iraqi aggression and the violation of gulf security.
3. It is impossible to establish a system for gulf security without the process of widespread modernization of gulf regimes, in order to transport them into the 21st Century, change them into real nations, and make them capable of meeting the "challenges" that confront them. That would basically require developing their political systems to be more democratic, by means of allowing multiplicity and broadening political participation, as well as changing the rules and regulations of nationality and justice. This would put an end to the problem of "foreign labor," and would make gulf societies more equal and modern.
4. Egypt is playing a role in protecting security in the gulf, after it was clearly shown that there was no other power in the region that could play this role. In maintaining the balance of power there, Egypt is—at the same time—receiving the gratitude and acceptance of the gulf nations.

The writer of this article is an expert at AL-AHRAM's Center for Political and Strategic Studies.

Nature of Regional Alliances

90AA0348B Cairo AL-AHRAM AL-DUWALI in Arabic
26 Sep 90 p 9

[Article by Dr. Mustafa Kamil al-Sayyid: "World of Multiple Axes, Geography of Regional Alliances"]

[Text] The American attitude toward the gulf crisis is proving those analyses false that held that the international system has changed in recent years, especially in the wake of events in Eastern Europe since November 1989, into a world dominated by one leader, the United States, whose hands were now free to use its military power. Despite the rapidity of the U.S. initiative to mass its naval, air and ground forces in the gulf region and in the eastern Mediterranean, the American administration has not yet embarked upon the use of this power in military action against Iraq. The reason for this is the difficulty of unilaterally undertaking military action by either of the two super powers, or by any other international power, in light of the new climate that dominates international relations, especially between the United States and the Soviet Union, marked by joint coordination between them in every region, instead of confrontation.

The fact is that possession of the capability for rapid military intervention in any world region has, to a large extent, lost its importance as one of the elements of international status, because of formidable restrictions on the employment of this capability in a world that is giving priority to elements of economic power. There is the huge financial burden caused by the massing of military forces in an area far from the United States for a long period of time, at a time when the American administration has failed to resolve the problem of the chronic, increasing deficit in the federal budget. This is ominous, if the United States continues to enter a long recession. Therefore, the American government has tried to appeal to other international powers, particularly Japan and the Federal Republic of Germany, which do not face such critical situations in their domestic and foreign budgets, to share in financing this buildup and the burdens associated with it.

On the other hand, the eminent importance of world public opinion caused the United States to search for a cover for its intervention in the gulf, by exerting efforts to obtain resolutions from the Security Council, to which all its permanent members, including the Soviet Union and Communist China, could agree. This allowed the presence of U.S. forces and the use of measures, including violence against shipping into or out of Iraq, to appear as an action enjoying international legitimacy. Moreover, the anxiety of American public opinion with regard to human losses among American troops, as expressed by American public opinion polls in the United States, editorials in the American press, and statements by leaders of Congress, is forcing the American administration to be bound by extreme caution before deciding on the use of military force. Finally,

despite the great disparity between the military capabilities of such an international leader as the United States, and a regional power like Iraq, Iraq's noncompliance with any acceptable principles vis-a-vis foreign citizens or other nations in the Middle East, particularly Saudi Arabia and Israel, makes the cost of using American military power, without taking appropriate precautions against Iraqi actions, prodigious from the viewpoint of American public opinion and the American administration. For all these reasons, the American administration is trying to give every means of economic and diplomatic pressure a chance, before facing the costly option and unreliable consequences represented by the use of armed power. For these same reasons, the American president tried to come out of his meeting with Soviet leader Gorbachev, in Helsinki on 9 September, with a Soviet understanding of the motives for adopting this decision if, in the long run, he was forced to do so.

However, the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait has ended the independence of the Arab regional system. The Arab nations are incapable of stopping aggression by one of them against another. Therefore, all of them are trying to enter into regional and international alliances to guarantee their security. In this regard, geographic factors play a complex role. Neighboring Arab states do not necessarily cooperate among themselves, and most of them are mutually competitive. Yemen needs Iraq against Saudi Arabia; Syria needs Egypt and Iran against Iraq; and, perhaps, the Sudanese regime needs both Iraq and Libya against Egypt and Ethiopia. This new situation lends great importance to nations that are geographic neighbors, especially Turkey, Iran and, to a lesser extent, Ethiopia, which will increasingly evolve into basic partners in regional alliances. It is certain that international powers outside of the region will try to back some of these alliances in opposing other regional alliances, and provide all elements of economic and military assistance to them, so that these international powers can lighten their burdens of direct military intervention, whenever circumstances require.

Economists Suggest Ways To Improve Banking System

90AA0347A Cairo AKHIR AL-SA'AH in Arabic
12 Sep 90 pp 18-19

[Article by 'Ala'-al-Din Mustafa]

[Excerpts] [passage omitted]

Egyptian-Saudi Cooperation

Engineer Taha Zaki, a former industry and mineral resources minister, believes that the gulf crisis has brought to light the strong foundations of Egyptian policy. This policy, he stressed, is based on principles, which lends very important credibility to Egypt and its political leadership. The crisis has also revealed the

extent to which Egypt is graced with stability and security. Egypt has displayed its true weight as a major power in the Middle East that is working to establish peace and stability in the region.

All of these positive aspects brought to light by the gulf crisis put Egypt in the running to attract Egyptian, Arab, and foreign investments. Investment means not only capital, but also technology, because, without technology, the products of investment will not be able to compete internationally.

Eng. Taha Zaki added:

Regarding Egyptian, Arab, and foreign investment opportunities, I believe that, due to the changes brought on by the gulf crisis, cooperation in investment fields must assume a new form. Investment should be made within the framework of the integration of available resources. The crisis uncovered a primary need to apply this new form of cooperation to Egyptian-Saudi cooperation within the scope of the natural and human resources available to the two countries, and the military power that protects these resources. Such cooperation must be planned scientifically and soundly. Egypt and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia have a common border in the Red Sea. An exchange of expertise between the two states can help strengthen their respective economic and military capabilities. We must not forget that Egypt and Saudi Arabia each have advantages, be they natural or human resources, which can help in the achievement of comprehensive economic, social, and other development.

Taha Zaki added:

Other states can be incorporated in this new type of cooperation, such as the other Gulf states, Syria, and Morocco, and the door is also open to Libya, Yemen, and Sudan, but in a fundamentally different manner from that of economic blocs that appeared during the 1980s.

However, this first of all requires a new vision regarding Egyptian economic policies based on a comprehensive review of all legislation and laws to eliminate obstacles in them and thereby provide greater flexibility for acting on projects.

For example, it is necessary to reexamine the new investment law, especially the controversial article in it that stipulates the distribution of 10 percent of a project's profits to the project's workers, as well as the article on the government's pricing of goods if necessary. These articles must be amended, so that they will not discourage investors.

This also applies to the banks. Development or projects can be implemented only through a competent banking system. This requires the development of Egyptian banks, so that they can provide services on a par with those provided by European and American banks. European and American banks provide diverse services. They

have investment divisions that gather information on the prices of stocks, gold, currency, and different goods. They can also effect banking operations very quickly and can offer and promote projects on which benefit analyses have been performed.

Without developing banking operations and establishing the principle of secret bank accounts, regardless of whether such accounts are held by Egyptians, Arabs, or foreigners, Egypt will not benefit sufficiently from the advantages it can offer, which were brought to light by the gulf crisis. Therefore, we must move quickly in the right direction. [passage omitted]

The Need to Develop the Banks

We asked Samir al-Qasri if banking activity in Egypt will be affected by the gulf crisis, and whether Arab and foreign capital can be attracted to Egypt.

Samir al-Qasri responded:

Banks, by virtue of their role as financial mediators, represent the other side of the coin. If we manage to attract the savings of fellow Arabs or foreigners to Egypt, the banks will flourish. The banks must therefore develop themselves and play a more active role in order to emerge from the current economic stagnation. But they cannot do this alone. Everyone must join efforts to eliminate obstacles. The banks can help by developing their operational concepts and promoting the national economy. This is also linked to the climate in which the banks operate. The longstanding, undecided controversy over the multiplicity of bank regulating agencies does not encourage decisionmaking. That problem must be solved.

In addition, the promulgation of a secret bank accounts law will promote the bank's marketability. Positive results will flow from the issuance of a judicious law that regulates the confidentiality of bank transactions and balances, or subjects any examination of balances to the authority of the judiciary.

A Map of Small Projects

Fathallah Raf'at, the chairman of the National Bank for Development, believes that we should draft a clear map for small projects that can absorb the savings of returning Egyptians, be they more or less than 100,000 Egyptian pounds. A clear map will perhaps encourage Egyptians abroad to make successful investments in agriculture and industry. The attraction of this capital will help absorb the shock of the return of Egyptians. Such a map can be created on the basis of a comprehensive survey and integrated studies that determine incentives to promote the absorption of these savings.

Fathallah Raf'at stressed that an increase in the flow of funds to Egyptian banks is expected. He underscored the

need to review regulations governing banking operations, especially the multiplicity of regulatory agencies, which hinders the refined specialization and artistry of decisionmaking in banking.

That must be paralleled by: a reexamination of the rules and regulations that govern investment, especially in agriculture; the provision of facilities to citizens who want to reclaim and take possession of arable lands; the provision of infrastructure; a reexamination of the system for transferring ownership of the previously mentioned lands; and the offering of incentives to returning Egyptians to invest their savings in production projects.

Fathallah Rafat states:

The expected injection of capital into the banks must be accompanied by flexibility in the investment field, so that this capital can yield benefits by being channelled into investments and projects.

Sa'id al-Tawil, the chairman of the Association of Businessmen, believes that the banks have a primary role in development. The banks must develop themselves in preparation for the new phase they will face. They must be as competent and as able as international banks. This can be achieved by expediting the promulgation of an account confidentiality law, which will attract deposits and give confidence to depositors. Egyptian banks need to be on a par with foreign banks, because Egyptian banks are expected to receive deposits from the Arab region and from Egyptians abroad, who used to prefer depositing their funds in foreign banks.

Egyptian banks must also strive to invest the bulk of the deposits within Egypt, instead of depositing them in foreign banks that invest their funds outside of Egypt. The banks need to create attractive, new savings instruments. They need to market these instruments among the various strata of the people. The time has come to take practical measures to eliminate the intimidating supervision of banks, and to have confidence in bank employees. The Central Bank should be the only agency entitled to make inquiries with banks. No agency has the right to interfere in the operations of banks, unless it does so through the Central Bank and with the prior consent of the Central Bank.

He continued his remarks:

This is closely connected to reexamining the conditions of the securities market and stimulating it. Activity on the securities market has unfortunately been so limited as to have no effect on economic activity in Egypt.

Sa'id al-Tawil adds:

Regarding economic conditions and investments in Egypt in the near future, it is expected that there will be a recession due to the growing chance of increased inflation stemming from the increases in world prices for imported raw materials and energy prices. These increases have not been matched by an increase in revenues. Revenues have not increased because of: the

cessation of export activity to Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and the gulf countries, which represented a large share of our exports; the freezing of sums stemming from equivalent deals with Iraq and Jordan; and the increase in prices arising from the disturbance of foreign currency exchange rates, which directly affected import prices by raising freight and insurance costs. The banks must take these economic circumstances into account. [passage omitted]

Private Sector Allowed To Import From USSR

90AA0331A Cairo AL-AHRAM AL-DUWALI in Arabic
16 Sep 90 p 5

[Article by Rafit Amin: "Minister of Economy Meeting With Exporters From Private Sector May Import From USSR"]

[Text] Several important matters have been raised in recent days about the export issue that is of great concern to the government. A request has been put forth to discuss the best ways to compensate Egyptians for losses incurred by the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and to hasten the ratification of the agreement concluded between Egypt and Saudi Arabia. This is provided that Egypt, with the approval of Saudi Arabia, grant customs duty exemptions for goods destined to the Saudi market, given the importance of this market at the present time as a substitute for the Kuwaiti market. Also discussed was the matter of parity agreements and the failure to issue a decision allowing the private sector to conclude them directly without government intervention.

The prompt response came from Dr. Yusri Mustafa, minister of economy and foreign trade, who offered to meet with General Bureau of Exporters' officials. The meeting was held in Alexandria and was attended by many exporters. Some Ministry of Economy leaders—including Salah 'Awad, chief of the Import and Export Control Agency; Muhsin Shihab, chief of the Public Sector Agency for Foreign Trade; and Fakhr-al-Din Abu-al-'Izz, chief of the foreign trade sector—took part in the meeting that was also attended by Mustafa al-Najjar, chief of the Alexandria Chamber of Commerce.

At the beginning of the meeting, bureau chief Abu-al-Su'ud Sultan praised the government's role in establishing equality between the public and private sectors in the export field, emphasizing that, ever since the Ministry of Economy adopted the idea to allow the private sector to export oranges, there has been an upturn in the volume of exports. During the last season, private sector exports amounted to 253,000 tons and public sector exports went up as well as a natural consequence of competition between the two sectors, thus underscoring the fact that monopoly always thwarts economic activity.

Dr. Yusri Mustafa emphasized that the export question is a national issue, stressing that government policy does not discriminate between the various sectors, be they public, private, or investment, because the aim is to

serve the national economy. He pointed out that, notwithstanding the accomplishments realized in the export field in recent times, particularly the export of unconventional goods that has gone up from \$800 million before 1987-88 to about \$1.5 billion, there is still much to be done to realize our export goals and aspirations and to reach the level attained by other countries that used to be in a situation similar to ours, such as South Korea whose current exports amount to \$60 billion as compared to a mere \$300 million in the fifties.

The minister explained that the Ministry of Economy strategy, designed to realize national export objectives, is aimed at the gradual realization of total equality between the public and private sectors in the export field, and we have begun to establish almost total equality between them in the exportation of oranges. In the next few days, a decision will be made to allow the private sector to conclude parity agreements that used to be a public sector monopoly. This decision will allow greater flexibility in exporting to countries that suffer from a liquidity crisis which means that the volume of exports may be increased in return for importing basic commodities the country needs. The minister also said that the private sector will be allowed to import directly from the agreement countries, emphasizing that export is based on free currency transactions "which we encourage in every way, but we do offer facilities for the exportation of certain goods that are difficult to export."

Implementation Rules and Regulations

The minister then announced the text of the decision permitting the private sector to conclude parity agreements that will be issued in the next few days. This decision allows the public, private, investment, and cooperative sectors to hold parity agreements for the parties listed in the import and export register, with the exclusion of investment companies or companies exempt from registration in these two registers. The decision includes permission to use this system with all the various countries of the world, including those who have payment agreements with Egypt (the USSR, Sudan). Also, deals pertaining to goods listed in trade protocols with these countries may be concluded with the approval of the minister of economy.

The decision also calls for the issuance of a passive list to be promulgated, following approval by the minister of economy, by the end of January of each year. This is provided that the foreign currency sector, with the participation of the Central Bank, make banking and monetary arrangements for the implementation of deals concluded by the private sector.

Dr. Yusri Mustafa stated that there will not be a control agency to oversee the implementation of the deals or to obtain prior approval to conclude deals so long as they are within the framework of the general import-export regulations and comply with the commodity lists that will be issued annually. All that is required is that the Ministry of Economy be informed for record keeping.

Importers Questions

Khalid Abu-Isma'il, secretary general of the Bureau of Exporters, raised a question about the nature of goods included in the passive list and whether oranges and potatoes will be allowed to be exported to agreement countries.

Dr. Yusri Mustafa explained that the list will include a ban on the export of oil and oil byproducts, raw cotton and cotton yarn, rice, aluminum ore, oranges, and potatoes and also goods banned from export per [Decree] No. 1036 of 1978 and its amendments. The list also includes a ban on the import of goods listed in Decree No. 333 of 1986, goods that do not have letters of credit, and goods that are exclusively imported by public sector trading companies and public sector beneficiary companies defined in Decree No. 1036, including wheat, flour, tea, cooking oil, animal fats, fertilizers, insecticides, cotton, coal, and oil. This is provided that, before the conclusion of contracts, approval is obtained from the competent authorities with regard to goods restricted by import agreements.

The minister added that the shift to free trade between the Soviet Union and the various socialist countries notwithstanding, our dealings with the Soviet Union are based on a protocol, but we are now seeking to abolish this system that is not the best and to replace it with free currency transactions and parity agreements. Nevertheless, the private sector will have the freedom to conclude deals with the Soviet Union even on goods mentioned in the protocol after obtaining approval from the minister of economy, but only after the pertinent quotas have been used or before the implementation of contractual agreements.

He announced that, in an effort to make things easy for foreign trade businessmen, another list containing commodities taken off the import ban lists will be issued soon. 'Ali 'Isa, deputy chief of the bureau, alluded to the need to announce the banking arrangements in a clear manner.

The minister of economy explained that these arrangements include a provision stipulating that foreign currency transfers to the outside shall not be required to carry out the deal and that bank accounts shall be opened for this purpose, provided that importation is done first, to guarantee payment to exporters. But, in the case of advance exportation, the bank shall obtain an Egyptian currency guarantee in the value of the exported goods. To facilitate matters, if the exported item is not more than 50 percent of the value of the deal, a promissory note shall be sufficient.

Exporters expressed their reservations about this procedure and demanded that form "TS", containing a promissory note by the exporter to import the export proceeds within a year from the export date, and the general bank systems governing export operations be deemed sufficient.

The minister of economy asked for a chance to reconsider taking up the exporters' opinion that has been backed by certain ministry of economy leaders.

Mustafa al-Dahshan, assistant secretary general for ships, then raised the question of the failure to ratify the customs agreement with Saudi Arabia, thus impeding our ability to compete in the Saudi market.

The minister of economy gave assurances that the agreement was recently approved by the foreign ministry's agreements committee and that the constitutional measures for its ratification will be completed very soon.

About the problem facing exporters and the damage they suffered from exports to Kuwait and Iraq that was raised by bureau deputy chief Ibrahim Abu-'Umayrah and by bureau secretary 'Abduh Badawi, he confirmed that such damages include goods manufactured under contracts concluded with these countries, but are ill-suited for other markets and loans used to finance such production, pointing out that losses suffered with Iraq amounted to \$66 million.

Dr. Yusri Mustafa pointed out that a Ministry of Economy committee, made up of the monetary and foreign trade sectors, besides the Central Bank, has been formed to take stock of exports that have not been paid for, with regard to Kuwait in particular because this process was done in advance with regard to Iraq. The committee's finding will be submitted to a committee formed under the chairmanship of Dr. Kamal al-Janzuri, deputy prime minister and minister of planning, to take stock of damages suffered by the national economy.

The minister of economy confirmed that the date for revenue payments on exports to these two countries, due after last 12 August, will be extended for another year and revenues due before this date will be considered on an individual basis.

He explained that Egyptians can submit applications to the Import-Export Control Agency requesting such an extension for consideration and that forms will be readied for distribution to exporters via agency branch offices or chambers of commerce.

Work Permits Issued After Gulf Crisis Show Increase

90AA0346A Cairo AL-AHRAM AL-DUWALI in Arabic
22 Sep 90 p 5

[Article by Muhammad Basha]

[Text] The news story of the week continues to track the effects of Iraq's vicious invasion of Kuwait. This article focuses on the process of the issuance of work permits for Egyptians wishing to work abroad. This process presents a living example of the movement of Egyptian workers, including workers seeking new permits or workers seeking to renew their permits. By examining this process, we answer the question of the week.

What is the size of this labor force? Which regions are the destination of Egyptian manpower? How are revenues from fees for taking out and renewing permits affected by the crisis, whose effects naturally include a decline in hard currency resources realized from the savings of workers when they went to work abroad?

Major General 'Abd-al-Muhsin Hindi, the director of the Central Work Permit Administration and deputy interior minister, produced a report on the movement of Egyptian manpower. We will excerpt the beginning of this report, which indicates the following:

- From 30 June 1989 to 1 July 1990, revenues from fees for the issuance of work permits totalled 150 million Egyptian pounds.
- During last August, on the second of which the vicious Iraqi invasion began, these revenues totalled 15.2 million Egyptian pounds, compared to 27 million Egyptian pounds in August of last year, a decline of 40 percent.

These figures point to a marked decline in the taking out and renewal of work permits, especially permits for work in Iraq, Kuwait, and Jordan. Also, workers on vacation before the invasion, refrained from renewing their permits for work in these states, and those who took out permits before the invasion are now requesting a return of the permit fee.

The report also indicates that, at the end of August, the taking out of permits began to increase at a rate of 30 percent. This can be attributed to an increase in contracts, and the demand for Egyptian manpower in the gulf states, Libya, and in new fields of work in Greece and Italy. We find that new work permits totalled 20,000 for work in Libya, 30,000 for work in Saudi Arabia, 4,000 for work in the United Arab Emirates [UAE], 2,000 for work in Italy, and 7,000 permits for work in Greece.

Based on these figures, Maj. Gen. 'Abd-al-Muhsin Hindi, emphasizes that the state lost revenues from permits because of the return of workers from Iraq, Kuwait, and Jordan, and the fact that workers are not renewing their permits until the crisis ends and its aftermath becomes clear. Accordingly, the state's hard currency revenues from the savings of these workers will also be affected (planning experts estimate that these savings amount to \$1.3 billion annually).

The recent increase this month in the number of new permits is attributed to the opening of new employment opportunities in Libya, Greece, and Italy, in addition to previous contracts in Saudi Arabia and the UAE.

Because a work permit is considered a supporting document in a final agreement between an Egyptian citizen and any employment party abroad, Maj. Gen. 'Abd-al-Muhsin Hindi stresses the following features, which conclude this story:

- The need for anyone wishing to work abroad to obtain a work agreement that is notarized and authorized by

the Manpower Ministry as a guarantee of his rights; and the need to take out a work permit, inasmuch as it is one of the supporting documents of the agreement, so that Egyptian workers do not have to face any hardships abroad.

- The administration is providing all facilities to citizens who want to obtain permits in implementation of the directives of Major General 'Abd-al-Halim Musa, the interior minister. It is also keen about conducting full criminal and political investigations to prevent any citizen engaging in criminal activity from going abroad to work. It is doing so out of a desire to uphold the reputation of the Egyptian work force, which, as previous years have proven, is highly competent and does not interfere in any political, religious, or ideological activities in any state in which it works.
- The [costs entailed by the] care that state agencies have provided to Egyptian workers returning from Iraq and Kuwait prompts us to seek to expedite the promulgation of proposed legislation to increase the fees for permits. Such an increase was studied previously by the administration, the Finance Ministry, and the Economy Ministry, and was actually approved by the state council.
- The need to implement recommendations that would require persons wishing to travel in search of work to acquire a round-trip airline ticket and to pay a security deposit of no less than 300 Egyptian pounds. Under the proposed requirement, if such a person does not return within three months, his right to reclaim the security deposit would be nullified; however, if he obtains a work contract during this period, he would be entitled to a return of the security deposit. These measures ensure the return of those who do not find work, and they prevent such persons from being exposed to many hardships, especially in countries that do not grant residence permits. The measures would thus preserve the reputation of Egyptian workers.
- The implementation of the idea of establishing a work booklet similar to a passport. This document, which would be valid for seven years, would facilitate knowing how many workers have taken out permits for work in each state, and the occupation of each worker according to the permit, which bears a number for each state.

The sudden return of more than 280,000 Egyptian workers from Kuwait and Iraq because of events there, and the efforts that are being made in this area, provide us with a practical opportunity to study the pros and cons of travelling abroad, so that we can complement previous studies to ultimately produce an integrated plan of action to supervise the Egyptian labor force abroad. Such a plan would guarantee Egyptian workers their rights and provide them with all of the services that they need. We are in strong need of an independent agency whose responsibilities would be just that.

Al-Hudaybi Criticizes Proposed Election Law

91AA0024A Cairo AL-NUR in Arabic 26 Sep 90 p 4

[Interview with Muhammad Ma'mun al-Hudaybi: "Authorities Ought To Adopt Decisive Stand on Honest and Impartial Elections"; date and place not specified]

[Text] Justice Muhammad Ma'mun al-Hudaybi, member of the Muslim Brotherhood's guidance office, criticized the new election bill, emphasizing that this bill legitimizes election rigging and does not offer any guarantees unanimously agreed on by the nation to ensure honest and impartial elections. In private statements to the brotherhood newspaper, Justice al-Hudaybi said that if the press report on the new election bill is true, this would be a disaster because all it does is sanctify the status quo, and it does not offer anything new save for the amendment of certain penalties for election crimes. Following is the text of Justice al-Hudaybi's statement:

[AL-NUR] A newspaper published the so-called new election bill. What are your comments on the bill's contents?

[Al-Hudaybi] If that indeed is the new bill, this would be a disaster because it only sanctifies the status quo, namely, it legitimizes election rigging by omitting any guarantees unanimously agreed upon by the nation represented by all politicians and partisan and non-partisan public officials, as well as all judges, university professors, the various unions, and articles by Egyptian journalists. The nation has unanimously agreed on these guarantees as the least that can be done to give elections an acceptable degree of validity and respectability.

Nation's Demands

[AL-NUR] Are there objections to any specific articles in the bill?

[Al-Hudaybi] The most important unanimous demands are:

- Put a stop to any form of interior ministry intervention in election affairs.
- Election committee chairmen should be elected strictly by the Supreme Judicial Council decision without intervention by the interior ministry or even the minister of justice. In other words, it should be up to the Supreme Judicial Council to appoint a justice, a chief justice, or a certain judge as chairman of an election committee instead of the interior ministry submitting a list of names to be approved in its totality by the Supreme Judicial Council and the interior minister or even the minister of justice issuing a decision to elect one of the names to a specific electoral district. It is very unfortunate that, in past elections, when policemen received information that the justice chairing the general committee was ready to announce election returns from a certain district that was not to their liking, the interior minister would issue a decision appointing someone else to that position, thus making it possible to tamper

with the ballots and announce false results. Also, from a moral viewpoint, the judiciary is the highest authority to which the interior minister and his staff are accountable. It is undignified to have the interior minister electing members of the judiciary to the committee of his choice.

- National consensus also emphasized that members of the judicial power and not the judicial agencies should chair all election committees, be they general or sub-committees, or even if it meant holding elections on more than one day. It is a known fact that restricting judicial power to membership in the main general committee precludes judicial control and oversight over an election held in other committees, and there are a large number of them when no elections are held in the general committee. This is an actual violation of the constitution that provides for judicial oversight that the bill didn't include.
- Another national consensus has to do with the need to verify the voter's identity by an official personal identification document such as an ID card, a driver's license, a weapon's permit, and other official papers that have a photo establishing the individual's name and identity. This demand was totally ignored in the published bill.
- Another unanimous demand is the suspension of the emergency law during the election period, something the bill overlooked despite its importance. It is still fresh in one's mind that a few days before the April 1987 elections, the interior ministry, under the emergency law, arrested 1,312 innocent persons who worked for the Labor Party election campaign that included the two Islamic Alliance candidates. This had the greatest impact on the alliance's election campaign activities nationwide, causing the candidates to lose many of their delegates and aides, which is a blatant intervention and patent exploitation of the emergency law in influencing election returns. The former interior minister has admitted this fact before the People's Assembly even though he alleged that the number was half the figures mentioned above.
- There are many other demands, including the requirement that the Supreme Judiciary Committee should set the number and locations of election committees; that police stations should not be designated as election committee headquarters; that voters sign or fingerprint the voter registration list when they vote; and that parties should be given equal time on TV, radio, and in the national press to prevent the ruling power and its alleged party from monopolizing the mass media. These matters did not get any mention in the published bill!

Dr. Abu-al-Majd's Interview

[AL-NUR] AL-HAQIQAH newspaper published an interview attributed to Dr. Ahmad Kamal Abu-al-Majd in his capacity as a member of the committee formed to study the election bill. In this interview, he said that

there were not enough judges to assume the chairmanship of all the general and sub-election committees and, therefore, sensitive committees would be chaired by members of the judiciary while general committees in other districts would be chaired by the judicial staff. How do you feel about that?

[Al-Hudaybi] With all due respect to and confidence in Dr. Ahmad Kamal Abu-al-Majd, I am afraid this proposal may provide a wide-open door for the legalization of election rigging. For who is to decide which district is sensitive and which is not? Would this be determined only after the nomination process is completed and the name, identity, partisan orientation, and popularity of the candidates are known? Doesn't this give the rule the right to choose a specific district where the judicial role is limited to the general committee, thereby sanctioning large-scale rigging? Would not this measure provide an avenue for challenging the unconstitutionality of the law or the unconstitutionality of the whole election campaign on the basis of unequal opportunities, a principle stipulated in the constitution and adopted by the Constitutional Court that used it as the basis for its renowned ruling on the invalidity of the 5th article of the political rights law on the basis of which the 1978 elections were held?

[AL-NUR] What is your comment on the excuse that the judicial power does not have enough members and that holding elections in stages would create serious problems cited in Dr. 'Abu-al-Majd's interview?

[Al-Hudaybi] First, it is a common fact that in the 1984 and 1987 elections the interior ministry went overboard in the number of election committees it designated, claiming that this would make things easy for the voters when, in fact, its aim was to cripple non-government candidates by preventing them from having delegates on the election committees because a candidate had to have a total of about 1,000 delegates, an impossible and costly process. A true assessment of the appropriate number of election committees would sharply reduce their current number. Likewise, the Judges Club submitted proposals facilitating actual oversight over and chairmanship of a number of elections committees held in the same building by a member of the judicial power. These and other similar proposals can be adopted, and we will not fail, if intentions are good, to find a suitable solution. And, if a decision was to be made to hold the elections that took place in the first stage, it would not be difficult to adopt measures that would make it impossible to tamper with them. I think it is the main power's duty to adopt a decisive stand vis-a-vis honest and neutral elections, for this alone would have a major impact on the safety of the electoral process.

[AL-NUR] One last question. In brief, is it your opinion that the new election bill does not fulfill any of the national demands?

[Al-Hudaybi] According to the published version, except for the amendment of certain penalties for election

crimes, it does not accomplish anything new and is a carbon copy of the status quo.

Political Leaders Discuss Dissolving Peoples Assembly

91AA0014A Cairo AL-AHRAM AL-DUWALI in Arabic
29 Sep 90 p 8

[Article: "How Did Politicians Receive Mubarak's Decrees About People's Assembly?"]

[Text]

NPUG Expects Elections In Mid-December. Al-Wafd Favors Announcing Elections Law And Dividing Districts First

The leaders of the opposition spoke to AL-AHRAM AL-DUWALI about President Mubarak's decree suspending the sessions of the People's Assembly effective last Wednesday and calling the voters to a referendum next October 11th on dissolving the People's Assembly. They also discussed returning to the system of single member [district] election which was adopted in implementation of the ruling of the Supreme Constitutional Court.

Mr. Mustafa Kamil Murad, the head of the Liberal Socialist Party, said: The decision is sound and anticipated because of his respect for the judiciary's rulings and respect for the constitution. It was natural that he would issue this decree. But he said: It is essential now that changes be made in the electoral laws to give expression to the wishes of the Egyptian people, and the division of the electoral districts must be reviewed also, as the single district system in elections demands.

He said that it had become appropriate for the judges to oversee the general and individual committees to insure no falsification with the hope that the coming elections will express the view of the people.

No Surprise

Counsellor Muhammad al-Ma'mun al-Hadhibi said that the decree was not a surprise, on the basis that the subject of the People's Assembly had been studied thoroughly, and the legal experts had expressed their view that the People's Assembly was not constitutional. However, he criticized the belated issuance of the decree (according to him), under the pretext that our country needed all this time to suspend the Assembly.

Al-Hadhibi joins Mustafa Kamil Murad in demanding full supervision of the elections by the jurists and that the government give complete guarantees that the coming elections will not be falsified.

Where Is The Elections Law

From the Wafd Party, deputy 'Ali Salamah said that the new elections law should have been issued for debate by public opinion before issuance of the referendum decree,

and that the plan for changing the electoral districts should have been announced and sufficient guarantees given as to the impartiality of the elections and that the votes of the electorate will not be tampered with.

'Ali Salamah added that the Wafd [Party] thinks that holding the referendum on the basis of the old law will be futile and that the referendum, the holding of which it was announced without a prior announcement about the new changes, may be contested.

The Wafd [Party] deputy demanded that the new elections law be put to debate in preparation for the issuance of a republican decree setting the date for the elections accompanied by the plan for the electoral districts.

Single Member [Districting] Is Preferred

Mr. Kamal Kirah, the Secretary General of the Green Party, said that President Mubarak's decree represents a natural situation with respect to the constitution and that he believes that the people accepted this decree with open-mindedness after the repeated excesses and forgery in the elections for the previous assembly.

Kirah expressed his belief that the single member system will prevent the citizens' being averse to participating in the election of their deputies, especially if there are changes in the elections law which make it in accord with the constitution.

He said: We want a legislative assembly which is in harmony with the era, especially after the events in the Gulf.

From the National Progressive Unionist Grouping [NPUG], Mr. Husayn 'Abd-al-Raziq, a member of the central committee who is responsible for mass action in the party, said that the decree was expected from moment to moment in light of the ruling of the Supreme Constitutional Court and that it was natural for it to be issued before the second week of November, that is before the resumption of the sessions of the People's Assembly, whether the dissolution be final or in the form of a referendum.

Husayn 'Abd-al-Raziq added that it is expected that the coming elections will be held in the middle of next December, that being a period which the National Democratic Party thinks—according to him—is propitious for holding the elections, first, because of the preoccupation of the people with the Gulf crisis and the absence of the negative effects of the return of Egyptians and the non-arrival at final decisions with the IMF. The second reason is that the period of the elections will coincide with the period of the examinations for the first semester in the universities, so the students will be occupied with them.

The mass medium official of the NPUG Party also said that he hoped that there would be no interference and forgery in the coming elections, especially since the

elections of 1984 [and] 1987 were falsified—according to him—in a hitherto unprecedented way.

IRAQ

Agriculture Minister Responds to Blockade

91AE0013A Baghdad AL-THAWRAH in Arabic
23 Sep 90 p 2

[Article by Husayn 'Imran: "Minister of Agriculture and Irrigation to AL-THAWRAH: Numerous Steps To Achieve Self-Sufficiency and Foil Imperialist Schemes; Symposiums in All of Country's Governorates for Ideal Exploitation of Every Inch of Arable Land; Peasant Cooperatives Urge Farming Families to Achieve Self-Sufficiency in Agricultural Crops and Livestock Products"]

[Text] To ensure the cultivation of every inch of Iraq's land and to achieve self-sufficiency in agricultural crops, especially strategic crops such as wheat, barley, corn, and (vetch), the Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation has taken several steps that are capable of foiling the economic blockade imposed on our struggling country.

'Abd-al-Wahhab Mahmud, the minister of agriculture and irrigation, has spoken to AL-THAWRAH about the ministry's tasks and activity under these circumstances, saying: Out of its awareness of the dimensions of the major responsibility it shoulders under these circumstances and to secure food to our proud people's sons, the ministry has instructed all agriculture branches in the country's governorates on the need to facilitate the procedures for the citizens and farmers to acquire arable land so that they may exploit it ideally and with all possible speed and to cultivate it in the coming winter season.

Noble Decisions to Encourage Farmers to Increase Production

His excellency the minister added: To foil the U.S. and Zionist schemes aimed at starving our people, the party and revolution leadership, headed by His Excellency Leader President Saddam Husayn, the builder of Iraq's glory, has issued several decrees capable of creating the right conditions for our farmers to ideally exploit cultivable land. These decrees include exempting farmers from reserve service and people's army service so that they may devote their full time to cultivating the land. This is in addition to decrees reducing the prices of chemical fertilizer by 20 percent below the previous prices so as to encourage farmers to use fertilizers by virtue of their impact on increasing production. The leadership has also issued a decree increasing the prices at which crops are purchased, especially grain crops such as wheat, barley, and corn, and a decree reducing seed prices to encourage farmers to use high-quality seed. This is in addition to Revolution Command Council Decree No. 364 on providing the citizen with the opportunity to exploit cultivable land. This decree permits

citizens to exploit state-owned cultivable land ideally by planting it with wheat, barley, and vetch. All these resolutions will be capable of foiling the U.S. and Zionist schemes for imposing an economic blockade on our struggling country. The glorious Iraqi people will continue to roll up their sleeves to cultivate every inch of Iraq's generous land and, consequently, to achieve self-sufficiency in agricultural crops, especially in such strategic crops as wheat, barley, corn, and vetch.

Ideal Exploitation of All Cultivable Land

His excellency the minister of agriculture and irrigation added:

The ministry has taken the initiative and held numerous symposiums with all of the officials concerned in the ministry and with the agricultural officials in all the governorates to familiarize them with the current phase being undergone by our struggling country and with the need to exploit all cultivable land and to take advantage of radio and television programs provided to the ministry in order to convey directions and instructions to the farmers and peasants on how to ideally exploit arable land.

On the use of scientific methods in the agricultural process, his excellency the minister of agriculture and irrigation said:

The farmers have been familiarized with the use of scientific methods to plow and fertilize the land and to control pests in order to enhance productivity per donum.

To achieve self-sufficiency in seed in the next two years, farmers have been encouraged to produce the seed they need, especially vegetable seed. Seed prices have been set by the Iraqi Seed Production Company. Moreover, the use of agricultural requirements, such as pesticides and machinery, has been rationalized. These requirements will be sold under the direct control of the agricultural branch offices in order to rationalize their consumption, as well as the consumption of water in the irrigation process. The farmers have also been familiarized with the need to employ the system of night irrigation by virtue of its importance in reducing water waste. We are confident, the minister has said, that with the instructions of His Excellency Leader President Saddam Husayn, with the decrees issued and steps taken since, and with the farmers' and peasants' redoubled efforts, we will be able to achieve self-sufficiency in agricultural crops and will foil the U.S. and Zionist schemes and their lackeys who call for imposing an economic embargo against our struggling country. Our country will foil these schemes with the resolve of the enthusiastic sons of our proud people.

Increased Allotments of Chemical Fertilizer for Agents

In a related development, the Ministry of Industry and Military Production has decided to increase the chemical fertilizer allotments designated for agents so that they

may distribute the fertilizer to peasants and farmers in order that they may use it in cultivable land and, consequently, increase the productivity per donum.

The General Federation of Peasant Associations has also developed a complete work plan that is likely to increase agricultural production. Sajir Zubayr Ja'atah, deputy chairman of the General Federation of Peasant Associations, has spoken to us about this plan, saying:

Our associations' plan seeks to ideally exploit available capacities and resources in order to increase production and improve its quality through self-reliance. In detail, this plan focuses on cultivating wheat and on refraining for expansion in the cultivation of fodder in lands fit for the cultivation of wheat. Emphasis is also put on increasing productivity per donum, on relying on the use of local seed, and on refraining from using wheat seed as fodder for livestock. The plan also emphasizes the need to launch popular action campaigns to clear main and subsidiary streams and drainage networks in order to facilitate the agricultural process.

Call for Achieving Self-Sufficiency in Livestock Products

Sajir Ja'atah added: As for our plan in the area of livestock production, all farming families have been instructed to achieve self-sufficiency in livestock products, and they have been encouraged to raise poultry and sheep in order to meet their own needs and to achieve self-sufficiency in such products. Moreover, they have been instructed to curtail the outrageous slaughter of livestock resources by virtue of the losses such slaughter inflicts on these resources.

In conclusion, we say that the proud Iraqis who carry weapons in their hands to defend our proud Iraq against the U.S. and Zionist threats are capable of cultivating every inch of Iraq's generous land and of thus foiling all the imperialist schemes and of achieving self-sufficiency in agricultural crops.

Editorial Considers How To Confront Blockade

91AE0013B Baghdad AL-THAWRAH in Arabic
19 Sep p 5

[Editorial by Nuri Najm al-Musawi: "Toward Foiling Economic Blockade"]

[Text] U.S. imperialism, along with U.S. allies in Europe, the Zionist entity, and lackeys of the U.S. in the Arab region, is wagering on the economic blockade, among other measures, as a means of aggression and of pressuring Iraq to force it to abandon its principled national and pan-Arab course, its adherence to its national sovereignty and independence and to its people's and nation's rights to their land and its resources, and its determination to prevent any violation of these rights, regardless of the source or objectives of such a violation.

In light of this wager, the task of foiling the economic blockade and the aggressive acts accompanying it emerges as one of the most significant national and pan-Arab tasks for securing the requirements of the steadfastness of the great Iraq which constitutes nowadays the vanguard of the Arab nation in its fateful battle against the imperialist-Zionist aggression. Underlining this task does not diminish the significance and priority of the other tasks of the national and pan-Arab struggle in the current phase, such as confronting corrupt and suspicious regimes and exposing their collusion with the imperialist U.S.-Zionist alliance, striking the aggressors' interest wherever they may be in the Arab homeland, cementing the people's front in every Arab country so that it may support the brave patriotic leaderships inside and outside the government, foiling the schemes of the lackeys who have been transformed into pliable instruments in the hands of the foreigner, and exerting efforts to infiltrate the hostile media so as to reach the peoples of the United States, Europe, Japan, and the other countries of the world in order to explain to them the just cause of the Arabs and the legitimacy of their struggle against foreign domination and against military aggression in the Arab Peninsula where the Arab and Muslim holy places are located.

All these and others are nowadays major tasks in the nation's battle. But foiling the economic blockade constitutes the natural inlet to defeating the aggression and the aggressors who are racing in the "Security Council" lobbies to tighten this blockade through a number of resolutions and measures, including resolution 666 which has rationed the entry and distribution of food and medicines in a manner that obstructs their delivery to the Iraqi people, that undermines the Iraqi people's sovereignty over their land, and that contradicts the principles of the UN charter which prohibit the use of medicines and food as a means of putting political pressure on peoples when crises develop, regardless of the nature of such crises. Rather, these principles emphasize the exclusion of food and medicines and prohibit withholding them from any people whomsoever.

Because the battle is pan-Arab in nature and in motives and objectives, all the Arab nation's sons are concerned with it. Because it is fundamentally humane in nature, considering that Iraq stands opposed to entrenching an international system that seeks to further enrich the countries of the north and to further impoverish and crush the countries of the south, then the peoples of South and Latin America, of Asia, and of Africa are concerned with the battle being waged by Iraq for a fairer economic system and for introducing changes in the international systems of production and in the relations between the parties to these systems. Also, within the framework of the humane dimension, the progressive forces in Europe, Japan, and the United States, which are opposed to colonialism and to the exploitation of

people and which believe in the right to self-determination and in pursuing a fair international economic system that is free of exploitation and oppression—these forces are also concerned with the battle of Iraq and the Arabs.

At the national level, Iraq—people, leadership, organizations, and state agencies—has begun enacting a number of necessary resolutions and measures to accomplish the following:

- Boost the production process in the areas of agriculture and industry.
- Reduce the reliance on imported materials and equipment at work.
- Secure full opportunities for the ideal exploitation of the land.
- Establish the rules for regulating and distributing foodstuffs and medicines.
- Release the freedom of initiative so that individuals, organizations, and companies may work without restrictions to achieve the economic, social, and political objectives.
- Rationalize family and societal consumption.

At the information and political level, all the people's factions are now moving to defeat the aggression and to foil all the endeavors seeking to usurp Iraq's rights to its land and resources and to undermine Iraq's sovereignty and independence.

At the Arab level, the Arab nation has risen as it has never done before to support and back Iraq, its historic leader, and its brave people. Most Arab countries are experiencing celebrations of struggle that signal and emphasize the importance of the issue Iraq is confronting and the degree of its impact on the Arab mind and conscience. It can be said that in the nation's history of struggle throughout this century, this is the first time that the masses have marched forth in this manner and that parties, forces, and organizations with different tendencies have been formed within coordinated frameworks organized under the umbrella of incontrovertible national and pan-Arab slogans.

Humanly, the world is witnessing numerous manifestations in support of the heroic Iraqi stance. Supporting positions are developing among peoples and regimes, the gap is widening between the positions of the nonaligned countries and of the United States and its allies, and shouts of disgust with the U.S. resolutions adopted by the Security Council are rising louder and louder.

For this entire movement to develop at the local, Arab, and international levels in order to foil the economic blockade, efforts must be made to move forward in crystallizing the declared policies and positions. We must not be content with what has been accomplished, especially since the battle goes on and since the imperialist countries are eager to escalate the tension for reasons and for no reason in preparation for a military aggression which they are hatching and for which they are making arrangements.

Foremost among the decisive means to confront the blockade is the development of voluntary popular participation in government agencies' efforts and actions so that the masses in the cities, provinces, and villages may employ new and unconventional methods of action in supporting the state's economic and commercial effort. This is accomplished when popular organizations begin to observe the citizens' current and expected problems, when they live with the particulars of such problems, and when they develop reasonable solutions that are possible under current circumstances and that lead to building a mighty and impenetrable social wall. If we are putting the emphasis today on dealing with the particulars and given facts of the current phase, then those who confront the problems emanating from the economic blockade must consider the future and must take into account the possibility that the blockade will be coupled with acts of aggression that require other types of social approaches and conduct in order to ensure social security for the Iraqi family, village, and city and, consequently, for the beloved homeland. Within this framework, reliance on state agencies or on what organizations and other institutions may offer represents a negative manifestation that may produce incalculable damage. With this statement, we do not wish to alleviate the government burdens. Under these circumstances, government agencies have been mobilized. Their preparedness and the services they offer in emergencies will rise to a higher level. But the more important issue—and this is a lesson learned from the history of the peoples' confrontation of the forces of aggression—is that within their well-known social frameworks, the masses are capable of doing a lot to fill the gaps that are created or generated by acts of aggression, especially by the economic blockade. Housework, agricultural work, an honest contribution to securing and distributing needed items, and the exertion of concerted efforts to select consumption and production alternatives are all means that serve the central objective and that complement the military, political, and information effort. As the 8-year war has taught us, the degree by which the domestic front is united and consolidated constitutes a safety valve so that our valiant armed forces can embark on and perform their national and pan-Arab tasks.

In the past 50 days since 8 August, it has been clearly noted that the level of citizen awareness has developed in a manner that befits the immense responsibilities currently shouldered by Iraq and that the high willingness to sacrifice, endure, and resist is boundless. All that is required is that we constantly seek and work daily to develop the formulae of organization, of coordination, of voluntary work and that we work to ensure citizen participation—each citizen from his position—in performing the tasks required of him so as to bolster his own economic and social security and in order that he may be prepared for every emergency, thus complementing the party and government performance and the performance of all the organizations.

If the imperialist and Zionist forces' objective behind the blockade is to bring Iraq to its knees, then the blockade

will provide the Iraqis with the historical opportunity to prove that Iraq, measured by population numbers and area, is the world's richest country, not just because of the presence of oil but also because the other sources of wealth (land, rivers, mineral resources, and so forth) indicate Iraq's capability to battle aggressors and to foil their conspiratorial endeavor. If need is the mother of invention, as the saying goes, then the plotting to which the Iraqi people's food and medicine is subjected will motivate Iraq's sons to turn Iraq's buried treasures into harvests, abundance, and lasting prosperity.

At the Arab level, the people's organizations, be they parties or labor unions and associations, are mainly required to work with all the available means to open gaps in the hostile wall with which the alliance of imperialists and Zionists and of their suspect lackeys in the region seeks to surround Iraq by providing various kinds of material aid, by organizing the means and methods to deliver the various materials Iraq's people and great army need, and by viewing participation in the imperialist blockade as an open contribution to the conspiracy being implemented against Iraq. In this regard, what has been done in fraternal Jordan represents a model for what political and professional organizations should do. Developing support and aid for Iraq surpasses, as a main task, the economic and political impact of the measures and means employed by the aggression. If the nation's munificent forces manage to mobilize tens of millions of Arabs and Muslims to secure what Iraq needs, then this alone will constitute a strong and understandable message to the U.S. administration, its allies, the Zionist entity, and to the corrupt regimes in the region and will certainly contribute to driving the aggressors back to where they came from or to compelling them to commit further follies that will cost them dearly.

The popular political action embodied in the popular conference held in Amman and the ideas and recommendations presented in that conference constitute a strong beginning which will continue throughout the Arab homeland with varied tasks and with numerous means in order to defeat the conspiracy and to topple the local plotters who have formed in the region the plotting mainstay on which the United States, the Zionist entity, and their western allies have relied. What is important is that this action assumes tangible material forms, especially the form of ceaseless efforts to develop means that contribute to demolishing the blockade wall. We believe that this is more than possible under the current circumstances and in the future. Moreover, Arab popular relations with third world countries, especially in the wake of Leader Saddam Husayn's historic initiative of offering oil free of charge to needy third world peoples, are supposed to be exploited to flow ultimately into the framework of foiling the economic blockade by providing popular cover for the independent political action of the governments that adopt sound positions free from U.S. pressures. They are supposed, as well, to flow into the framework of putting pressure on the governments that implement or fear the U.S.-Zionist policy.

Focusing on the political, economic, and cultural impact Iraq's victory in its historic battle may leave on the future of the peoples, forming in Asia and Africa major political powers capable of acting as the equals of the United States, the Soviet Union, and other powers, and transforming the peoples' hardship into political and economic positions and work programs that fight the causes of hardship will hasten Iraq's victory, and along with it the victory of the world's oppressed and exploited peoples, and will inevitably rearrange the conditions in the international community as we in the Arab homeland and as the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America want them rearranged according to our free choices and not rearranged as the international cartels want them arranged for us.

Iraq's victory lies in our ability as Iraqis, Arabs, Muslims, and as the poor of the world to stand united and steadfast against aggression and to find the means to counter the aggressors' conspiratorial and aggressive methods until we score the decisive victory.

ISRAEL

General Puts Iraqi Strength in Perspective

91AE0024B Tel Aviv HADASHOT in Hebrew
13 Sep 90 p 17

[Article by Brigadier General (retired) Aharon Lev-Ran]

[Text] Frightening figures have recently been bandied around about possible U.S. losses if it were to take military action against Iraq. It must be pointed out that these figures are baseless suppositions defended only by the wishful thinking of foreign and local "experts and commentators." They have not been accompanied by convincing studies or conclusions based on relevant experience. These suppositions leave room for the suspicion that they may be aimed at discouraging the United States from implementing the offensive option. Although I am not a supporter of such an option at this point, for any eventuality, in spite of the quantitative strength of the Iraqis, the Americans don't need to fear it excessively. This claim is based on an incomparably up-to-date and instructive experiment: the long Gulf war. Iraq won the war against Iran not because of its impressive offensive in the air or on the ground. It won the war primarily because Iran did its best to lose it: its religious fanaticism had cut it off from any strong patron who could have supplied it with weapons and military equipment. Fanatical enthusiasm alone is not enough to defeat well defended military positions. In the end, ever since 1987 Iran also brought upon itself American maritime involvement in the Gulf, which dashed any hope it may have had of defeating Iraq. True, the chemical weapons and ground missiles did their work, but against a mortally exhausted Iran.

The Iraqi army failed in its ground campaign to conquer Khuzistan; after several months of fighting (September 1980) it became bogged down, and by June 1982

Saddam was ready to pull out of Iranian territory. Between that time and the middle of 1986 the Iraqis did not stage any offensive, either because they did not have confidence in their capability or because of heightened sensitivity to losses. In 1986 they briefly tried to return to the offensive with a desperate attempt to conquer the town of Mahran. Only in the last few months of the war (April-August 1988) did their attacks succeed in reconquering certain areas and penetrating Iran again, and this thanks to the intensive use of chemical weapons used against poorly equipped Iranians scared of those weapons.

This example is relevant for the rumored possibility of an Iraqi "counterattack" on Saudi Arabia from Kuwait. According to the above we have good reason to estimate that Iraq does not have such an option against U.S. troops. The Iraqi army does not have great capability for ground maneuvers, certainly not in open, desert terrain and against strong and modern forces. It is doubtful whether its defense capability, which was certainly good when Iraq was defending "its own turf" against the Iranians, will suffice to sustain it in Kuwait. In its own land, the Iraqi defense was aided by the Tigris and Euphrates rivers, swamp areas, and so forth. As for chemical weapons and missiles, Saddam knows very well that the power of the United States is not exactly identical to that of the ill-equipped Iranians.

Iraqi air attacks on Iranian oil installations in the Gulf in March 1984 and on the Iranian economic infrastructure in March 1983 were no success story either. According to testimonies by reliable American sources and to various studies, the Iraqi air force was successful in only about one fifth of its targets, although there was almost no enemy air force to hinder it and the Iranian anti-aircraft defense was weak. Especially instructive was the failure of the Iraqi air force to put out of commission the Iranian oil terminal on the Kharj Island (about 200 km. from Basra), in spite of the hundreds of attacks staged against that critical target (since August 1985). The installations on the island sustained a great amount of damage, but the Iranians continued to load oil from them until the end of the war. This was achieved only with the aid of anti-aircraft defense consisting mostly of artillery guns, machine guns, and a few anti-aircraft missiles.

More than a few conclusions can be derived from this concerning the low potential capability of the Iraqi air force to damage Saudi oil installations, especially in view of the fact that they are defended by U.S. air force and anti-aircraft forces. This point is crucial in terms of the great fears of the West that an offensive against oil installations in the eastern part of Saudi Arabia is a valid Iraqi defense option, if and when the United States should attack Iraq from the air. An additional relevant point is the great Iraqi sensitivity to losing aircraft and pilots. After two months of intensive fighting at the beginning of 1987 (during Iran's attempts to penetrate the Basra area) the Iraqi air force lost about 50 airplanes, after which it almost disappeared from the arena for four

months. Small wonder that this air force chose to attack defenseless vessels in the Gulf, with stand-off weapons moreover, and even this wasn't done consistently, resolutely, or very effectively.

All this is not meant to say that the Iraqi army is completely helpless from an operational viewpoint or that the Americans would not suffer losses. However, one must view possible developments of the crisis in the right professional perspective, and commentaries must be anchored in authenticity and relevant experience. Iraq may not be Panama, but neither is it Vietnam.

JORDAN

Shipping Agent on Effects of Crisis on al-'Aqabah 90AE0375A Amman AL-DUSTUR in Arabic 18 Sep 90 p 6

[Article: "Head of Shipping Agents' Association in Jordan Explains Damages Resulting From Gulf Crisis"]

[Text] The port of al-'Aqabah and the transport sector were and still are the main nerve of Jordan's economy. In the last four decades, the port has developed significantly, after our brother country Iraq began using al-'Aqabah as one of the main ports in the region. Goods shipped to al-'Aqabah in transit to Iraq accounted for about 75 percent of all cargoes unloaded. Iraqi goods—sulfur, other fertilizers, petroleum, and other oils—accounted for about 21 percent of exported cargo.

In a memorandum about the damage that the port of al-'Aqabah will suffer because of the Gulf crisis, Mr. Tawfiq Qa'war, head of the Maritime Shipping Agents' Association in Jordan, said that every ton of goods unloaded in the port generates about 25 dinars of income for Jordan as a whole. This figure accrues from the first moment the ship anchors in the port, because it pays port fees and expenses for unloading goods, beginning with stevedorage, the fee for transport ashore, portage, and the dock fee. Then there are storage fees, agency fees, other consultation expenses, pay for extra workers and extra work, and finally truck rentals. In addition, there is the charge for hiring land transport from al-'Aqabah to Baghdad or Amman, as well as transit fees. If we take the average quantity of goods unloaded at al-'Aqabah overall as about 9 million tons, multiplied by 25 dinars, this equals 225 million dinars of yearly income. This figure includes the income yielded by freighters shipping phosphates and other fertilizers, including the fees for land transport from the phosphate mines and potash sites to the storage depots, as well as port fees on those ships. However, the figure does not include what this operation yields in indirect income—e.g., hotels, restaurants, other means of transportation, merchants, and gas stations in al-'Aqabah and along the roads from al-'Aqabah to cities in the interior and to Iraq. The income may thus reach 250 million dinars. No fewer than 5,000 workers, 10,000 drivers, and tens of thousands of employees working in

all sectors directly or indirectly related to transport and allied fields benefit from this income.

This relates to income from arriving goods. If we assume that goods for Iraq will cease arriving—and they totalled about 75 percent—the income of the port and of citizens benefiting from it will be reduced by about the same percentage, if not more, because some concerns—hotels, restaurants, etc.—will shut down completely because it will be unprofitable for them to continue operating.

Higher Insurance Premiums Against Dangers of War

Mr. Qa'war said that the premium for insurance against dangers of war has risen alarmingly. It had been zero; now it is 0.25 percent computed on the value of the body of the ship (hull insurance). Coverage is for one week. If we reckon the value of large modern ships at about \$10 million, the insurance premium for one week could amount to \$250,000. Goods will carry this insurance in the form of shipping charges. Some ships are therefore refusing to load goods for Jordan, preferring to avoid the Gulf of al-'Aqabah region, which Lloyds has classified as a war zone. Also, marine insurance has risen from 0.0275 to 0.125 percent as of 14 August 1990.

Rising Fuel Prices

Since events in the region began early in August, the price of fuel oil has risen from \$90 to \$132. The price of diesel has risen from \$185 to \$320. These are Suez delivery prices for comparison. This has the negative effect of raising sea transport costs for both imports and exports.

Rising Shipping Costs for Imports and Exports

Mr. Qa'war explained that sea line associations from the ports of northern Europe and Britain have set the following increase on container shipping: the charge for a 20-foot container, which had been \$1,400, is now about \$1,750; the charge for a 40-foot container, which had been \$3,230, is now about \$3,900.

Rates from Mediterranean ports show similar increases. Sea line associations from the ports of Japan and the Far East have set the following increase on shipping charges:

The charge for a 20-foot container, which had been \$1,700, is now about \$2,500; the charge for a 40-foot container, which was \$3,300, is now about \$4,850.

Shipping charges for various goods transported normally—i.e., without containers—have risen by 20 percent.

One of our most important exports is phosphate. For the reasons mentioned above, shipping costs to the Mediterranean have risen by about \$302 per ton. This will make Jordanian phosphate uncompetitive compared with the price from competitors in Morocco and America, which have not been faced with an increase in insurance premiums. This will also apply to our exports of potash, clinker, and cement.

Ship Availability

It should be noted that the sea traffic into al-'Aqabah, the rapid turnover of goods, and the availability of exports in large quantities that are shipped in bulk from and to the port, particularly in bulk carriers, have gained for the port of al-'Aqabah the confidence of shippers and have provided ships in the area ready to carry goods. Carriers have favored the port of al-'Aqabah as a destination for their ships because of the availability of ready cargoes of phosphate, potash, clinker, and Iraqi fertilizers such as sulfur and tri-superphosphate. The carrier pays a fee to only one port, since the cargo is unloaded in it and another cargo is carried from it.

This advantage is fundamental in the economics of maritime shipping. The only port in the Red Sea that assures goods for the return trip is al-'Aqabah. Its importance therefore became prominent. This advantage has had a positive effect on the cost of shipping by sea to al-'Aqabah and from al-'Aqabah, bringing benefit to importers and exporters alike.

Cutoff of Iraqi Goods

The absence of Iraqi goods being shipped through the port of al-'Aqabah means a large decrease in the number of ships arriving in the port and therefore a decrease in the number of lines coming to the port. This will have a negative effect on the speed with which goods reach Jordanian merchants.

As an indication of this, and because of obstacles arising from higher insurance costs, a number of regular maritime lines have announced that they will stop coming to the port of al-'Aqabah, because it is not economically profitable. Because predicted economic conditions are not encouraging, we expect another decrease in the number of these regular lines that ensure the regular shipping of goods.

Another negative result may occur: importation from northern Europe and the Mediterranean basin may be redirected to the port of al-Ladhiqiyah.

Employees and Workers

Maritime shipping agencies employ about 1,000 employees in Amman and al-'Aqabah. Other concerns and companies, such as clearing agencies and truck owners, employ several thousand employees and drivers. Many of them may be harmed.

Mr. Qa'war said that this is a preliminary study of the effect of current events on the sea and land transport sector. He stated that the air transport sector has also been affected. Merchants' imports by airplane have decreased greatly. However, we find no obstacles in this field, as long as Jordanian Royal Airlines continues to service most of the main destinations linked commercially to Jordan.

LEBANON

Junblatt: Political Class, Parties 'Bankrupt'*90AE0369A Beirut AL-NAHAR in Arabic**18, 19, 20 Sep 90*

[Interview with Walid Junblatt, Progressive Socialist Party Leader, by Michel Abu-Judah and Habib Shalluq in al-Mukhtarah; "Junblatt Tells All;" first three paragraphs are AL-NAHAR introduction; date not given]

[18 Sep pp 1, 7]

[Text] Walid Junblatt, the PSP [Progressive Socialist Party] leader, the bayk [title of absolute prominence] and son of a bayk, and the grandson of Nazirah Junblatt and Prince Shakib Arslan, the minister who rarely participates in the cabinet sessions because "everyone seeks his own interest"—Walid Junblatt, the socialist leader, seems to be inclined to bid farewell to arms because "why all this arsenal when war has exhausted everybody?" He urges that all participate in the government, from General President Michel 'Awn to Dr. Samir Ja'ja', the Lebanese Forces commander. He prefers that B'abda and al-Yarzah be regained without a military decision because "we have had enough wars." If one repeats the question about the reason for his failure to attend the cabinet sessions, Junblatt responds: "With whom is one to talk?"

[AL-NAHAR] We miss you in AL-NAHAR, in al-Hamra' Street, and especially in the cabinet.

[Junblatt] I have not been going to Beirut.

[AL-NAHAR] What is the true story with the cabinet?

[Junblatt] The truth is that I have been traveling. I have been abroad and I have visited Iran and Russia, and even gotten to Helsinki. This means that there is no story. Currently, not every cabinet session deals with serious issues. This is why I have decided that some retreat from public political issues is better, especially under the momentous current Arab circumstances. (He then added loudly:) Considering that some issues cannot be dealt with or that there is no serious effort to deal with them, why should one go and disagree with people over nothing, especially where economic matters are concerned?

Who Are Others

[AL-NAHAR] There are those who say that your excellency encourages the creation of a "civil administration?"

[Junblatt] Who are they? Moreover, what is the concept of civil administration? A civil administration is tantamount to a plenary governorate council with expanded powers. Such councils exist in all countries of the world. Even in France consideration is being given to creating new governorates so that the provinces may be given freedom of economic movement and greater [self-] management. This is the story of the civil administration.

The civil administration is always the sacrificial lamb. What is wrong with the administration and with the other provinces is revenue collection. If the province revenues were collected centrally in a manner that allows them to be returned to the province, if the province needs were studied, and if a five-year plan were established, it would be better and there would be central financing. We are not the only ones who collect revenues. Everybody in Lebanon "is operating on his own and collecting revenues." I believe that we have been relatively successful under the circumstance we have experienced. But the destruction has spread to affect everybody, and we can no longer carry on. If the economic collapse persists, nobody will be able to carry on. How could one carry on? Moreover, our province is one of the poorest provinces. There are relatively richer provinces which have more resources and facilities and more smuggling. Our province is the poorest province. It is true that the province encompasses beautiful areas. Bayt-al-Din is very pretty, and so are Dayr al-Qamar and al-Mukhtarah. But man does not live on pretty stone. There is a crisis now. The farmers [in our province] harvest one crop whereas farmers in al-Biq'a harvest several crops. How will fruits be marketed and to whom, especially when Turkish applies, just to give one example, control the market? There is no control in the country and the country's borders are open.

[AL-NAHAR] You are one of those who say that General 'Awn is the main obstacle in the face of restoration of the state?

[Junblatt] I have not said anything about General 'Awn. Our experience with 'Awn in the so-called "liberation war" was a bitter experience. We were among the first to object even to his appointment to the post of army commander at the time. If we are to backtrack to the cabinet which emerged from the Lucerne conference, then we find that the man "just came into existence." We again remind everybody who has told even the delegation of the new Lebanese Front that the so-called al-Ta'if accord is a phased settlement and a settlement to which we have many objections. But it is an existing settlement, and there is nothing else. It is not a covenant. It is an accord. Let us try to accept and develop this settlement. To date, General 'Awn continues to reject it. Is this the solution? I don't think so. Let us accept it and let us find out what it will produce. Let all of us—we, General 'Awn, and Samir Ja'ja'—participate in this settlement openly. We can develop it later. This is my opinion.

Sphere of Change

[AL-NAHAR] Should there be greater deterioration, how would you see the solution? Is it in keeping the government or in changing it?

[Junblatt] Meaning in what sphere? The question is: Is there possibility of change and of forming a political action team and an economic action team that tackle the issue most seriously? Is there a possibility without

returning to the Arab and regional balances? This government is the product of balances and of war. It came into existence at the end of the "liberation war" and after the so-called al-Ta'if accord was established. It is true that some ministers came at the last moment as a result of settlements, favoritism, and balances. It is true...

[AL-NAHAR] There are those who say that the presidency and this government operate as if they were in the pre-1975 era, as if there is no al-Ta'if accord, and as if no war has taken place.

[Junblatt] To be true, some of this behavior does exist. Some people in the government, some in the assembly, and some political officials inside and outside the regime do not yet realize the existing political and demographic facts. I believe that some are "unconscious" and unaware of what is happening in the Arab area as a whole and unaware even of the international developments. To put it in one word, it is as if legitimate government has been established and the problem is over. This is not true. If, for example, a legitimate government is established in B'abda tomorrow, will the south be restored, will Beirut Port be regained, will Samir Ja'ja' depart from al-Karantina section, will Walid Junblatt turn in his weapons, and will an army in which the citizen trusts be built? Will the door be shut to the smuggling of hashish and heroin which have become the main source of income of some Lebanese? What form will the new governorates take if we take into account the changes that have taken place on the ground? What is the new election law? Can we all develop a modern concept of a new election law or will we do what they are doing now with the settlement they are considering. Some deputies who have reached a certain age may resign to appoint their sons in their place. But with whom is one to talk? With all my respect and love for all and even though I do not wish to criticize anybody—and "I have stopped criticizing others"—the question is: With whom is one to talk? With whom is one to talk in Lebanon and with whom is one also to talk outside Lebanon?

Son From Father

[AL-NAHAR] What is your opinion of the appointment of deputies?

[Junblatt] It will create immediate civil wars between the sects. (He went on to add:) Within some sects and families. It will open a Pandora's box. I also believe that we will fail in the partial appointments which are supposed to have been an endeavor to inject new blood into the Chamber of Deputies because when brother inherits from brother and son from father, nothing will have changed.

Militias' Fate

[AL-NAHAR] Is there no chance of lessening the Lebanese citizens' involvement in politics and of increasing their involvement in business?

[Junblatt] I believe that the existing political class generally has gone bankrupt. I believe that the parties have gone bankrupt. I believe that the people as people have reached the stage of despair, especially under the impact of this burden and drain. We notice how anybody who gets a visa to Canada or Australia goes "without waiting for me or for anybody else. They are fleeing." They have lost hope in everything. The resounding speeches that we make create a little enthusiasm. But it then becomes obvious that the speeches are without content. General patriotic statements have become meaningless. Nothing has meaning any longer. Everything has changed. Of course, a certain class of youth continues to exist in the land, and we are responsible for absorbing this class and for turning it into a productive force, not an unproductive force. I mean by this class the militias, the troops, and thousands of youth who have gotten accustomed to nothing other than fighting, be they our youth, Samir Ja'ja's youth, or even Michel 'Awn's youth, who are also a militia. The great army has also become a militia. There are thousands...

[AL-NAHAR] Do you find it possible to establish a unified army?

[Junblatt] The mission of this unified army must be defined. Is it not so? At a certain phase, this army was for the protection of the privileges of a certain sect. I believe that time has outpaced such an army. The unified army should consist of a certain and defined number, and it should be for the south, and the south only. It should try to implement UN resolutions 425 and 426. We do not need these hundreds of tanks and guns which will, if they erupt at any moment, destroy everybody. We, Michel 'Awn, and Samir Ja'ja' have an immense amount of weapons, if you wish to add it up. "Ouch... This is fearful... This is terrible."

There remains for later an old idea which has been presented as a result of the circumstances created by the war, namely that it is possible to create provincial internal security units tied, of course, centrally to the Ministry of Interior or to another ministry. These units will be the police. With time, "people will be mingled with each other." But we must all be convinced that the weapons we possess will do us no good and that they will destroy us and destroy everybody. These vast quantities of weapons must be reconsidered. These weapons are in Lebanon and, he added with a laugh, "not only in Lebanon."

Christians and Mountain

[AL-NAHAR] There was discussion regarding the return of Christians to Mount Lebanon. What has developed in this connection?

[Junblatt] The discussions faltered and stopped because they concern a political issue and an economic issue. Whenever the issue of repatriation of the Christian evacuees in Mount Lebanon was discussed, some people

thought that a Druze-Christian deal was in the works. Lebanese and non-Lebanese, as well as regional, objections were raised.

The little Lebanon has ended, and the given facts have changed. But we, as inhabitants of Mount Lebanon, are entitled to restore our historical concord. We are entitled to it, but it seems to be forbidden. It seems to be forbidden. When we tried two years ago, perhaps the step was important. But we did not take into account that the step would be followed by a "liberation war." One cannot return people to their villages when there is a so-called "liberation war" in which bombs rain on villages and provoke rancors anew. Then there is an economic step because tens of villages are destroyed, burnt, or inhabited by a certain group of Druze refugees. Does not one want to rebuild these villages? We proposed in the past a Mount Lebanon council as a representative, economic, and political council. But the proposal collided with obstacles and the issue of the Mount Lebanon evacuees was tied to the issue of all evacuees in Lebanon. We have no objection and we do not consider the Mount Lebanon people to be better than others. But Mount Lebanon's historical place gives the issue more importance than the evacuees from the north, from the south, or from other parts. The Mount Lebanon council proposal was rejected and lost in the lobbies. "Doesn't one need money?" There are tens of villages. Creating an economic activity requires money so that the Druze evacuee may be repatriated in his province and that the Christian evacuee's village may be rebuilt. The issue is not an easy one. The discussion has come to a halt.

[AL-NAHAR] If your excellency were in the place of President al-Harawi or of Prime Minister al-Huss, what would you start with first?

[Junblatt] I would try to implement an expenditure-squeezing policy, and I believe that we can implement such a policy. I would try to raise the customs fees, and all the ports on Lebanon's coastline have Lebanese customs offices. I would call a spade a spade. We would name whoever tries to evade taxes, especially customs taxes at the ports. We would cooperate with the local and regional authorities. We, whether Syrian, Amal followers, or socialists, must pay customs fees. Lebanon may not be just a crossing point for thousands of tons of smuggled goods. "The only thing that is observed are fees on vehicles because they require essential administrative procedures. Other than this, there is nothing." I would then try to reduce the size of the army and of the security forces and to introduce new blood. There are tens or hundreds of civil servants who live abroad. They have emigrated, and we continue to pay them money to this moment. I would then close some unnecessary embassies. There are important embassies in important countries by virtue of the presence of vast numbers of expatriates in these countries. There has to be there somebody to tend their affairs. But there are, on the other hand, embassies that "make no sense." We have ended as a state. "It is finished." Lebanon, the state of

the 1950's and 1960's, has ended. We have become a fourth, a fifth, and a sixth world country. Bangladesh may be better than us.

[19 Sep pp 1, 7]

[Text] In part one, Minister Walid Junblatt said that the appointment of deputies would create a "civil war" among some sects and families and would open a Pandora's box. He also talked of steps that can be taken to improve the economic situation. Today, he adds:

Regarding the political issue, let all participate. Why should we exclude anybody. Let a new government be formed, and let it include everybody from Samir Ja'ja' to Michel 'Awn, if he agrees. We should hold elections. Instead of appointment, we should hold elections. We should subject some of these ideas to an electric shock.

[AL-NAHAR] What makes President al-Harawi and Prime Minister al-Huss reluctant to take such steps?

[Junblatt] The only thing they have on their mind is the surrender of legitimacy—their legitimacy, our legitimacy, B'abda—and the question of how to take over B'abda and al-Yarzah. If we take them over, then first... At present, everybody is preoccupied with this point. Suppose that there are international or local obstacles that make it impossible for the al-Harawi and al-Huss government to take over B'abda, should we give up? They tell us now that they want to take over B'abda by the end of the month, and they are tying the step to Baker's visit to Damascus. God willing, it will be a bloodless takeover because I believe that we have had our fill of war. We have all gone through wars and we have all had laurel wreaths. But I believe that all the laurel has dried up. We have had enough war. Let us wait and see what the Baker-Asad meeting will produce.

But we must keep in mind the other possibility, namely: What should we do if we do not succeed in this? Is there an emergency plan? Herein lies the question.

Palestinian in Dilemma

[AL-NAHAR] What is your opinion of the statement that the Lebanese should tell the Palestinians: Enough? What we mean is that the developments started in the south and it is now becoming evident to people that acts of violence are reviving among the Palestinians and between the Palestinians and others?

[Junblatt] This is true. But the Palestinian is in a dilemma now. This dilemma has caused him to be involved in the Sidon wars. What I mean is that the Palestinian is in a major Arab and international dilemma. Some in the PLO are thinking anew that resuming the so-called armed struggle through Lebanese borders may give them a place. It is my opinion that this notion is outdated. A single Arab plan has to be developed to confront the Israeli settlement activity and to

face the Arab world's economic challenges. Regrettably, the Palestinian issue is no longer on the world's ladder of priorities.

Also, if one wanted to talk, with whom would one talk? One has several interlocutors to talk to, isn't it so? One has to talk to Abu-'Ammar and has to settle the Palestinian-Syrian dispute, and perhaps the Palestinian-fundamentalist Iranian dispute. There are, moreover, Palestinian people on one's land, and one has to give them guarantees and make them understand that as a state, one will protect them. But the state is incapable of protecting itself. To start, where is the state and where are we? A return to the previous life of the refugee camps is rejected. But at the same time, a return to armies and to a state within a state is also rejected. What I mean is that a return to the Cairo agreement is rejected. But the question we have to ask first is: Where are we?

We Have Had Enough Wars

[AL-NAHAR] You have pointed out the need to end the war, and you have said we have had enough war. Is Walid Junblatt prepared to hand over his weapons?

[Junblatt] We proceed on the basis of a certain concept, namely that we thought at a certain phase that this vast quantity of weapons in Lebanon and these long-range weapons would protect the sects and the provinces. But now, they no longer protect anybody. Everybody can reach everybody else and destroy him. There may be certain quantities, certain types, or certain types of forces. But believe me that every one of us can get these types of weapons. This would mean our embarking at the Lebanese level on an endless arms race that will not protect the sects. Protecting the sects can only come from a national reconciliation and from trust. When this is accomplished, whatever weapons we have concealed in monasteries, in homes, and in stores and whatever artillery emplacements we build will be of no significance.

Military Decision

[AL-NAHAR] There are those in the government who call for a military decision against General 'Awn, and there are others who say that the war has ended. What is your viewpoint?

[Junblatt] I say that the war has not ended. However, I also say that there is a central point, namely that the domestic war, meaning the war that was a result of the previous circumstance or of the so-called "liberation war" or "abolition war," must be ended. Trust must then be developed between the responsible military and political circles, i.e. between Samir Ja'ja' and the so-called "Islamic and nationalist" faction. Trust is required, and it is not easy to develop trust even if some think that it is easy for us to conclude a deal with Samir Ja'ja'. However, a deal with Samir Ja'ja' may be required as a military-political condition. Third, one must turn to the south. Is the south now a purely Lebanese issue or is it

something bigger than a Lebanese issue? We must not think that this is an easy question.

Will the Americans, with their dense military presence in the Middle East now, give us the south? Will they intensify their direct pressure on Israel? Maybe and maybe not. Nobody knows.

[AL-NAHAR] How do you interpret the return, even though limited, of the Christians to Mount Lebanon and the obvious movement of Druze to some parts of East Beirut?

[Junblatt] This is what we have been saying. The gun will not protect. Trust is what will provide protection. In the past, some people had travel permits but the permits have now been canceled. Permits were also issued to the Christian inhabitants of Dayr al-Qamar and those permits have been canceled and people can now move freely. We now see groups that come from East Beirut to discover this province for the first time. This is interesting and good, as I have already pointed out. Basically, there is no sectarian conflict. What exists is a political conflict. Evacuees have been returning on their own initiative and with the help of Caritas. It has been a limited initiative but a beneficial one in al-Jiyah. It is beneficial that Caritas has realized for the first time that giving the Lebanese evacuee, the Christian evacuee specifically, money to rebuild his home and return to his land is much more important than giving him a little oil, flour, and butter. Moreover, one half al-Shuf inhabitants go to Jazzin for medical care and for treatment at the government hospital there which offers good services. There are certainly people who go from al-Matn to East Beirut. People want to live [freely], and one cannot build a Berlin wall. The Berlin wall has fallen. So should we build Berlin walls between al-Shuf and 'Alayh, and between al-Matn, Kasrawan, and Jubayl? Trust has to be established. It is my opinion that the people like each other and that the people do not fear each other. But one has to have trust between the officials.

Presidents of Republic

[AL-NAHAR] It is said that the al-Ta'if accord has created 15 presidents of the republic and that there are ministers who present their plans to their colleagues to exchange approval for these plans.

[Junblatt] There is some sort of a bazaar. But as to whether this is due to al-Ta'if or not, I don't know. Let me be frank on this, I don't know and I am not an expert in this regard. But if the government officials and if the people involved with the al-Ta'if accord want a solution for Lebanon, then they should have developed a fundamental solution by turning Lebanon in its entirety into a single election district that leads to people mixing with each other. If this were done, one would, if one ran for election, have to take into account the vote one would get from 'Akkar and the vote he would get from the south, and vice versa. There is now a Chamber of Deputies that has been in existence for 18 years by virtue of continuity. They want to stick to it some so-called new

faces and favorites. This does not satisfy the Lebanese people's aspirations. New elections must be held, and a plan must be formulated to get the people mixing with each other. I may vote for Samir Ja'ja', and he may vote for me.

[AL-NAHAR] In what manner can elections be held under these circumstances? Some demand UN or Arab League supervision.

[Junblatt] We have an occupied territory called the south. It should be excluded from the election or a special arrangement must be made for it, as was done in the past in connection with the West Bank, Jordan, and Amman. There is a special arrangement for them.

[AL-NAHAR] How about the single district?

[Junblatt] I believe in it. It will break these barriers, which are not sectarian. I wish they were sectarian because it is not known what kind of barriers they are. We may call them province barriers. I don't know what to call them. Fundamentally, the war has not been a sectarian war. At a certain phase in 1975 and 1976, it was intended to become a sectarian war. Election in accordance with a single district will break and eliminate all the barriers.

[AL-NAHAR] Can you expand on this point?

[Junblatt] Let each list of candidates running for election include 108 or 110 candidates from 'Akkar to the south. Everybody should have the right to nominate such lists.

[AL-NAHAR] Are you, for example, prepared to enter into an alliance with Dr. Samir Ja'ja' and with the Phalanges in a single list?

[Junblatt] I may enter into alliance with Samir Ja'ja' or with others. I will determine what the considerations are and build my alliance. People will mix with each other and will think from a broader perspective. Instead of voting for a candidate from Dayr al-Qamar, al-Mukhtarrah, or Jazzin only, one may vote for candidates from al-Qubayyat, Mays al-Jabal, or al-Harmil. But today everybody is like a cock on his own dunghill and everybody has barricaded himself within his hamlet, his village, and perhaps his own pit. Mount Lebanon was a single governorate in the days of the Constitutionals and Coalitionists but President Sham'un reduced the governorate's size. There were no sectarian considerations. I recall that the Constitutionalist's and the Coalitionist's, as well as the Junblattist's and the Yazbaki's, partisanship encompassed everybody. But don't forget that such partisanship does not suit the people of the current regime and of the current parliamentary assembly. There are interests as well. With a miracle, they have increased the number of [deputies] to 108.

Reestablishing Lebanon

[AL-NAHAR] If we do not reestablish Lebanon now, then when will we do it?

[Junblatt] Al-Harawi and al-Huss have been content with the al-Ta'if [accord] and have slept on the silk of al-Ta'if and of the Arabs. They have contented themselves with al-Ta'if while the given facts are rushing like a roaring river or like a moving bulldozer, and I call it the U.S. bulldozer. We are sleeping on al-Ta'if glories while al-Ta'if people are already somewhere else. (He added with a laugh:) Al-Ta'if Arabs are now somewhere else. Al-Harawi's message of today is not necessary, meaning that it is not necessary to send a begging message. There is no need. For what? Al-Huss went and sounded the alarm. We must sound the alarm here first. Reforming the corruption begins here, and then we can go begging. Besides, if the Arabs give 100 million, 200 million, or 300 million [dollars], they will all evaporate with this corruption and with this mismanagement. But with whom is one to talk? Regrettably...

[AL-NAHAR] Don't you think that the presidential system or the people's election of the president of the republic will produce the kind of solution you are proposing?

[Junblatt] It is an idea. Turning Lebanon into a single election district makes it possible for the president to be elected by the people. But such ideas are revolutionary. So will certain Lebanese, certain interests, certain forces, and certain sects accept them? Will the Arabs accept them? The question is also addressed to the Arabs. Will they accept them? It is difficult to propose election of the president of the republic by the Lebanese people because such election will be different from the way presidents in some Arab regimes are elected. It will be a little different. One also wants to find out if the neighbors accept such ideas. They are not easy. Perhaps the only country that is now breaking away from the old systems is Algeria. But Algeria's experiment is still new. Algeria continues to experience a major democratic struggle, and not an easy one at that. As to where this struggle will lead, it is another issue. But the struggle has begun. Algeria has been influenced somewhat by France.

[AL-NAHAR] What is the alternative to the parties?

[Junblatt] One cannot find an alternative to the parties. But these parties must reshuffle their cards together so that they may actually become general national parties. The [type of] election about which we have talked may help create alliances that encompass all of Lebanon. There are parties going through labor. The old party language has become meaningless, and it must be changed and renewed. Its renewal will rejuvenate the political thinking. Moreover, we have all gone bankrupt. The political class, if you can find it, has become something of the past. We do not wish to look at the past but at the future. The past is gone, and they are dead and gone. It is the future that must be reconsidered.

[20 Sep pp 1, 7]

[Text] In part two, Minister Walid Junblatt demanded parliamentary elections, provided that a special arrangement be made for the occupied south. He also expressed the belief that the single election district is the ideal way to unite the Lebanese.

[AL-NAHAR] Don't you think that raising the election issue in the cabinet would have a greater impact?

[Junblatt] No. In the cabinet, each minister brings with him a petition by a neighbor and wants it signed by the prime minister. Each seeks his own interest. Regrettably, very few are those who surpass this thinking. We tried twice and then found out that they are people who have different tendencies. So why bother with this job. This is why I have been absent. I try to let Mahmud 'Uthman take care of the business of the Ministry of Public Works. I have become minister of unpleasantness. It is easier on the mind and less trouble.

[AL-NAHAR] But the country needs somebody to get the ball rolling.

[Junblatt] To get the ball rolling, the dams and walls existing between the provinces must be smashed. Don't forget that the [Lebanese] Front is still present, Suq al-Gharb is still present, and Michel 'Awn's front with Samir Ja'ja' is still present. As for the south, don't forget that we don't dare go to Sidon. Moreover, one must talk to a new generation that understands, absorbs, and develops ideas. We must develop the ideas together. The old political class has ended and gone bankrupt. It has become rusty and has been corroded. These words may not be understandable today even to some of our party bases. We are alive, comfortable and happy, so why bother with this problem altogether? This is how some people think. Moreover, the provinces have broken away from each other. In al-Biqa', a different climate and a different idea prevail. In the north, they are in a different world, and I don't know whether it is a third or a fourth republic.

Furthermore, I do not fully remember the single district. It was before my generation. But it was a single district in my father's time and in the days of Lady Nazirah, my grandmother. There was the struggle between Bisharah al-Khuri and Emile Iddih. It was a major issue at the time. Nobody felt that he was a Druze, a Maronite, a Shi'ite, a Sunni, or anything else. It was a political struggle.

Deputy and Serving People

[AL-NAHAR] A deputy used to serve all the people?

[Junblatt] The entire governorate. For example, where would you place the [southern] suburb today? People say [about the suburb]: O God, this bogey, this horror! The suburb exists, and its inhabitants are people like us. Where would the suburb be placed: with Beirut or with Mount Lebanon? Some in Beirut may think that we should wipe out the suburb.

[AL-NAHAR] What is the alternative to the current government, keeping in mind the number of faults for which you censure it?

[Junblatt] With the hope that I will not be misunderstood and without criticizing anybody—because we have criticized and accomplished nothing—I will again say that the method is perhaps wrong. This working team [cabinet] is not qualified and cannot accomplish the required task in order to alleviate the political and economic losses. This team is not harmonious. I will say no more about the method to replace it or about the possibility of replacing it. I don't know. You must ask somebody else because governments are no longer formed here. They are formed abroad for certain considerations which constitute a small part of the equation.

"Corrupt" Method

[AL-NAHAR] So how can they carry on with this method which people are calling "corrupt" whereas they agreed to the al-Ta'if accord that stipulates that [corrupt] cabinet ministers be brought to trial? It is as if this stipulation did not exist.

[Junblatt] Who will try them? Is it reasonable that they be their own judges? Is it reasonable that ¾ of them be their own judges? Everyone has set up his own empire. The same goes to the Chamber of Deputies. Consider the interpretation of the al-Ta'if accord. Every one thinks that he has gotten his morsel, and the whole thing is collapsing gradually. Every brigade commander in the army has become an emperor over his brigade and has come to consider the brigade his private property.

[AL-NAHAR] But the Lebanese people have proven their ability to survive?

[Junblatt] They have proven the ability to survive, but they continue to be shackled by political and economic bonds especially. This powerless people has become incapable of objecting. In the past, labor union and political demonstrations were organized. An article published by you, AL-NAHAR, was enough to scandalize and topple a government. This is why oppressive measures used to be taken against AL-NAHAR. Ghassan Tuwayni was jailed as a result of a certain article. Today, one can no longer buy a [real] newspaper. The people are shackled. Every morning, they have to ponder the actual value of a 1,000 pounds and wonder what the exchange rate would be. This unfortunate people is waiting for the visa to come from the Canadian or Australian embassies in Damascus. In the other provinces, everybody lives in a different world as a result of the separation and of the lack of communication. I believe that the northerners are living in a different world. Zgharta and Tripoli are in a different world. Nobody shares the public concern with others because everybody has a private concern to match his wits. Besides, the people express themselves through their instruments, i.e. the Chamber of Deputies principally and then the parties. If they have all gone bankrupt, then why bother? Even the sects have gone bankrupt and the sectarian leaders have been slighted. When the

Maronite patriarch is subjected to abuse, then what is it that we have left for others? This is the process of demolishing symbols, demolishing parties, and demolishing institutions. There are no authorities to refer to any longer.

All Democracies

[AL-NAHAR] As long as the international tendency, especially in East Europe, is toward a more democratic life. We have a form of this democratic life, so why don't we develop it?

[Junblatt] There are major and deep-rooted democracies along East Europe's borders. Regrettably, we have no democracies along our borders. We must take this into account. Along East Europe's borders lies West Europe which possesses a very great democratic legacy. It is true that the communist phase abolished democratic life. But this life has its legacy. Moreover, there are alternatives. International socialism has succeeded in its old struggle against communism. It is true that some regions are faltering, especially Russia. With Russia, it is not an easy matter because Russia is a vast and great empire that has collapsed suddenly. But it will succeed in the long run whereas our [Arab] environment is not encouraging.

[AL-NAHAR] The picture looks black to you. Are there no white dreams?

[Junblatt] A man must dream and must stand fast. But it is not easy. We lived through a certain phase which had its national and Arab aspirations. But that entire phase collapsed. What can one say, especially in the wake of the invasion? (Laughing, he added:) It is not an invasion but a fraternal request for the U.S. presence. Where has the Arab cause gone? Can one speak? One cannot say a thing. Let us go to what Mansur al-Rahbani says in the theatrical "The Summer of 840." He says: When nations disagree, keep your head. It is a very beautiful play. We saw it in Bayt-al-Din. It is expressive but it evokes sadness.

[AL-NAHAR] Do you think that the U.S. presence in the Gulf will lead to turning the title to the entire Middle East to the United States or is there an endeavor for a new European-Soviet entry into the region?

[Junblatt] I believe that the Americans will take the region and that all the region's wealth will end up in their hands. They have taken the region through the international redistribution of forces and through the new international system about which Bush talks. The region contains vast oil and non-oil resources, and they want to get them. The U.S. oil needs are increasing daily. Do not forget that Japan's economy is strong whereas the U.S. economy is not very strong. There are new balances. Russia will decline.

Action and Reaction

[AL-NAHAR] If the current U.S. policy seeks two objectives, namely protect oil and confront what they call

dictatorship, then will the U.S. presence in the region lead to encouraging the democratic current in the Arab countries?

[Junblatt] I can at least say that the concentrated U.S. presence in a part of the Arab region will have its ramifications. Will they be ramifications inclined toward democracy, toward fundamentalism, or toward other changes? There will be numerous changes which I cannot foretell. But I hope that this will lead toward democratic change. Some Arab countries may go through big labor even though some rulers think that they are in a stable condition currently. There is action and reaction, even in Saudi Arabia itself. The existence of a concerted U.S. presence, estimated at nearly 200,000 troops, on Saudi territory is not an easy matter. The Saudi society will also be subjected to a jolt. Sa'ud al-Faysal raised this issue with some of his visitors but they then backed down since. There are, moreover, the economic ramifications. Theoretically, this money was Arab money. It is true that there has been misuse. Let us state frankly that nobody defends Saddam Husayn. However, nobody can defend the amir of Kuwait or feel pity for this family or this group of people who possess this vast wealth. If this money were employed soundly in Sudan or Egypt, it would be possible to feel pity for them. In any case, we, as Lebanese, might be gloating because we have seen the Arabs laugh at us. Now, their turn has come. They used to send us a few bags of rice, some powdered milk, some tea, and some other items. We, the Jordanians, and the Palestinians have been the mainstays of the so-called State of Kuwait. Without us, they could do nothing. It is true that our loss is big, and so is the Palestinians', the Jordanians', and the Syrians' loss. But ultimately we are Kuwait's people. Now, the Arab money and Arab billions will not be enough. Bush is threatening Japan and demanding that it pay more. His presence in Saudi Arabia will, theoretically, improve his balance of payments. He is engaged in a military muscle show at our expense.

This is why I again say that we do not need the arsenal we have. It is not worth it. All this steel will turn into scrap metal. Russia built the world's biggest army and then went bankrupt. There is a certain reality, namely the bigger the army and the bigger the military burdens, the more of a drain to society they become. The United States can send its army beyond its borders. Russia suffered a major defeat in Afghanistan. I have been in Moscow. Benzine is not available in the suburbs. Now cigarettes are not available in the market. They pray that mother nature will be kind to the citizens this year and that the winter will not be harsh because they may not be able to supply enough heat due to the lack of coal as a result of the mine workers' strike. The best tank and best missile will not protect one from cold or disease and will not feed one. We, too, can do without these arsenals that can no longer do any good. I say this at the Lebanese level and at the Arab level.

**Franjiyah Denounces American-Israeli
'Conspiracy'**

91AE0008A Beirut AL-SHIRA' in Arabic
17 Sep. 90 pp 18-19

[Interview With Lebanese ex-President Sulayman Franjiyah by Huda al-Husayni on 10 September 1990; "Ex-President Sulayman Franjiyah in Most Serious Lebanese Position vis-a-vis Gulf Crisis: Saddam Has Regained Kuwait But We Are Against Him If He Fights Arabs; Kissinger's Conspiracy Still Extant and Being Implemented; Maronite War Is to Resettle Christian Palestinian and Shi'ite War To Resettle Muslim Palestinian; Constitution Does not Recognize B'abda; Presidency Must Be in Capital; I Approved of Al-Ta'if Without Reluctance and I Continue To Do So; If Government Wants To Implement Its Declaration, There Is Nothing To Stop It; I and 'Awn Have Common Friends and I Will Go to Him If Need Arises;" first seven paragraphs are AL-SHIRA' introduction; place not given]

[Text] Ex-President Sulayman Franjiyah has settled an issue on which no Arab or international legal authority has made a determination yet, namely the issue of the sovereignty of Kuwait or of what Iraq demands as Iraqi territory, as Iraq says.

President Franjiyah has said that "Kuwait is Iraqi territory." This is a serious position coming from Lebanon.

What is serious about the position is that it emanates from a prominent Lebanese authority and from a Maronite authority who enjoys a special Arab status. What is most significant about the position is that it emanates from Syria's and President Hafiz al-Asad's sincerest and biggest friend in Lebanon. Everybody is aware of the Syrian Arab position toward Iraq's invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990.

Is Franjiyah's position in harmony with the general Maronite stance of defending Iraq, as Michel 'Awn does in one half of East Beirut and Samir Ja'ja' does in the other half?

Does Franjiyah's position reflect the existence of a certain state of relations between himself and Damascus and has Franjiyah sought to convey a certain message through this position?

Does Franjiyah hold a certain repressed position toward the Gulf as a consequence of a position he holds toward the al-Ta'if [accord] and its people, and has he found the present time to be a proper opportunity to respond?

All this does not cancel the principled positions to which Franjiyah ordinarily adheres and which he defends valiantly, even if such positions are denounced by many, especially by friends.

Because the serious position declared by Franjiyah concerns one aspect of the Gulf crisis, namely Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, and takes a positive stance toward this aspect, and because it then takes a negative stance

toward the other aspect, namely Iraq's threat to invade other Arab countries, Franjiyah's interview with AL-SHIRA' is the prominent local event insofar as positions are concerned. Here we present the interview to the reader with all its importance:

[Al-Husayni] You have been warning and you continue to warn of Kissinger's plot against Lebanon. What point has this plot reached and are we in its final chapters?

[Franjiyah] This plot is still extant and is still being implemented. Israel's interest is in Lebanon's disappearance. Everything the United States does in the Middle East is, very regrettably, in Israel's interest. Currently, if we consider the inter-fighting within the Maronite ranks and within the ranks of our brothers the Shi'ites, we find for the first time in the history of the two sects that each sect is divided into two factions and that each faction is killing the other. "What do they want and why?" I say that this is the biggest service rendered to Israel. The Maronites in Kasrawan are fighting each other and are, unwittingly, rendering Israel a service. The number of Lebanese expatriates is larger than the number of the Lebanese living on this land. In every country of the world, there are Lebanese expatriates who assist their kinsmen and relatives [here]. The inter-Maronite war in Kasrawan is intended to drive the Maronite away from Mount Kasrawan and the war of our Shi'ite brothers in the south is intended to drive our Shi'ite brothers away from the south. The Shi'ite will emigrate to where some relative or friend lives in Africa or somewhere else and the Maronite will emigrate to such relatives in one part of the world or another. At least, half a million people will emigrate from the south and ¼ of Kasrawan's Maronites will leave it. Should such emigration materialize, the United States or Israel will come and tell the Muslim Palestinian "your home in Gaza is lost, so here is a home in Sidon." So the south becomes a new Palestine. The United States or Israel will come and tell the Christian Palestinian: "Your home in Jerusalem is lost, so here is a home in Kasrawan's plains." All this will be done to accomplish the objective of implementing Kissinger's scheme. I believe that they have nearly implemented it.

In 1970, there were 80,000 Lebanese in France. A month and a half ago, they conducted a survey and found as a result that 424,000 Lebanese live in France. I have mentioned France because there is no fear for those who live there and because they will return shortly, God willing. But tens of thousands have gone to Canada, Australia, and Latin America. This is what the United States and Israel want. Kissinger's scheme is still being implemented. When Kissinger hatched the war, he did so on the basis that the Lebanese does not fear emigration and that he "packs up his suitcase and moves on." But what has happened is that the Lebanese have clung to their land.

I have not chosen the land on which I am living. God, may He be exalted, chose to put me here, and I have come to shoulder a duty toward this land. I do not have

to emigrate any time Kissinger or somebody else wants me to emigrate. I emigrate of my own volition but not against my will.

Completing Scheme

[Al-Husayni] Does this mean that the current Lebanese emigration is tantamount to completing Kissinger's scheme?

[Franjiyah] Yes, it is all tantamount to completing Kissinger's scheme to make the Lebanese abandon his country and to replace him by the Palestinian, thus relieving Israel. The formula that calls for putting the Christian Palestinian in Kasrawan and the Muslim Palestinian in the south is a new formula.

Patience...Patience

[Al-Husayni] In your excellency's opinion, what is required to confront this plot and who is responsible?

[Franjiyah] We must be patient, and God is with those who are patient. Militarily, we can do nothing. Patience is our most important weapon. The party responsible for this plot is the party that launched it, namely the United States. Regrettably, the United States finds in the arena lackeys who implement its schemes.

[Al-Husayni] Does not our patience mean silence and does not silence allow the plot to last longer?

[Franjiyah] Yes, it will make it last longer. But our patience is great.

[Al-Husayni] Do you agree to making a governmental change that affects all the parties?

[Franjiyah] It is certain that forming a government that represents Lebanon in its entirety is sounder than a government that represents certain factions in Lebanon. This is something that I have experienced. Today, a lot is being said about some cabinet ministers, and hundreds of reports are circulated about them. We hope that God will inspire his excellency the president and will make him "think sometime of what he must do" according to the dictates of his conscience. I personally favor a parliamentary cabinet formed of individuals who work for the people.

[Al-Husayni] It is well known that your excellency is one of those who cling to Islamic-Christian coexistence. Do you think that this coexistence has failed?

[Franjiyah] Darling, I prefer that you ask a Christian northerner and a Muslim northerner how they coexist. We here in the north continue to coexist as our fathers and forefathers coexisted. We do not have what is called Muslim or Christian. If you are my friend, I do not try to find out what your sect is and the way I treat you will not change, regardless of whether you are Muslim or Christian.

[Al-Husayni] This is insofar as the north...

[Franjiyah] (Interrupting) There, darling, the sect has become a commercial commodity. There is a faction that has been alleging since 1936 that it seeks to protect "Christianity" in Lebanon. If there is still a man with an excellent memory and if such a man takes a pencil and paper and adds up only the number of Maronite victims of the acts perpetrated by this faction in the past 16 years, he will find out that the number of those killed treacherously by this faction exceeds the number of those killed in the battlefield.

[Al-Husayni] What is your position vis-a-vis the al-Ta'if accord? Do you support the Chamber of Deputies' approval of the constitutional reforms or would you have preferred awaiting a certain phase to approve them?

[Franjiyah] I read the al-Ta'if accord and approved of it without reluctance, and I still do. The deputies represent the people, and theirs is the final word. If the Chamber of Deputies meets and decides to wait, then there is absolutely no objection. We are a democratic people, and we can change whichever part of our constitution we wish to change any way we wish to change it.

Ink on Paper

[Al-Husayni] Does your excellency believe that the government is capable of implementing the cabinet statement it has issued?

[Franjiyah] Believe me, when I perused the statement I said: May God bless these efforts. This is a first step for Lebanon to regain its freedom, which is above everything else. But regrettably, the statement continues to be mere ink on paper. If the government wishes to implement it, there is nothing to stop her, provided that she decides to ignore private interests and to move and work for the country's interest.

[Al-Husayni] The regime's eyes are focused on B'abda. Is B'abda a pretext or does B'abda give the government its legitimacy?

[Franjiyah] Darling, "when one cannot do something, one has to have a reason." The constitution does not recognize B'abda. The presidency of the republic, the Chamber of Deputies, and the premiership must be in the capital.

[Al-Husayni] Do you think that the citizen can wait until the government regains B'abda in order that he may get water, electricity, and improved economic conditions?

[Al-Husayni] Darling, I know nothing about economics. But I do know that a kilogram of meat now costs 4,500 [Lebanese] pounds. I [remember when I] personally bought the kilogram of meat for three francs. Two cans of oil now cost 40,000 pounds and I [remember when I] personally sold two cans for 3.75 pounds at a time when we lived off our harvest.

Friends

[Al-Husayni] There have been emissaries going between you and General Michel 'Awn.

[Franjiyah] Darling, there are no emissaries. There are common friends who come to me and go to him. "What they say in my presence and what they say in his presence is something that I don't know."

[Al-Husayni] Is there a possibility of dialogue with him?

[Franjiyah] If the need arises, I "will go to him."

[Al-Husayni] Do you think that there is a chance to settle the situation in East Beirut peacefully?

[Franjiyah] Believe me, as long as the Israelis are present in East Beirut, there will be nothing but a military solution.

They Have Forgotten Lebanon

[Al-Husayni] Let us turn to the Gulf crisis. In your opinion, to what degree will it affect the conditions in Lebanon?

[Franjiyah] The world was preoccupied with Lebanon. But now that it has the Gulf, it has forgotten Lebanon.

If we wish to examine history, we find that Kuwait is Iraqi territory. Acting on the principle of divide and rule, the British stripped Kuwait away and turned it into a sheikhdom. Saddam has now regained it. I personally say that he is entitled to it provided that now that he has regained Kuwait, "he does not consider" launching an inter-Arab war. If he launches an inter-Arab war, then woe be to us, the Arabs. Without any reason, we are divided and scattered. Should such a war break out, then we will leave our country and scatter throughout the world.

[Al-Husayni] Do you envision for Lebanon a comprehensive solution that falls outside the framework of the al-Ta'if [accord] and that is compatible with the visions proposed to settle the Gulf crisis?

[Franjiyah] There are 20 proposed solutions. We do not disagree over anything. Our only disagreement is over the fact that Israel is present on our land and that she must leave it. Israel has lackeys, and it exploits these lackeys to their own detriment.

[Al-Husayni] How negatively will the Arab conditions affect Lebanon?

[Franjiyah] Darling, Kuwait and Lebanon are now very similar economically. For example, the Kuwaiti used to come to Lebanon to spend the summer. Some of them built palaces which were destroyed during the events and others who owned a lot of money deposited that money in Lebanese banks. When the war broke out in our country, the Kuwaitis "forgot us." When the Kuwait crisis erupted and the world's attention turned to

Kuwait, Lebanon became forgotten, and God be thanked. God willing, "they will continue to forget Lebanon."

Exposed to Storms

[Al-Husayni] Your excellency, our final question is: Is it true that Lebanon will continue to be exposed to storms if the legitimate government does not employ force to enter East Beirut?

[Franjiyah] Certainly, darling. This is my thinking, and I cannot impose it on anybody. Legitimacy is in having the ministers meet and make a decision. Today is 10 September and they must decide that after 10 October, anybody found carrying a weapon in public will be given sixfold the penalty the law stipulates. If the penalty stipulated by the law is a 6-month prison term, then it should be made a 6-year term. Every faction in possession of weapons must be required to store all the weapons in one site and one place. This place must have a gate with two "locks," one lock controlled by the government and the other by the owner. Should a gun be fired, we can look for any broken lock and say here is the perpetrator who fired the gun. As long as weapons are on the streets, I very much doubt that the conditions that we, the Lebanese, hope for will be restored. You find nowadays individuals who are not yet 20 carrying rifles on their shoulders. They are generally drugged. When they encounter a person whose face they do not like, they shoot him. Such street acts must be stopped. Sound reforms and a solution will then follow.

[Al-Husayni] Where will we reach under the umbrella of this situation?

[Franjiyah] The end and the abyss, darling. There is nothing more abysmal than our current situation. A dollar is worth 1,200 pounds. Whoever thought it would reach such a figure?

Interior Minister al-Khazin on Security Issues

90AE0329B London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic
17 Aug 90 pp 20, 24

[Interview with Shaykh Ilyas al-Khazin, minister of interior: "Shaykh Ilyas al-Khazin, Minister of Interior Tells AL-HAWADITH: 'South Was the Gateway to War and Will Be the Only Gateway to Peace';" date and place not specified]

[Text] Shaykh Ilyas al-Khazin, the minister of interior, called for an end to the bloodshed in Iqlim al-Tuffah so that the regular, legitimate forces can be given an opportunity to go into the area. He affirmed that the peace which will come can come only from the south, which is the gateway to the peace that has been lost just as it was the gateway to war. Mr. al-Khazin said, "Without the legitimate security forces it is useless to look for peace in the south or to look for a comprehensive national peace. As a government, we are determined to send regular forces into Iqlim al-Tuffah to strengthen security, to

return residents to the area, and to put an end to the infighting among fellow Lebanese."

In an interview with AL-HAWADITH Magazine, Minister al-Khazin made it clear that the measures taken by the government to confront General Aoun's rejection were taken to give the quest for peace and harmony momentum and to protect that quest which no one can stop.

Minister al-Khazin revealed that if Ibrahimi's mission had not been rejected, internal security forces would have undertaken the matter of security for the administrative plan of Beirut. He affirmed that Arab and international support for the legitimate government of Lebanon was comprehensive, real, and serious, and he indicated that the legitimate government had not moved to B'abda and al-Yarzah because it wanted to avoid a clash between members of the army, whether they were in this or another area. The minister spoke about new organizations and appointments in the Ministry of Interior, and he revealed the fact that the legitimate government wanted to sign on new gendarmes to strengthen the internal security forces organization. What were the particulars of the interview which AL-HAWADITH conducted with the minister of interior?

[AL-HAWADITH] Now that the armed conflict in Iqlim al-Tuffah has changed and become more dangerous, we are being warned of grave consequences and momentous dangers whose negative effects will go beyond the area of Iqlim al-Tuffah and its residents. People are expecting the government to act quickly to bring in the army and to deploy it in this area. When will the government make the decision to bring in its own legitimate forces into this area?

[Al-Khazin] Everyone knows that the government has appealed to those who have been fighting in Iqlim al-Tuffah. It asked them to stop fighting each other and to withdraw from the area so that the government can bring its legitimate forces into the area to establish security and stability and restore a normal way of life there so that those who had fled the area can return to their homes, their villages, and their property. We believe that any fighting among the Lebanese, whether it is in Iqlim al-Tuffah or in any other area, is fueled by nothing else but people. We believe that such fighting has no other objective but to serve outside parties who want to block efforts that are being made in more than one local, regional, and international forum. We are referring in particular to the commendable efforts made by the Supreme Tripartite Arab Committee to establish peace and harmony in Lebanon.

Thus, all marginal bloody conflicts serve the enemies of Lebanon and abort the peaceful objectives of establishing security, harmony, and stability among the Lebanese. How is it then that the south and Iqlim al-Tuffah in particular came to be the scene of this conflict? The time has come to be merciful and to stop the bloodshed which is taking place in this area of Lebanon which we

cherish. It is time to give regular government forces an opportunity to enter the area. It is time for us to understand that the peace which is coming will come only from the south. The south is the gateway to the peace that has been lost just as it was the gateway to the war which has been going on in our country for over 15 years. Whatever the motives of the warring factions there, it is the interests of the south and its people as well as the supreme interests of the country that must triumph because everyone knows that the dangerous winds which blow from the south have to be a threat to national peace in general. Everyone also knows that the inevitable consequence of these dangerous winds will be to keep Lebanon in danger. Since it is no longer a secret to anyone that the stability of the south is a basic factor in the general stability of all Lebanon and because such stability can be provided only by Lebanon's legitimate security forces, who represent the proper tool for establishing and strengthening that stability, it would be useless to look for peace in the south and to look for a comprehensive peace in the country without this tool. As a government we are determined to send Lebanon's legitimate security forces into Iqlim al-Tuffah soon to end the bloody conflict in the area and to put an end to the internecine fighting there.

[AL-HAWADITH] Some of the measures which the government decided to take to confront Gen. Aoun's rejection of the Council of Ministers' 11 July appeal have been declared, but others have not been revealed. Do you think it will be easy to apply effective, practical measures in that regard without hurting the people who are living in the area that is under the general's control?

[Al-Khazin] The government had to take practical and effective measures to confront Gen. Aoun's rejection of the plan, and each minister was entrusted with the task of carrying out those measures that come under his jurisdiction. We in the Council of Ministers have been careful to observe the principle of not infringing upon the interests of Lebanese citizens in any area, especially those in the eastern zone. All I can say about that is that implementation of the measures, which were taken to give the quest for peace and harmony momentum, has begun. These measures were taken to protect that unstoppable quest, and their effects will appear on the ground soon. The goals and objectives of these measures have to do with citizens' interests and serving the cause of comprehensive peace in Lebanon. It was the government's opinion that these measures had to be taken in light of the obstacles which had been put in place to slow down the quest for peaceful solutions. These measures had to be taken to put an end to actions that were taken to encroach upon people's interests and security and to support their aspirations for a comprehensive peace in this country. People in this country have had enough suffering, destruction, immigration, and expatriation, not to mention the ongoing destruction of the country's infrastructure which has come as a result of misadventures by the reckless.

[AL-HAWADITH] Statements were being made recently, before Ibrahim's mission came to a dead end, about changing or expanding the government. Do you believe such statements are still relevant, or has this matter been shelved at least for the present time?

[Al-Khazin] We are among those who have always been saying that the appropriate conditions for the success of Mr. Lakhdar Ibrahim's mission must be made available because the success of the Arab envoy's mission means bringing the peace process out of its bottleneck and creating broad prospects for the country. Everyone wants this. When it happens, it would make no difference whether the government stays or goes, and in this case there would be no advantage to changing or expanding the government because our main objective is to bring this country and its people to safety. Our main objective is not to miss the opportunity to bring peace to citizens who have waited too long in this gloom.

[AL-HAWADITH] The Arab and international communities as well as the Vatican have given their support to the Council of Ministers' 11 July declaration and, accordingly, to the al-Ta'if process. If all this implicit support had been real and serious, do you believe that any faction could have stood up to such comprehensive and strong support and opposed it? Wouldn't the legitimate government have been able then to move to B'abda and al-Yarzah without any obstacles?

[Al-Khazin] Arab and international support for the legitimate authority in Lebanon is undoubtedly total, real, and serious. Anyone who believes otherwise is making a mistake. As to why the legitimate government is not moving to B'abda and al-Yarzah, it is because the legitimate government does not want a clash to occur between its citizens. It refuses to force the military establishment and its members into bloody conflicts, fights, and confrontations because everyone in the army, whether he is in this area or in another controlled by some other faction, is our son and the son of our legitimate government. Everyone in the army is the son of the military establishment, and we are bent on making sure that this military establishment does not slip into the mazes and fights that serve neither the military establishment itself nor the country, which we believe will not stand on its feet without the military establishment. Therefore, we, the legitimate authority in the country, are being very careful about the military establishment. Because we have always wanted to avoid any confrontation between our military personnel, the legitimate authority has taken its time about moving and taking up its position in B'abda and al-Yarzah. There is no other reason for that.

[AL-HAWADITH] After two visits to Aoun the papal envoy announced the Vatican's position in the name of his holiness the pope. What about the Vatican's action and these positions? Don't you believe that had this action succeeded, Ibrahim's mission would have succeeded too?

[Al-Khazin] The papal envoy told me nothing about the outcome of the Vatican's effort, and I am not Gen. Aoun's confidant either.

[AL-HAWADITH] The Lebanese forces urged the state to play its part in the areas where it has a presence. So far, however, the state's presence in those areas has been limited to an administrative one. Why is that?

[Al-Khazin] Why is it being said that the state's presence in these areas is only an administrative one? The army command sent one of its officers into these areas to assemble elements of the army who were there. The same thing was done with members of the general security forces and members of the internal security forces. Officers assembled those people, and we proceeded from there. Therefore, I can say that although our steps were slow, we did take those steps on the security and administrative fronts. I can also say that the action we took was successful, and, thank God, it was "steady and unprecedented."

[AL-HAWADITH] And when will Shaykh Ilyas al-Khazin, the minister of interior and deputy from Kisrawan al-Futuh move to his area of Kisrawan to reside there?

[Al-Khazin] When I can come and go in a normal way. It makes no sense for me to spend five hours on the road to get to my house in Kisrawan and another five hours to return [to work] from my house. How much time would I have left for my duties as minister? And you know that the affairs and concerns of the Ministry of Interior require the minister to be in his office all the time, from 8 a.m. until the evening hours. Sometimes the minister must be in his office even at night. Should the minister then waste his time and citizens' time commuting back and forth from his house?

[AL-HAWADITH] Which one of the regular forces would have undertaken the task of providing security in Beirut had Ibrahim's recent mission succeeded and the administrative plan for Beirut materialized? Would this task have been undertaken by the army or by the internal security forces?

[Al-Khazin] The internal security forces of course. They would have undertaken everything.

[AL-HAWADITH] Do the internal security forces now have enough equipment to enable them to undertake such broad missions?

[Al-Khazin] As much as possible of the equipment which is required for the internal security forces is now available, but when things start moving in a more positive direction, providing the internal security forces with equipment becomes easier and offering material support from the state to enable these forces to carry out larger and more comprehensive missions becomes more possible. Now that these forces have been reinforced and strengthened, we will soon be signing on new gendarmes who would be joining this corp.

[AL-HAWADITH] Solidarity between the ministers became evident recently in the wake of the fragmentation and disintegration which manifested themselves in contradictory positions and opposition campaigns within the government's ranks. Do you believe that actions taken by the government became better after that?

[Al-Khazin] Basically, there was no fragmentation in the government, but there were rather different ideas and contrasting views about some matters. The fact that there are differences in points of view between one minister and another or between one minister and the prime minister about a certain fact and on certain issues does not mean at all that the government is breaking up. Nor may the existence of such differences be described as fragmentation. This has been proven to everyone. An understanding has been reached on matters about which there were differences of opinion, and there are absolutely no problems today between members of the government. I can confirm that the government is taking care of everything and acting in solidarity on everything. It is a homogeneous task force whose actions, premises, and goals, particularly those that have to do with the nation in general, are based on mutual agreement and solidarity.

[AL-HAWADITH] When will the Chamber of Deputies ratify the constitutional reforms which were approved in the al-Ta'if document?

[Al-Khazin] You know that parliament will hold an emergency session and that the meetings of that session are already under way. So far, a number of important bills have been passed, such as the one which has to do with putting prime ministers and ministers on trial. Another bill which has been passed has to do with organizing internal security forces. Reform bills will be discussed at a later date.

[AL-HAWADITH] But will it be possible to guarantee a quorum for these sessions which ... [word or words missing from the Arabic text]?

[Al-Khazin] A quorum will be guaranteed, but a serious effort is now under way to guarantee a quorum for the session during which reforms will be discussed. Preparations to that end are now under way.

[AL-HAWADITH] When will public security have its own general director?

[Al-Khazin] Very soon, God willing.

[AL-HAWADITH] And when will internal security forces have their own general director?

[Al-Khazin] As soon as possible.

[AL-HAWADITH] Should we also expect that a new general director for personal affairs will be appointed?

[Al-Khazin] Personal Affairs has its own general director. He is Mr. Jamil Ni'mah, the former general director of public security.

[AL-HAWADITH] What about the Civil Defense Department? Do you intend to appoint new people to that department?

[Al-Khazin] I do not want the present director of civil defense to be replaced. Although he has all the good qualities of a director, I don't know if his professional rank gives him the right to become director of civil defense. At any rate we will look into the rank of the present director, and we will consider his legal qualifications when the organizations and appointments are issued. We will then see whether his legal qualifications will allow him to remain as director, and we will act in accordance with the legal facts.

[AL-HAWADITH] Will the appointments and organizations be issued all at once and at the same time?

[Al-Khazin] It is certain that all the appointments and organizations will be issued at once and at the same time.

[AL-HAWADITH] The office of the minister of interior has been the object of a recent libel campaign, and much has been said about payoffs that were made for completed business transactions, particularly things which have to do with passports, residence permits, and entry visas. What does the minister of interior have to say about that?

[Al-Khazin] The minister of interior regrets such fallacies, and he says with determination that he challenges anyone to prove that a payoff was made to this office. The office which was established by the minister of interior was established to make matters easier for citizens and to meet their needs. I established this office here at the ministry when public security offices were non-existent in Kisrawan, Jubayl, and al-Ashrafiyah. I charged this office with the task of completing business transactions for citizens and for my Lebanese friends in the aforementioned areas. Fees for most of these business transactions were paid by me out of my own pocket and at my own expense.

I am issuing a clear challenge (These words were repeated three times by the minister.) to anyone who dares to say that he paid a single piaster as a payoff to anyone in my office. And let me declare here that I would be willing to cut off the hand of anyone in my office who took a bribe if a single citizen can prove that he himself gave that person a bribe.

Popular Nasserite Leader Would Welcome Security Plan

90AE0326B London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic
24 Aug 90 p 19

[Interview with Mustafa Sa'd by Thurayya 'Asi in Beirut; date not specified]

[Text] After the efforts made by the chairman of the Popular Nasserite Organization, Engineer Mustafa Sa'd,

with different parties, especially Hizballah, the Amal Movement, and the Palestinians, and after his humanitarian call to allow the Red Cross to evacuate the casualties from the battlefields in Iqlim al-Tuffah, AL-HAWADITH interviewed Sa'd regarding the latest developments in the south.

[Asi] What is your appraisal of the outcome of your call to the groups that are fighting each other in the Iqlim al-Tuffah area?

[Sa'd] After the call and the earnest appeal that I made to the parties that are fighting each other in Iqlim al-Tuffah, especially Hizballah, the Amal Movement, and some Palestinian parties, all of the parties responded to the call to evacuate the wounded and the dead from the battlefields.

I must stress the importance of preparing the climate for the return of democratic dialogue between the groups that are fighting in Iqlim al-Tuffah. Dialogue is the only way to solve political disputes. Therefore, I renew my call to continue efforts to hold a broad, national, Islamic meeting between Amal and Hizballah to discuss matters and apprehensions in Lebanon, especially in the south, once implementation of the humanitarian part of the call is completed. This first of all assumes the full consolidation of the cease-fire, and secondly, the continued implementation of the humanitarian part pertaining to food supply and displaced persons, and from there, earnest entry into a democratic, responsible dialogue to achieve security in the south and to preserve the resistance as the only way to regain Lebanon's unity and preserve its Arabism.

[Asi] How do you view that, specifically after the interjection of the Palestinian factor?

[Sa'd] Regarding this subject in particular, we value the importance of reorganizing Lebanese-Palestinian relations in the Lebanese sphere, especially after the abrogation of the Cairo agreement by the highest legislative authority in Lebanon, the Chamber of Deputies. In my opinion, if this broad, national, Islamic meeting does not take place, the situation in the south will become more complicated, especially given current security and political developments in the Arab world, and the possibility that these developments might affect Lebanon negatively. Here, we must stress the importance of holding the meeting quickly in a national, Islamic framework, and the need for an agreement on security in the south and the establishment of a national resistance against the occupation. This topic, in my view, concerns all of the parties without exception, be they nationalistic or Islamic.

[Asi] And in the event that the warring parties do not respond...?

[Sa'd] If the concerned parties do not commit themselves, I believe that our position in the south will be

threatened by a danger that will necessarily have a negative effect on Lebanon and the entire Arab world. We reiterate our commitment to the communique that was issued by the Lebanese cabinet. We continue to support the security plan from al-Naqurah in the south to the large river in the north. We said as much in previous communiqués and statements.

[Asi] How do you view the initiative of the Lebanese cabinet regarding events in Iqlim al-Tuffah?

[Sa'd] The important thing is that there be seriousness and commitment regarding the initiative that was set forth by the Lebanese cabinet.

[Asi] To what extent can it succeed in view of the state's available capabilities?

[Sa'd] I believe that when an agreement is made between all of the concerned parties, the Lebanese Army, despite its modest capabilities, will be capable of implementing the cabinet's initiative with the abilities available to it.

[Asi] What about some of the Palestinian parties?

[Sa'd] Here, it is necessary to reemphasize the importance of moving quickly to reorganize Lebanese-Palestinian relations, especially after the abrogation of the Cairo Agreement by the highest legislative authority in Lebanon, as I mentioned. The presence of more than 350,000 Palestinians in Lebanon must not be forgotten or disregarded, taking into account that many Lebanese people and Lebanese forces support the Palestinians cause, and of course, with the understanding that the Palestinians must comply with Lebanese national decisions.

[Asi] Some observers fear a Palestinian entry over the Iqlim al-Tuffah line, and a subsequent deployment of Palestinian forces similar to the deployment that existed in part of the south before 1982. Thus, the slogan "no return to before 1982" has entailed much debate, which has sometimes turned into fighting. What is your opinion and position?

[Sa'd] In no way can we accept a return to the pre-1982 Lebanese or Palestinian national situation, even if it means the destruction of our cities and villages. At the same time, we of course cannot accept a return to the Lebanese authorities' oppression and mistreatment of Palestinians in the refugee camps before 1969.

Here, I reiterate the need to focus on the importance of reorganizing Lebanese-Palestinian relations after the abrogation of the Cairo Agreement, and the importance of the Palestinian brothers' compliance with Lebanese national decisions.

[Asi] Some observers say that the events of Iqlim al-Tuffah were a card for the entry of the Palestinians into the al-Ta'if agreement, which, the Palestinians assert, disregards the Palestinian factor in Lebanon. What is your opinion on that?

[Sa'd] As I said previously, we supported the al-Ta'if agreement, even though it does not respond to the aspirations of our people when weighed against the vast sacrifices that it made during 16 years of war. We supported the al-Ta'if agreement, because it provides for the unity of Lebanon, the soundness of its Arabism, and the liberation of its territories from the forces of the Israeli occupation. An examination of the Palestinian presence lies within the purview of the legitimate Lebanese government. That is one of its tasks. Here, I repeat that Lebanese-Palestinian relations must be reorganized quickly, taking into account the need to avoid returning to the circumstances that existed in the south before 1982 and before 1969.

[Asi] What is your view on what is being said regarding the link between what is happening in Iqlim al-Tuffah and the blocking of the governmental initiative?

[Sa'd] When the national, Islamic meeting takes place, in which Hizballah and the Amal Movement will participate, 'Awn's only choice will be implementation of the al-Ta'if agreement and the governmental initiative.

[Asi] To what extent will current events in the Arab world, specifically in Kuwait, affect the Lebanese crisis, especially given the existence of an Arab committee that is monitoring the settlement of the Lebanese crisis?

[Sa'd] Current events in Kuwait will no doubt affect the entire Arab world, not just Lebanon. I believe that if the situation becomes more complicated, they will appoint another committee. In this regard, an Arab summit conference should be quickly convened to discuss outstanding issues between the Arab states. This conference must not end before positive results are achieved between all of the states involved in disagreements with each other. Otherwise, the crises between the Arab states will escalate each day, given that the major states have not yet agreed among themselves on how to solve the Palestinian and other problems in the Middle East and gulf region.

I believe that, at this stage, the situation will gradually become frozen in the Lebanese area, and on the international, Arab level. On the domestic level, it will become more complicated. We are working hard to prevent the situation from becoming more complicated, and to reach a minimum mutual understanding between the parties that are fighting in Lebanon. We hope that we are mistaken in our estimation that matters will become more complicated in Lebanon.

[Asi] A final question regarding the surprising event in Kuwait. How do you view the dimensions of what happened in Kuwait?

[Sa'd] In my opinion, there are outstanding problems between Kuwait and Iraq. It was possible to resolve these problems through peaceful means, unless it was the case that there were some Kuwaiti parties that requested the aid of Iraq or others to change the ruling regime in

Kuwait. Here, it must be emphasized that Iraqi forces must withdraw from Kuwait in some form.

Fadlallah Discusses Sectarian Mentality

90AE0343A Beirut AL-NAHAR in Arabic
21 Aug 90 pp 1, 8

[Interview with Shaykh Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah, Hizballah Spiritual Leader, by Michel Abu-Judah and Habib Shalluq; "Sectarian Mentality and Political Reality;" first two paragraphs are AL-NAHAR Introduction; date and place not given]

[Text] Scholar Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah is one of a kind, unique, and unmatched.

The scholar has discussed the Shi'ite sect's affairs. He seemed composed, and his composure was bolstered by a broad smile which he did not hold back throughout the interview. A cool atmosphere was created by his presence, along with a quiet air conditioner which made one feel as if one was in a different world. But Scholar Fadlallah sees in the al-Ta'if [accord] "something, anything" whereas he sees in Iraq's occupation of Kuwait a first step in the 1,000-mile march.

[AL-NAHAR] What is the position of the Shi'ite sect in Lebanon toward Hizballah and the Amal Movement and toward what is happening between them?

[Fadlallah] The Shi'ite sect in Lebanon may have a special intrinsic or historical characteristic. Throughout its history, the sect has not exercised a sectarian mentality in the sense of a mentality that is open to the aspirations of political unity within the other units existing in Lebanon. There may be a uniform feeling of dispossession but this feeling does not harbor within itself a uniform feeling regarding the method with which the dispossession can be overcome. Therefore, and despite the positive aspects that it has experienced throughout its history through obvious obscurity at the scientific level, at the level of prominent political feudal or non-feudal names, or at the literary level—despite all this, the sect did not develop within itself the sectarian mentality until the recent period of Lebanon's history. This period experienced numerous shocks which have created a sectarian mentality among those who had not experienced this mentality and who had been burnt by its fires. The shocks have entrenched a sectarian feeling among those who had already experienced this feeling by one degree or another throughout history.

Shi'ite Council Climate

[AL-NAHAR] When, in your opinion, did this mentality (come to life)?

[Fadlallah] It is very possible to imagine that the Shi'ite sect began to experience sectarian aspirations as of the time when it proceeded to establish the Supreme Shi'ite Council, and in the subsequent conditions which assumed a political or a cultural dimension. But while

moving in this direction, the Shi'ite sect felt ashamed to use the word sect. It tried to surpass this sectarian framework, justifying its orientation with the fact of the Lebanese reality at one time and, another time, with the sect's need to live as a unit side by side with the other units so that the unification could come from the position of the unity of each circle within the sect with the other circles within the sect. But at the same time, the sect remained rebellious against the sectarian mentality. Perhaps the intellectual waves which have lived in the area and which have been nurtured by the political, economic, and security reality within which Lebanon has been moving have opened the windows to an international movement, perhaps Marxism or socialism, to a national movement, perhaps pan-Arabism, or to an Islamic movement, perhaps the Islamic awakening. Through this, the sectarian mentality in the movement of these groups has clashed with new mentalities that have experienced the struggle between confinement within the sectarian organizations of the Lebanese circle and opening up to the reality which has caused Lebanon to experience tremors as a result of every new political or security wave.

But those managing the issue of the Shi'ites' sectarianism tried to give these waves the impression that it is possible to experience intellectual, political, or security lines that use the special rejectionist characteristics within this sect as a basis for finding a place for it within these lines without removing the sect from the sectarian arena. Those managing the issue succeeded in some cases when intellectual or political factions viewed the sectarian climate with the major bannerline that says that a sect which has lived the rejectionist experience in its history can continue to practice this rejectionism without losing its special characteristics by opening up to this or that tendency. All this success was achieved when no acute problem existed in the arena and when the problem was a problem of war of words to which the Lebanese had become accustomed. Political conflicts may have occurred but the problem rarely reflected itself in armed security and military conflicts. This was the case until military development arrived in Lebanon. Violence then became the area's line. It also became the plan of the regional and international policy which imposed itself on the Lebanese reality.

New Experiment

When this climate developed in the Lebanese arena, the Shi'ite Muslims in Lebanon were most open to it, considering that their political experience in the political game—a game which can enter regional, international, and local labyrinths—was a new experience going through its infancy. This experience was thus able to pick up violence through the political reality's movement instead of picking up the political reality to find out where the locations of violence in this reality are and where the locations far from this violence are. Thus, developments in the area and in the world brought Islam out of its tranquillity, its inactivity, its moderation, and its remoteness from the arena of conflict. Initially, the

Shi'ite Muslims moved with this wave in a totally emotional upsurge, especially since the revolution carries in its features or in its bannerline a Shi'ite particularity that evokes pride in those who think at the level of the Shi'ite sect, considering that Iran is the party that has staged the revolution and that Imam Khomeini is the religious figure to whose thinking and jurisprudence the Shi'ites adhere within the context of their adherence to jurists. Shi'ites are bound to the jurists as a jurisprudential authority that stores within itself the inspirations of the bond to the imams. This is why the bond to the Islamic revolution was a complete emotional bond on which no two people disagreed, as was the case at the general Islamic level which was able to share the general Islamic feeling with the Islamic revolution. When the international and regional political lines began to be aware of the danger coming from Iran at the intellectual, political and security level, when the cards began to be reshuffled in this regard, when Muslims began to split into supporters and opponents of this revolution, and when the Shi'ites began to split over the revolution, even outside of Lebanon, according to the tendencies or positions controlling them, the people in Lebanon began to split in the same direction.

[AL-NAHAR] And how do you view this split in Lebanon?

[Fadlallah] A faction that thinks of Islam the same way the Islamic revolution in Iran thinks of it and that lives at the level of changeable feeling has emerged. Meanwhile, another faction that thinks of the Shi'ite line at the level of the Lebanese reality and that is open to the non-Lebanese reality, be it Islamic, Arab, or non-Islamic, has also emerged. This faction does not greatly disagree with the political movement of a Lebanese reality whose features are perhaps lost when it tries to couple itself with some regional positions or whose features perhaps get involved in some cases with conditions that are peculiar to Lebanon.

We can say that the Shi'ite Muslim has been moving in the arena between an orientation that is open to the entire world and that considers Lebanon a part of the Islamic world and an orientation that is open to the Islamic world, but not on the basis that Lebanon should be a part of this world. Even when the Shi'ite Muslim opens up to the Arab world, regardless of some particularities that may impose themselves on the reality, he may feel embarrassed when he speaks of Lebanon as a part of or not a part of the Arab world. It is under this condition that the Hizballah and Amal Movement issue began to assume a dimension that entered into the Lebanese political process at a level that is far from the Shi'ite particulars, especially when Amal's experience with the resistance movement and Hizballah's experience with this movement were raised in one way or another within various slogans and various methods or within some of the Lebanese political reality's particularities that border on Arab or Islamic realities.

Trilateral Reality

In this regard, the Lebanese, Arab, and international political reality has realized that Lebanon has become an arena of conflict for the Islamic issue as it was an arena of struggle for the Arab issue during Jamal 'Abd-al-Nasir's time. Considering that the Islamic issue has assumed for itself numerous symbols—the symbol of terrorism, the symbol of resistance to Israel, the symbol of confronting world imperialism, or the symbol of moving against the reality of the regimes established in the region in one way or another—this struggle in its entirety is held against Iran. The world tried to isolate Iran, to besiege it, to blockade all its positions, and to declare war on it through the Iraq-Iran war.

The international political game then began to look for elements inside the political reality existing within the Shi'ite sect, not to mention the conflicts existing in the Lebanese and Arab conditions, the nature of the personal ambitions here and there, the models that can be exploited through the intrinsic elements which they possess and which make these models fit to be exploited, and the nature of the vocabulary projected by the developed parties that were shaking Lebanon and that were provoking fear and counter-fear within the sects as they provoked them between one sect and another. This is in addition to the particulars of the movement of the regional game in Lebanon's political reality.

Amal-Hizballah Wars

It is through this that wars erupted between Amal and Hizballah—wars nurtured by minor sensitivities in the arena, by minor symbols here and there, and by disagreements over major bannerlines having no basis in reality. For example, when resolution 425, which was embraced by the Supreme Shi'ite Islamic Council, by Amal, by the Lebanese reality in general, and by the Shi'ite reality—when this resolution was projected, it was opposed by Hizballah and a violent conflict ensued over the legitimacy of this resolution and over its openness to peace with Israel, considering that the resolution (either establishes all the UN resolutions in a complete manner or does not come close to doing this or to moving realistically on this issue). A debate ensued, the points were defined, and the conflict proceeded as forcefully as

possible. But nobody paid attention to the fact that resolution 425 was opposed by the United States and that, as a consequence, it was lame internationally and of no significance at the Lebanese level. Yet, the plan was for the internal violence to be nurtured by such unrealistic battles in a manner capable of creating internal problems. There was a war of verbal or speech campaigns as to whether the resistance should march toward Jerusalem or whether it should liberate Lebanon and then let the Jerusalem issue be subjected to the Arab or Islamic strategy or some other strategy.

The conflict reached the point where everybody accused everybody else of treason. But everybody knew that it was unrealistic to ask the resistance, in its capacity as a military resistance movement, to liberate Lebanon from Israel. It may have been realistic for the resistance to weaken the Israeli occupation; it may have been realistic for it to weaken the South Lebanon Army which Israel has embraced in the south; and it may have had the capabilities to grow stronger if integrated with the intifadah or with some other international political conditions. But there could be no liberation of Jerusalem [by the resistance]. This was out of the question at the level of the real movement and the level of the instruments employed by this or that party to accomplish such an objective. Despite this, every faction was scoring points against the other in this connection because the issue was not just an issue raised with such violence for the purpose of focusing the political concept at a broad level or a narrow level. The issue was raised in this manner to encourage the transformation of verbal violence into emotional violence and to entrench the psychological barriers.

Thus, we have noticed that the regional language has sought to expel Iran from all its positions in order to impose control on all the tendencies that have sought to move close to Iran. We have also noticed that this language has sought to fight the terrorism which it considers a political symbol. Through this symbol, it is their intent to fight all the world's liberation movements, especially the Islamic movement, and—to use the west's idiom—to cordon off fundamentalist Islam, considering that Lebanon is the area in which this Islam can express itself more violently and effectively or in a manner that is more open to the world's positions of power.

IRAN

New Plan of Action To Increase Government Worker's Salaries

91AS0064M London KEYHAN in Persian
18 Sep 90 p 3

[Text] Economic service—The wages of workers in offices and organizations, which are covered by the National Employment Law, will be paid henceforth on the basis of the "new working plan." This plan is being implemented to create work incentives for government workers and to please the administrative authorities.

Engineer Mansur Razavi, vice president and general manager of the National Administrative Affairs and Employment Organization, held a press conference yesterday in which he discussed the manner of implementation of the new working plan, and changes in office hours to solve traffic problems. He said:

"Working plan" standards of quality and quantity have been set and announced for all office jobs. The details of this plan have been announced to the offices covered by the National Employment Law, and as of yesterday the offices are required to implement it.

He added: Henceforth the wages and benefits of government workers will be paid based on this standard plan, and based on the set standard every worker who does better and more work will be paid more.

He discussed the wage ceiling according to the standard for government workers. He said: According to the standard set, each government worker in each post and public position will be paid a maximum of twice the designated wages and benefits.

He noted: By order of the president of the republic, the managers of every office that properly implements the plan will be encouraged. Article One on the agenda of the Council of Ministers is to strengthen and perpetuate this plan, which will be submitted to the Majles for final approval.

The vice president said the goals of implementing this project are the creation of suitable financial resources, creating work incentives for government workers, and pleasing the administrative authorities. He added: To solve the Tehran traffic problem and create the necessary opportunity for government workers to take care of personal and family affairs, as of the first of Mehr this year [23 September], office hours will be changed. Based on a measure taken by the Council of Ministers, as of the first of Mehr office hours for government companies and organizations will begin at 8:00, working hours for educational units will begin at 7:30, and banking hours will begin at 8:30. He said: In view of the new working hours, the offices must arrange their own work schedule in such a way that each worker works 44 hours per week.

Children of Freed POW's To Enjoy Special Education Privileges

91AS0064N London KEYHAN in Persian
22 Sep 90 p 22

[Text] KEYHAN Social Service—In a radio and television press conference, the Martyr Foundation cultural assistant and official in charge of educational planning for the children of martyrs announced the educational situation for the children of martyrs, veterans, and former prisoners of war as the new academic year begins.

Engineer Hoseyni began by mentioning the arrival of sacred Defense Week. He said: As a member of the Defense Week Commemoration Staff, the Martyr Foundation has made plans to make these ceremonies as glorious as possible and to honor the families of martyrs. He then congratulated the children of martyrs on the arrival of the new academic year. He said: With the beginning of the new academic year, 75,000 children of martyrs will be studying in 425 high schools and 12 elementary schools throughout the country.

The Martyr Foundation cultural assistant then presented statistics on the number of martyr children covered by the Martyr Foundation's educational facilities. He said: This year 8,050 martyr children are entering first grade. Likewise in the 1368-69 [1989-90] academic year 6,050 students were in pre-school, and in the new academic year this number will be increased to 10,000.

He then noted that, like last year, the children of former prisoners of war will enjoy the educational benefits of the children of martyrs, and he discussed the entry of children of martyrs into the universities. He said: In view of the gathering of 2,000 applicants taking this year's university admissions, held last month, this summer academic reinforcement classes will be held for the children of martyrs and their academic fields will be chosen. At least 60 percent of those using the martyr's stipend entered the university in the month of Mehr [23 September-22 October]. For the remaining 40 percent additional academic reinforcement classes will be held and a new admissions test will be administered for them in Bahman [21 January-19 February], and those accepted will enter the universities.

The official in charge of educational planning for the children of martyrs discussed Martyr University. He said: Martyr University begins its work with 270 students and seven academic programs.

The Martyr Foundation cultural assistant discussed the foundation's education and training activities carried out for the children of martyrs during the summer. He said: The three months of summer were busy ones for the children of martyrs, for 20,000 children and wives of martyrs were sent to holy Mashhad. Likewise, the summer activities staff was formed in Mashhad, which had the responsibility for coordinating educational

activities, and, as in previous years, a special group of fathers and mothers of three or more martyrs was sent to Mashhad.

Likewise a camp for 2,000 of the 8,000 outstanding students was held at Camp Martyr Bahonar. He then discussed the Koran teacher training. He said: Another of our summer programs at the camp was twenty days of training for 600 Koran teachers among the children of martyrs. These dear ones are actively working after completing training in the provinces and the municipalities.

In conclusion, while emphasizing that the expenses obtained by the martyr schools from non-children of martyrs will be paid to the Ministry of Education for pay for services and food. He said: The food and transportation costs of children of martyrs will be paid by the Martyr Foundation. For the brothers and sisters of martyrs, 50 percent will be collected, and it will be free for those with more than two martyrs.

PAKISTAN

A.Q. Khan's Remarks on PAEC Said 'Counterproductive'

91WP0015B Lahore *THE NATION* in English
11 Sep 90 p 2

[Text] Dr Abdul Qadeer Khan's fame as Pakistan's premier scientist can almost be matched only by his ability to make candid statements on the pace of nuclear development in the country. In just such an exercise, in his address at the Pakistan Institute of National Affairs (PINA), the renowned scientist has dismissed our ability to commission the French nuclear reactor by 1997 and discounted the possibility of closing the energy gap by the year 2000 as "too ambitious". Both the statements would appear as complementing each other. If Pakistan's scientific thrust cannot achieve the installation of a nuclear reactor with a 950 MW capacity in the next seven years, it would be a reasonable assumption that it cannot achieve the total target of over 4,000 MW in ten. The reasons given, however, do not create the right impression. Dr Qadeer's contention that the Kahuta Research Project's success in producing nuclear fuel has not been matched by the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission's (PAEC) effort to install its targeted nuclear plants does not send the right signals.

Such statements, made with the best of intentions, create a public impression that the disparity in our targets and achievements in the nuclear energy sector could be based on the lack of coordination between the two wings of the programme. In turn, this can be capitalised upon, by certain quarters, to create misgivings about the viability of selling nuclear technology to Pakistan. It cannot be denied that assurances about the Kahuta Research Project's inability to produce nuclear fuel was an important factor in clinching the French nuclear reactor deal in March. But PAEC's importance in the feasibility study—

providing 20 to 25 percent of components—cannot be underplayed. Any public debate on this department is, therefore, counter productive, merely serving to create international misgivings about a vital development project.

Article Explores Indigenous Nuclear Fuel Manufacture

91WP0015C Lahore *THE NATION* in English
21 Sep 90 p 8

[Article by S. M. N. Zaidi]

[Text] Pakistan has an operating CANDU-type nuclear power plant (KANUPP) for the last 18 years which uses natural uranium as fuel and heavy water as coolant and moderator. The fuel for this plant has been fabricated locally for the past decade. Now, like most other countries of the Western world, it is planning to shift to the more widely used pressurised water reactor (PWR) using slightly enriched uranium as fuel and ordinary light water as coolant and moderator.

Since nuclear fuel constitutes a very important component of a nuclear power plant, the question arises how we can make the required fuel for this type of reactor locally. Will it be as easy as making fuel for KANUPP? Does it involve different materials, technology and knowhow? How soon can we accomplish this task and what are the related economic considerations?

To answer these questions we should first have a clear understanding of what the local manufacture of nuclear fuel involves. Briefly, the main ingredients for manufacturing PWR-type fuel locally are:

- Availability of local uranium,
- Ability to enrich it to about 3-4 percent,
- Facility for converting enriched uranium to fuel pellets,
- Availability of zirconium alloy tubes and plates,
- Fabrication of enriched uranium pellets into fuel assemblies,
- Availability of design and manufacturing knowhow.

Pakistan has been producing uranium from local resources for the past 10 years and has been carrying out sizable exploration drilling, mining and refining activities to meet its current requirements for KANUPP and other programmes. Considerable experience has been gained in all these areas.

However, to meet the requirements of the future nuclear power programme, production will have to be increased by an order of magnitude. To do so, investments will have to be made first on a greatly expanded exploration programme to identify large mineable reserves of high-quality uranium ore. Although Pakistan has extensive favourable geological formations of uranium host rocks, the ore grades discovered so far are of low concentration as compared to the ores obtained in other uranium-exporting countries like Canada, Australia, China, the

USA, the USSR, etc. As a result, the average cost of production of uranium in Pakistan is well above the world market price, which at this stage is particularly low. In fact, uranium is currently selling at around \$10 per pound while the US prices 20 years ago were around \$12 per lb. At these prices only large producers with rich deposits can be competitive. However, this does not mean that a country should depend on imported uranium indefinitely for its nuclear power programme. Intensified efforts should, therefore, be made to locate large reserves of higher concentration for future use.

Pakistan has acquired reasonable capabilities in establishing uranium mines and recovery of uranium from ores. It can design, build and construct uranium mills and produce refined nuclear-grade uranium, which can be used for making fuel pellets. All this required a great deal of research and development spread over 20 years. Processing of about 500 tons of uranium required initially for a 1,000 MW nuclear power plant, as well as the recurring amount of 150 tons per year, should, therefore, not pose any technical problem.

Pakistan has also succeeded in enriching uranium to low grade and, according to published reports, it is technically in a position to produce enriched uranium at the level required (3-4 percent) for our nuclear power plants. However, these facilities have a limited capacity and large investments will be required to expand them to meet the needs of large nuclear power plants. For instance, a 1,000 MW power reactor typically requires an initial fuel inventory of about 73 metric tons of enriched uranium. The enrichment work involved in producing this amount of uranium is about 250,000 to 300,000 separate work or enrichment units (SWU). For building this large capability within the country we have to invest much more. The ultimate question is again the economics of production, the same as we have discussed above in the case of natural uranium. Currently, the cost of uranium enrichment in international market is very low. US supplies are priced at about \$100 per SWU now when some years ago it was about \$160 per SWU. The Soviet Union is reportedly signing contract at \$50 to \$60 per SWU for nuclear power plants abroad.

These low costs can be achieved only with large-scale production facilities employing high technology and low-cost energy. In addition, new technologies are coming which are likely to reduce the enrichment cost still further. Thus, we have to be very careful in deciding where to make large investments; in existing technologies or upcoming new technologies. When our nuclear power programme grows, we will have to face this problem and adopt a long-term strategy in this regard.

The next important consideration in regard to local manufacture of PWR-type fuel is the indigenous capability to produce enriched uranium oxide pellets of exact specification, their cladding and sealing in zirconium alloy tubes and then making complete fuel assemblies of specified quality and design. Pelletisation and cladding

techniques have already been acquired by PAEC [Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission] in connection with the manufacture of KANUPP fuel. Indigenous capability to produce zirconium alloy tubes and plates of precise dimensions has also been developed. It is, however, too early to say whether these products will be competitive with the prices in the international market.

Another important requirement for the manufacture of PWR-type fuel assemblies in Pakistan is the availability of their detailed design. Even if a country has all the materials and techniques mentioned above, it does not mean that it can start manufacturing the fuel because each reactor has a specific core design and requires matching fuel assemblies. In all cases, the fuel elements have to meet very stringent mechanical, material and nuclear specifications with the required precision and tolerances exceeding those encountered in a jet engine.

Then there is the most important question of nuclear safety on which no chances can be taken. This is why advanced countries have spent several decades and billions of dollars on basic research and development and on the design, testing and fabrication of nuclear fuel for their reactors. Consequently, they have proprietary rights over their designs. Countries like France, Germany and Japan could, therefore, start manufacturing fuel locally only after entering into a licensing arrangement with the parent companies in the USA. These countries, however, subsequently improved upon the design to meet their own requirement.

It hardly needs to be emphasised that when it comes to a 1,000 MW reactor, one cannot afford to put untried and untested nuclear fuel in it, as it could not only damage the core and incapacitate the reactor but could also result in total loss of investment.

The question then arises how it was possible for PAEC to make KANUPP fuel. The fact is that KANUPP and PWR fuel designs are very different. KANUPP fuel is in the form of small bundles, which are simple in design and have fewer mechanical constraints. Also, in 1960s, PAEC engineers acquired considerable experience in the design, manufacture and inspection of this fuel in connection with the purchase contract in Canada. Based on this experience, PAEC started an indigenous programme in 1972 for local manufacture of fuel. The programme involved exploration and mining of uranium, establishment of necessary facilities for recovery and refining of uranium and its conversion into pure oxide for pelletisation. A pilot-scale fuel fabrication plant was established at the same time and the technology of pelletisation, fuel cladding and bundle assembly perfected. All these steps took several years of intensive effort making it possible to build a production plant in 1977 and produce the first test bundle in 1978. This bundle was subjected to step-by-step performance tests at KANUPP, starting with extensive experimental work in a rig under cold conditions, then in the outer region of the reactor core where operating conditions of temperature and pressure existed and finally in the centre of the core in

high neutron flux. This was a well-planned, technically sound and cautious approach which paid dividends in the form of trouble-free fuel performance later. As a result, the KANUPP reactor is now operating on 100 percent locally manufactured fuel and thousands of Pakistani bundles have measured up to the international standards.

Unlike the KANUPP fuel, which is in the form of bundles, about half a metre in length, the PWR fuel is several metres long and its design is much more complicated. To manufacture this fuel locally, heavy investment will be necessary in research and development, testing, etc. Alternatively, we may seek transfer of technology, as other countries have done, and manufacture the fuel under licence. This, in fact, could be the most practical approach.

We have now seen in general terms the necessary ingredients involved in the local manufacture of PWR fuel. It is clear that simply having local uranium and some enrichment capability is not enough. If it were so, the Dutch would be making their own fuel, which they are not. Similarly, China would be making its own fuel for the Daya Bay plant, which it is not doing until it has obtained necessary transfer of technology from France or developed its own for such a reactor. So, all the claims of having indigenous capability to manufacture the entire fuel for the proposed 1,000 MW PWR reactor in Pakistan at this stage would be untenable and technically unsound.

Commentary Views U.S. Indecision in Certifying Nuclear Plan

91WP0015E Lahore *THE NATION* in English
23 Sep 90 p 12

[Commentary by Nusrat Javeed; quotation marks as published]

[Text] Islamabad—A US Embassy spokesperson said on Saturday that "President Bush has yet to make up his mind regarding certification of Pakistan's nuclear programme that it was not aimed at military purposes. The Symington Amendment makes it obligatory for the US President to assure American legislators every year in October that a country receiving financial and military assistance from Washington was not engaged in developing nuclear weapons.

This was stated by US sources, when they were approached by *THE NATION* to comment on reports in a section of the Press that during his brief stay in Pakistan Ambassador Oakley had dropped hints that the certification for '90-91 was about to be issued.

Meanwhile, there is a set of informed diplomats in the capital who insist that sudden calling of Pakistan's nuclear brain, Dr A. Qadeer, to China by President Ghulam Ishaq Khan indicated that road blocks were once again being in our nuclear aspiration by the USA and France. [as published]

There already are credible reports claiming that the French are adopting discouraging posture in finalising the financial dimensions of the [Nuclear Power Plant] NPP deal former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto hammered out with President Mitterrand during his visit in February early this year. It is generally suspected that by tough bargaining, the French were in a way conveying their displeasure over August 6 action and developments thereafter.

Pakistan, it seems, is, therefore, telling Paris that it has "alternative sources" to meet its requirement by calling Dr Qadeer to Beijing in a visible manner. It was People's Republic of China which facilitated France to agree to the sale of Nuclear Power Plant without a loud and strong opposition from the West.

Gen (Retd) Imtiaz, one of the close confidants of the former Prime Minister, held fruitful negotiations with China. But they could only produce a 300 mg capacity plant.

After the Chinese agreement of providing Pakistan with the NPP, a strong lobby prevailed in the previous government which desired that France should not be approached for the purpose. It desired that France should rather be pressurised to pay compensation for not fulfilling the agreement signed with Zulfikar Ali Bhutto for the supply of Nuclear Reprocessing Plant because of American pressure.

Prime Minister Bhutto, however, wanted the French to supply a nuclear power plant because French agreement could have vindicated Pakistan's position vis-a-vis its nuclear programme.

Following the Mitterrand-Benazir agreement, some top government negotiators suspected the French would demand "exaggerated rates and quid pro quo in negotiating financial aspects of the NPP deal.

There even were strong rumours in Islamabad that the deal was linked with Pakistan's agreement to buy French made air buses. In a market where a lot of reservations were expressed about the performance of the French civil avionics, particularly after a gory accident in South India, counter air bus lobby found a favourable audience here.

On more than one occasion the COP [Combined Opposition Parties] militants in the dismissed National Assembly agitated against the manner PIA [Pakistan International Airlines] decided to buy the air buses. The "corruption in the PPP" [Pakistan People's Party] gossip was indulged in through a powerful disinformation campaign over the decision of buying the air buses. Even Begum Nusrat Bhutto and Asif Ali Zardari were dragged into the controversy and accusing hints were made against a "French citizen of Iranian origin seeking Pakistan citizenship" who was projected to be very close to the "Iranian roots of Bhutto.

The manner Dr Qadeer Khan was called to Beijing has also inspired some Western Diplomats in Islamabad to suspect that instead of promising a "clean chit" to our nuclear programme. Oakley might have desired that a "group of US Senators, known for opposing Pakistan's nuclear programme in a consistent manner, be permitted to visit" our nuclear installations facilitating "Presidential Certification".

It may be recalled that last year the USA demanded this kind of a visit, but Ms Benazir Bhutto resisted it in a very determined manner.

Ironically, it was Ghulam Ishaq Khan who sought "alternatives" as all powerful Finance Minister of Gen Zia in 1978.

Documents captured by the militant students from the US Embassy in Tehran reveal French-US collaboration against Kahuta. Western journalists and diplomats, including the then French Ambassador in Pakistan, had to suffer "rough" resistance when snooping around Kahuta. The USA blocked aid and assistance in retaliation.

Mr Ishaq Khan visited Moscow and held negotiations with the man considered to be the architect of Indo-USSR collaboration in the power generation areas. He came with strong signals from Moscow that the Soviets were willing to assist Pakistan in overcoming its power related problems and could go to the extent of transferring nuclear power generation technology also.

The situation in Afghanistan, however, froze the deal and from '81 an administration emerged in Washington which appreciated Pakistan's worth in bleeding the Russians in Afghanistan.

There once again is a situation in the Gulf where people anticipate Pak-US coordination in strategic terms. On public level Washington is not sending the matching vibes though.

World Bank and the IMF are being difficult in releasing funds Pakistan crucially needs. We have not been put in the category of countries like Turkey or Jordan deserving sympathetic treatment because of the Gulf fall out. Though some lobbies wanted, the US President is not asking the Congress to write off Pakistan's military debts although he is persuading the Congress for the same in the case of Egypt [as published].

Our sources insist that before "bringing Pakistan into the Gulf game, the USA is going to make last ditch efforts aimed at achieving a Camp David between Islamabad and Delhi, an objective which appears to be extremely elusive.

Commentary Views 'U.S. Nuclear Blackmail' Against Pakistan

91WP0015D Lahore THE NATION in English
23 Sep 90 p 6

[Commentary by Mushahid Hussain: "Oakley's Mission; Reviving the Nuclear Spectre"]

[Text] US Ambassador Robert Oakley's visit to Islamabad had an agenda which is now familiar with Pakistan policy-makers. Far from any focus on the Gulf crisis or Pakistan's disjointed domestic scene, Oakley came with a specific message dealing only with the nuclear issue. His 48-hour journey to Islamabad (he is on vacation in the US till October 5) included meetings at the Foreign Office plus the President, Prime Minister and the Chief of Army Staff.

Oakley's 4-point message to the Pakistani leadership was characteristically blunt and categorical. It reiterated America's long-standing concern on the question of nuclear proliferation and conveyed that "the Bush Administration feels even more strongly than the Reagan Administration" on an issue that has been the single most important cause of friction, and indeed serious divergence of perspective, in bilateral Pakistan-American relations. Given this context Oakley outlined the official US line:

- Pakistan "must freeze all nuclear activities";
- US "concern on the nuclear issue is heightened due to regional tensions" particularly Pakistan-India ties over the Kashmir insurgency;
- This time around, President Bush "might find it difficult to certify that Pakistan is not engaged in a nuclear weapons programme", an annual requirement of American law before aid is cleared for Pakistan;
- If "Bush is unable to provide this certificate, American aid to Pakistan can be affected".

Interestingly, this is the second formal threat from the United States to cut off aid to Pakistan within the last five months, the first being expressed over alleged Pakistani support to the Kashmiri freedom-fighters in Occupied Kashmir. That unsubstantiated allegation would, in the official American perspective, fall in the purview of US laws regarding "terrorism fomented by a state".

The revival of American pressures over the nuclear issue, in terms of timing, should be seen in three contexts. First, the Oakley message came on the eve of President Ghulam Ishaq Khan's Beijing visit. China was the first country to break the US-led international nuclear embargo on Pakistan, which was in place since 1976, when Chinese Premier Li Ping announced in November 1989 that this country would sell a Nuclear Power Plant to Pakistan. Oakley was telling Pakistan, in effect, not to expand nuclear cooperation with China during the Presidential visit.

Second, in the context of the Gulf crisis and Iraq's known chemical and missile capabilities, the US is keen

to lump together the issue of missiles, chemical and nuclear weapons in one package so as to convey that US is against all sorts of proliferation and not just against Iraq, but also its "friends" in the region like Pakistan. However, India and Israel are, of course, exempt from such pressures.

Third, the timing is determined by the impending Bush certification which is due any time after October 1, the beginning of the US fiscal year. The last Bush certification came on October 5, 1989, which allowed US aid worth US\$590 million for Fiscal Year 1990, including US\$230 million in military assistance.

By deploying the ultimate American lever, that of aid, against Pakistan, what does the US hope to achieve? Ironically, this American pressure comes at a time when Pakistani troops have been sent to Saudi Arabia as part of the multinational force operating under the aegis of the US Central Command (CENTCOM). Instead of thanking Pakistan for coming on board the most significant US military build-up in the Third World since the Vietnam War, the American act of reciprocity is renewed arm-twisting on the nuclear issue.

The American design is clear. By seeking to decimate the Iraqi military machine and to pressure Pakistan into acquiescing on the nuclear issue, the United States wants to ensure that a castrated Muslim World will lie prostrate before only two nuclear powers, both of them non-Muslim, Israel and India. Bereft of military teeth, the Muslim World will only have lot of manpower, lot of money (most of it stashed away in Western banks) and lot of "moderate Muslims" ready to do the Americans' bidding and willing to accept the twin hegemony of Israel and India.

For Pakistan, such pressure is simply unacceptable. The US position is based on double-standards, it violates Pakistan's sovereign right to seek all available means for our defence and to top it all, it is designed to weaken our security. The only reason India was deterred from attacking Pakistan during Exercise Brasstacks in 1987 or now during the Kashmir Uprising has been due to fear of Pakistan's nuclear capability. Succumbing to pressure on this count is tantamount to signing off our sovereignty and assuming a permanent client-status vis-a-vis India in South Asia.

In any case, the Americans should be told to dispense with their hypocrisy on this issue, especially when they have consistently and deliberately winked at Israel's nuclear weapons and even India's own covertly expanding programme of developing chemical weapons since 1985, to reinforce its missile and nuclear capability.

Fact Sheet: US Nuclear Blackmail Against Pakistan

August 1976:

Dr Henry Kissinger says US will make "horrible example" of Mr Bhutto if he continues with nuclear programme.

September 1978:

France cancels deal for Nuclear Reprocessing Plant under US pressure.

April 1979:

In a deliberate leak to THE NEW YORK TIMES, the US says it is considering military strike to "disable" Kahuta.

October 1979 and April 1981:

Foreign Minister Agha Shahi refuses to give "No explosion" guarantee to the Americans on Pakistan's nuclear programme.

September 1984:

President Reagan writes to General Zia warning him that if Pakistan's enrichment levels remain "beyond 5 percent" US aid can be affected.

July 1987:

US aid is cut off on the Arshad Pervez Case.

June 1989:

Half of Benazir Bhutto's 50-minute meeting with President Bush at the White House is devoted to "briefing" on Pakistan's "nuclear activities" by CIA Director William Webster.

September 1990:

Ambassador Oakley threatens aid cut if Pakistan "does not freeze" its nuclear programme.

PAEC Chairman Says Nuclear Energy 'Only Option'

91WP0015A Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English
25 Sep 90 p 3

[Text] Islamabad, Sept. 24—Chairman Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission, Munir Ahmed Khan Monday said that nuclear energy was the only viable and environmentally safe alternative for the developing countries to meet their energy requirements.

According to a message, received here, he was speaking at the special ministerial level meeting, held at Vienna recently, in connection with 34th general conference of the International Atomic Energy Commission [IAEC]. He called upon the developed nations to share peaceful nuclear power technology with the developing countries under the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards to help overcome their energy problems.

He said one of the prerequisites of the revival of the nuclear power was through further enhancing its safety with improved design and promoting better understanding among the nations.

Munir Ahmed Khan called for global cooperation in the accelerated development of small and medium power reactors with the Agency playing a co-ordinating role.

The Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission said Pakistan was prepared to cooperate closely with the IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] in its programme for the development of small and medium power reactors. He urged it to pay its attention to crucial energy needs of the developing countries.

The meeting, at Vienna, was attended by the Ministers, vice-Ministers and Heads of Atomic Energy Organisations of 22 countries.—APP

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